So far as happiness-catenals and their situations are concerned, a neutralistic hatred of pain or unhappiness is an unconditional one, and so is a neutralistic love of good, neutral situations; but a neutralistic love of pleasure or happiness is a conditional one. It is an intrinsic duty to improve the situations of human or other sentient beings when these situations are not good in a neutral sense. Improving these situations is nanaic, and striving for their improvement anafactive. Where there is pain and suffering, because human or other sentient beings find themselves in a deteriorating or bad situation, it is an intrinsic duty to alleviate or relieve the pain and suffering of these happiness-catenals. Where there is pleasure or contentment, because human or other sentient beings find themselves in a situation which is ameliorating or good in neutral terms, we may be satisfied as well.

To promote the well-being of happiness-catenals and to take away their pain and suffering is 'doing or producing good' in traditional terms. In other words, the duty to be anafactive with respect to their bad situations, and with respect to their unhappiness, is a duty to be beneficent. Beneficence is nothing else than intentional anafaction of the situational type. The motivational value corresponding to it is benevolence that is, the disposition to be beneficent. If happiness and situational neutralization are indeed inseparable, beneficence in the sense of situational anafaction need not differ much from utilitarian happiness or utility in practise (except in the marginal cases discussed earlier). Also other nonutilitarians have often explicitly recognized a (semi-)utilitarian principle of beneficence besides, for example, a nonutilitarian 'principle of just distribution'. In this way it was, and still is, possible to incorporate that part of utilitarianism which is most convincing. One ethical theorist has correctly pointed out that the principle of beneficence is 'the more basic principle' which must underlie the principle of utility. This latter principle (that one should bring about the greatest possible balance of eudaimonist good over eudaimonist evil) emphasizes that one ought to do good and to prevent or avoid harm. Since the ideal to do only good, and not to do any harm, is often impossible in practise, one is in those instances that it is impossible forced to bring about the best possible balance of good over evil -- it is argued. This argument amounts to exactly the same as what has been said above: not the total or average value (utility in this case) is the ultimate one but each individual value. In this respect individualized forms of consequentialism (which are still identity-independent, however) are much more plausible than an individuality-denying form of consequentialism such as utilitarianism.

It has been suggested that it follows from the principle of beneficence, firstly, that 'one ought not to inflict harm'; secondly, that 'one ought to prevent harm'; thirdly, that 'one ought to remove what is bad'; and fourthly, that 'one ought to do or promote good'. On such an account the reason to be beneficent is in neutralistic terms that one ought not to worsen any human or other sentient being's situation, or to make it unhappy (the minimum requirement of nonactivating neutralism); that one ought to prevent that this happens; that one ought to improve such a being's situation, if it is unhappy, and if its situation is not good in a neutral sense; and that one ought to improve such a being's situation, if its situation is not good in a neutral sense even when it does not feel unhappy (the severest requirement of activating neutralism).

For utilitarians utility, and therefore beneficence, is a duty in all respects (that is, if they use the term duty at all); for many anti-utilitarian deontologists beneficence is only something supererogatory, or if not beneficence in general, at least the normative condition that one ought to do or promote good. The deontological tendency to lift beneficence beyond the call of duty may be a very convenient one, the idea of a supererogatory duty is an artificial device which only blocks or hampers the operation of a doctrinal principle. It is the dire consequence, firstly, of confusing the doctrinal aspect of morality with the metadoctrinal one; and secondly, of neglecting or ignoring the activating interpretation of doctrinal principles. From a metadoctrinal angle every doctrinal or intrinsic duty which requires more than noninterference is, indeed, in a sense 'supererogatory', but the principle of beneficence is a doctrinal principle, and we are not in this context concerned with extrinsic considerations. From a doctrinal angle it does make quite a difference whether the duty connected with the principle of beneficence is activating or nonactivating. But to say that it can be either activating or nonactivating is something else than saying that it must definitely be nonactivating. It is precisely in the latter case that every anafactive (or 'positive') action becomes 'supererogatory' without further ado. In the former case, however, the activating duty always remains, if not in the foreground, at least in the background. Moreover, even where it concerns the activating interpretation of the duty of beneficence, there is no reason to hold that the moral agent's or decision-maker's modal condition would not count anymore. Nor is there a reason to hold that all happiness-catenals would be subject to equally intense feelings of happiness and unhappiness, and that they would all experience the same conditions in the same way. (Here we touch on issues whose treatment, or partial treatment, we will have to postpone until the chapter on life and nonlife.)

