2.5.1.1

By saying that discrimination because of the denominational or political ideology someone adheres to is a standard example of thought-related person-centered exclusivism (as we did in 2.4.1), a number of classificational levels of thought-related exism have already been skipped. Following our typification of thought itself (as expounded in I.6.1) the two kinds of thought-related exclusivism to be distinguished first are disciplinary and nondisciplinary thought-related exclusivism (X.78 & 79). The two kinds of disciplinary thought-related exclusivism to be distinguished next are then (inter)ideological exclusivism (X.156) and nonideological disciplinary exclusivism (X.157). And, as we have also differentiated comprehensive ideology or denominationalism and specialist ideology from the beginning on, interideological exclusivism is either specialist ideological or denominational exclusivism (X.312 & 313). The branch of specialist ideological exclusivism of which discrimination because of someone's political convictions is an active affirmative manifestation is politico-ideological exclusivism (X.625).

When speaking of "the discrimination", "exclusion" or "preferential treatment" of people on the grounds of the political or denominational ideology they espouse, or on the grounds of any other thought they may have, the irrelevance of the distinction between them and others is already presupposed in the use of discrimination, exclusion and preferential treatment. This is especially important when the thing rejected, or conceived of as inferior, is not a person or group of people, but a particular thought or system of thought. Whereas it may not be relevant to make a distinction between people on the basis of their thoughts, it may be 'highly relevant' to make a distinction between these thoughts or systems of thought themselves. Thus it is on the grounds of the principle of discriminational relevance itself that irrelevantist systems of thought are inferior in a normative sense. Hence, we have every reason not to associate ourselves with them, since we have an inclusivistic alternative. Yet, this does by no means imply that we would have a reason to always reject a whole person who thinks in exclusivist terms. To reject a person as person 'e would have to impinge upon our own or someone else's right to personhood. So long as no right of personhood is impinged on, it should be possible for every inclusivist to coexist with an exist.

For us as adherents of a denominational doctrine, the prime mover of all exclusivist matter is thought-related subanthropic exism on the basis of someone else`s denominational convictions or someone`s own denominational presuppositions. Yet, before dealing with the basics of this manifestation of ideological exism, we should briefly discuss the manifestations of thought-related subanthropic exism which are not denominational first. Formally speaking, those nondenominational manifestations are not only the specialist ideological ones, but also nondisciplinary and nonideological, disciplinary thought-related exism and even disciplinary and ideological, thought-related exism in general. (In this sense, exclusivisms which are not denominational encompass denominational exism: they need not be undenominational.) Nonetheless, we shall confine ourselves to politico-ideological exclusivism.

The unitary manifestation of politico-ideological person-centered exclusivism is exism re someone or people distinguished on the basis of 'er or their belonging to a politico-ideological group. The comparison is then not with people of other political groups, as in the case of the compositional manifestation of it, but with people distinguished on the basis of other ideological or nonideological characteristics. If aggrandizemental and sentimental, unitary, that is, interfactorial, politico-ideological exism becomes manifest in an exclusive or disproportionate attention for, or preoccupation with, people distinguished on the basis of their belonging to a political group. Typical of this exism is a preoccupation with the persecution or discrimination of people on account of their political affiliation as distinct from the persecution or discrimination of people on other grounds. For example, to call a society "a free society" merely because people are not persecuted for, or discriminated against on the basis of, their political convictions, is only one instance of interfactorial politico-ideological exism. (To call it "a free society" because people are not persecuted for their religious convictions either is only an instance of a little bit broader type of interfactorial ideological exism.) The minimum society that may be called "free" in this respect is a society in which people are not discriminated against on the basis of their (ideological) convictions in any way, whether these convictions are political or nonpolitical, religious or nonreligious, and whether in an affirmative way, in an exemplary way or by means of the state`s phraseology and symbolism, that is, in an intermediary way.

Infrafactorial politico-ideological exism has been classified as "compositional" because the 'thought' to which it is related may be of several types. Firstly, it may be a political doctrine in the strict, theoretical sense. Political doctrine-related (person-centered) exclusivism (X.1251) is, then, exism re someone or people adhering to a particular political doctrine, or re a characteristic concomitant with adherence to such a doctrine (but not re that doctrine itself). Secondly, the 'thought' concerned may be that of a political party, however inconsistent or pragmatic. Thus political party-related (person-centered) exclusivism (X.2501) is exism re someone or people sympathizing with a certain political party, or re a characteristic quality of members or sympathizers of such a party. The worst form of party-related exclusivism is apparently the ideological exclusionism of a one-party state, that is, a state in which only one political party is permitted and recognized. Yet, it is not necessarily the case that the leaders of such a one-party state suffer more from politico-ideological exclusivism than those of a multi-party state or country in which only one party is outlawed. Maybe, the one party in the one-party state happens to admit of a greater internal diversity of opinions than the two or so legal parties manage to represent in a multi-party state.

We thus touch on the complicated subject of 'democracy', that is, democracy not only for those with whom the powerful agree but also for those with whom they disagree, and democracy not only for the rich and educated but also for the poor and illiterate or less educated. Altho we cannot discuss this subject further here, it is obvious --also from our brief discussion of it in the previous chapter-- that politico-ideological exclusivism is certainly not the only manifestation to be blamed where democracy has failed. There have always been, or still are, people in power who exclude, or try to exclude or discredit, fellow citizens on the basis of many other factors than the political ideology they adhere to. One such factor, and a most important one, is their denominational belief. This factor does not only concern the denominational convictions they used to have in the past, it concerns not less the ones they presently have, and the ones they will have in the future.