If denominationalism is not used in the sense of (adherence to a) comprehensive ideology but in an unfavorable sense, it is a synonym of denominational exclusivism (X.313). The three main criterions to differentiate the types of denominational exclusivism are the same ones as the main criterions to differentiate the types of denominational doctrine. They relate to questions of (1) primacy, (2) principle and (3) principalship.

The first criterion, that of primacy, has not yet been mentioned at all, and its proper treatment has to be postponed until a later chapter. It applies to a fundamental choice which every denominational doctrine, or everyone choosing such a doctrine, has to make: the choice between (a) the belief that a universal norm or norms did, do and will exist independently of their being propagated by some authority, and (b) the belief that it is some authority who made or makes the universal norm(s). In other words: do i believe in the right norm(s), or do i trust in an authority because i believe that 'e has chosen the right norm(s) versus are norms right because an authority i trust in has chosen and recommended them, or recommends them. Those who opt for the first alternative implicitly or explicitly give primacy to the normative; those who opt for the second one give primacy to the authoritative. As we will see, denominationalists of the former persuasion can be called "normists", whereas those of the latter persuasion are 'theocentrists'.

The second criterion, that of principle, is easier to explain. It relates to the principle(s) or kind of principle(s) which a particular denominational doctrine embraces or violates, whether under the (belief in the) primacy of the normative, or under the (belief in the) primacy of the authoritative. To typify our own denominational doctrine as "an inclusivistic one" is to use a criterion of principle, the principle being that of discriminational relevance interpreted in a neutralistic way.

The third criterion, that of principalship, has to do with the principal being(s) playing a role in a particular comprehensive ideology. If such an ideology starts from the primacy of the authoritative, it must have at least one principal being, namely the authority on whose will and decisions the rightness of norms is believed to depend. Thus the belief in the primacy of the authoritative implies a belief in principalship if someone does adhere to a denominational doctrine at all. (If someone believes in the primacy of the authoritative, but does not 'see' any god or other authority, it will lead to nondenominationalism.) Conversely, the belief in principalship does not imply that one believes, or has to believe, in the primacy of the authoritative. That is why principalship is another criterion than primacy. We will discuss denominational exclusivism which is somehow related to principalship in the next section.

The disjunctive manifestations of primacy-related (person-centered) denominational exclusivism (X.1252) are theocentrist- and normist-person-centered exclusivism (X.1252.14 & 15). These manifestations are disjunctive instead of lateral, because one cannot consistently believe in the primacy of both the normative and the authoritative at the same time. (Someone may be so inconsistent as to believe in the primacy of the normative with respect to one principle and that of the authoritative with respect to another, but then it does not make sense to classify the exism as "primacy-related".) An ancient form of external abnegational normist-person-centered exclusivism is the description of normists who do not believe in the authority of any god or someone's own god as "atheists", or worse, in a derogatory way. Judging atheist by its literal meaning, however, the exism is rather a form of principalship-related denominationalism. But then, of course, all these types of denominational exclusivism are too closely connected to be treated differently by the biased believer. 'Er Authority, Law and Principal Being are a sacred trinity that is certainly not meant to be taken apart.

As regards principle-related (person-centered) denominational exclusivism (X.1253) we will only consider one principle and unitary manifestation of it. The principle is truth, and the criterion not so much whether truth is recognized or not (because every ideology does this in name), but the way in which it is interpreted. In the denominational field this underlies the distinction between supernaturalist or religious and nonsupernaturalist or nonreligious doctrines. (On our model supernaturalism is a denominational violation of the principle of truth, but for the purpose of this classification it suffices to speak of a different interpretation of this principle.)

When truth or supernaturalism is the principle, principle-related denominationalism is religiousness-related (person-centered) denominational exclusivism (X.2507). The disjunctive manifestations of this unitary exism are religion-related (person-centered) exclusivism (X.2507.14) and irreligious-person-centered exclusivism (X.2507.15). We say "religion-related" because religious-person-centered exclusivism (X.2507.28) has still to be distinguished from religion-based (person-centered) exclusivism (X.2507.29). Religious-person-centered refers to the distinction between religious and irreligious people, whereas religion-based refers to the distinction between (people of) the one religion and (of) the other. 'Religionism' is aggrandizemental religion-related exclusivism, whether religious-person-centered or religion-based. (Hence, a 'religionist' is not just someone adhering to a religion but someone discriminating on the basis of adherence to religion, or to a particular religion.) As is generally the case with disjunctive manifestations of the same type, the aggrandizemental component of the one corresponds de facto to the abnegational component of the other. Thus aggrandizemental religious-person-centered exclusivism or religious exclusivism (X.2507.28.2), that is, exism re religious people who are believed or felt to be superior or good on the whole corresponds to abnegational irreligious-person-centered exclusivism (X.2507.15.3), that is, exism re non- or irreligious people who are believed or felt to be inferior, if not wicked. (Irreligious may be used instead of nonreligious here because it is now subject to an exclusivist attitude or practise.) Similarly, aggrandizemental irreligious-person-centered exclusivism or irreligious exclusivism (X.2507.15.2), that is, exism re irreligious people who are believed to be superior or good on the whole corresponds to abnegational religious-person-centered exclusivism (X.2507.28.3).

Altho we believe that supernaturalism is a violation of the principle of truth and that the human mind should therefore be purged of it, it is religious belief itself which must be considered normatively inferior because of its being supernaturalistic. This religious belief should not be confused, however, with the religious person adhering to such a belief: 'e may even be normatively superior because of 'er good conduct in other respects. And if 'e isn't, it is 'er right of personhood to have religious convictions. Should a religious person voluntarily ask to be exorcized 'imself of spiritual ideas which are inconsistent or too implausible to be true, or to have remained true, we may assist 'im. Yet, we must not force such an operation on 'im. In the event that these spiritual ideas are, and remain, the evil cause of 'er own infringements of other people's rights of personhood, there are always suitable measures which can be taken. (Unlike certain sacred books of religious or monotheist ideology, none of the books of this Model calls for the wholesale slaughter of denominational opponents, neither literally nor figuratively.)

The encroachment by religious people upon the moral rights of personhood of other religious and of nonreligious people, especially in countries where the majority of the citizens were, or still are, religious, is an affirmative manifestation of active self-aggrandizing religionism. The gravest and most bloody examples of this religionism have been the civil and international wars between people or nations fighting in the name of a different god, or in the name of the same god, but for different socioeconomic and national interests. This religion-based exclusivism, however, is only one aspect of religion-related exism. Warfare amongst religious believers themselves may be a serious affirmative manifestation of it, yet we must not forget the intermediary manifestations which prepare those believers for such affirmative actions.

An intermediary manifestation of religious-person-centered exism is the employment and propagation of religious symbols by the state (whether or not in connection with religious feasts). The evaluative opposite of this emblematic manifestation and of all similar, nonemblematic manifestations of religionism is abnegational religious-person-centered exism, which involves the encroachment by nonreligious people upon the moral rights of personhood of religious people. What it does not involve, however, is the nonuse of religious symbols by the state even tho religious fanatics have but too often claimed that such nonuse would be antireligious. Time and again these unteachable out-and-outers have to be told that the state has to represent citizens of all denominations, and citizens of no denomination, by not exclusively associating itself with the denominational belief of any group in particular. When governments that do not allow the display of religious emblems in public buildings and during public ceremonies display the emblems of a party-political ideology instead, this is in itself not abnegational religious-person-centered exism, but a brand of politico-ideological exclusivism. Such is no better nor worse than religionism.