In a strict, direct sense it is impossible to alter the happiness-catenary state of a sentient being, even if one wanted to. One just cannot give it units of happiness, or take units of happiness or happiness-catenality away from it. It is only the condition, and hopefully the situation, of a happiness-catenal which one can change, and it is such a change in condition which may affect its happiness-catenary feelings. If the catenal's condition is neutral and 'good' in a badness-catenary sense, there is no reason to alter it. The catenal in question is then 'well', that is, healthy or in a desirable state. Some say that a human being in such a healthy state does not feel any separate parts in her or his body, but is aware of this body 'as an integrated whole'. When it is subsequently claimed, however, that this awareness would generate 'a feeling of well-being and happiness', the awareness must either be an occasional one or, if permanent, must generate (a feeling of) well-being and nanhappiness instead. To equate well-being with happiness --as in this example-- could solely be correct on the implausible, absolute view of the relationship between happiness-catenary and situational catenality. Since we cannot change happiness-catenary states but only conditions, the term well-being should even for this reason be applied to a condition, or situational state, and not to a happiness-catenary one. The situation which then represents well-being is the neutral state. According to 'the norm of well-being', a subnorm of the norm of neutrality, it is this state of well-being which is normatively superior. And it is this well-being which may be brought about, and which must be brought about, if anything. (From this it does not follow that when we try to promote a catenal's well-being in one respect, that it could not for contingent, empirical reasons be detrimental to the catenal's well-being in another respect.)

Hedonists or eudaimonists might object that even tho one cannot directly offer a catenal happiness, or more happiness, one can manipulate its conditions in such a way that it is made to feel happy. But if happiness is indeed a situational guiding-signal, and unhappiness a situational warning-signal, it is rather odd --to say the least-- to consider it one's goal to have a signal flash as frequently and as long as possible, and to use the thing it conveys information about (the catenal's situation) merely as a means. Hedonists and eudaimonists of the perfective end type must, then, too blithely be turning things upside down. On the argument from the function of happiness-catenality, happiness and unhappiness themselves may only be used as means to attain, or to establish how to attain, a good situation. Happiness is on this account an instrumental (antepenultimate) value, while the good situation itself, or well-being, is the (penultimate) perfective value. Hence, the norm of well-being is compatible with a form of instrumental or nonperfective hedonism or eudaimonism, even tho pleasure and happiness are not neutralities in themselves.

Perfective hedonists and eudaimonists might now still argue that the happiness catena is a basic catena and that happiness-catenary polarity is not a sign of anything. This, however, would not yet force the neutralist who adheres to the subnorm of well-being to completely reject happiness. If the neutralist said that happiness (like unhappiness) is inferior to nanhappiness this is, or would be, true all other things being equal. But given that there is a special relationship between happiness-catenality and all situation catenas, this ceteris paribus clause never holds. For happiness cannot be combined with every kind of situation or situational change; it can solely be combined with a good situation or situational improvement. Where there would be inferior happiness, there is superior well-being or a change in the direction of superior well-being. Now, as it is only the situation which can be changed, or left the same, we have no reason to alter a state of well-being, or to refrain from changing a situation in the direction of such a state, regardless of whether it is accompanied by a feeling of happiness or not.

(Hedonists or eudaimonists cannot argue that the ceteris paribus clause could hold with respect to the situation catenas. For if that were possible, there would not be any relationship between happiness-catenary and situational catenality. But in that case hedonists and eudaimonists themselves would have no means at all anymore to promote pleasure or happiness, the ultimate or perfective values of their own doctrines.)