The principle of utility is not part of the neutralistic doctrine, because we do not believe in sum totals which are ultimate, and because we do not believe in happiness as a perfective value. Yet, where we do strive for the minimization of unhappiness, and the improvement of situations (an improvement which probably will be accompanied by happiness), utility can indeed play a role. This role, however, lies only in the way it deals with the practical application of the principle of beneficence where beneficence in one respect is maleficence in another. The fact that one and the same act can do good here and harm there is a contingent, empirical one, and also therefore utility does not belong to a normative doctrine as an ultimate value. But when trying to implement what such a doctrine prescribes, it is evidently a very important factual-modal condition to take into account, and we, too, will have to do this. Thus on the whole only that action may be regarded as nanaic which produces more situational amelioration than deterioration (and which does not cause more unhappiness than happiness). This is a rule which does not only apply to the different situations of different happiness-catenals; it also applies to the situations of one and the same happiness-catenal at different times. Where it is sure or probable that the betterment of a catenal's situation in the short term is substantially greater or smaller than the worsening of its situation in the long term, or vice versa, only that action must be regarded as nanaic which yields more situational betterment than worsening over the whole life-time of the catenal in question.

In theory it is the well-being of all happiness-catenals at all times which matters, but in practise the anafactive agent has, of course, limited means and a limited knowledge of what the effects of 'er action will be. This may be a reason to pay special attention to situations 'here and now', yet it can never be a reason to pay no attention to situations far away in other parts of the world or in the future, for it is often the case that one can be quite sure that one's actions will be beneficent, or for that matter maleficent, to foreign peoples or future generations. And where there is insufficient guarantee that the distant effects of one's action will be beneficial ones, it is not seldom possible to first exert one's influence to get such a guarantee, or to make these effects probable. Such action, too, is, if not nanaic, at least anafactive.

Utilitarianism (and indirectly also theories of beneficence and well-being) is a much favored instrument of exclusivist sociobiologists and other ideologues of naturalness who would like to get rid of certain groups of human beings, or certain kinds of human phenomena or policies, altogether. (Particularly, the equality of men and women and of hetero- and homosexuals are thorns in their flesh.) Rather than callously appealing to some ancient, sacred book that commands the extermination and subjugation of certain minorities and (near-)majorities, they prefer a more 'objective' approach to warrant their attitude by arguing that the human beings concerned 'must be' unhappy, or that the phenomena or policies at issue cause such unhappiness. (The 'pleasant resemblance' between a religious book of the brand in question and utilitarianism is that neither one recognizes an independent right to personhood.)

There may be numerous objections against any assumption that certain groups of human beings would be, or would have to be, unhappy (or more unhappy than other groups), or that certain kinds of human phenomena or policies would on balance cause more unhappiness than happiness (or more than other phenomena or policies), that is, even in a society in which no-one would be discriminated against. This is an 'empirical' issue we cannot deal with here, altho such an assumption betrays more of the human being doing the assuming him- or herself than of the reality talked about. The informative point is, first of all, that beneficence in its activating form requires that the situations of people, or groups of people, who 'are so unlucky to be unhappy' be improved. Secondly, so far as the phenomena themselves are concerned, one must even from a purely utilitarian point of view not only look at people's state of being happy or unhappy, but also at their real or potential contribution to happiness and unhappiness in general. Perhaps, people who are creative, physically less aggressive and more critical of what the majority presumably have always believed to be normal are on the average also unhappier. But, perhaps, it is also these very same unhappy people who create more beautiful things, who cause less misery to others, and who are more likely to discover what has made human beings unhappy in the past, or to ascertain what will not make them happy anymore in the future. Naturally, to simply take all these things for granted would not be less exclusivistic, and our own prejudgment shall be neither abnegational nor aggrandizemental. What leaves utilitarianism in a sad state here is that it is often in practise not even the principle of utility which counts; what often seems to have the greatest weight instead is a utilitarian's or pseudo-utilitarian's own personal preference for the one empirical presupposition over the other.

Altho the principle of utility is preceded by a principle of beneficence, neither utility nor beneficence is a perfective value for us. Beneficence is situational anafaction and therefore a corrective-instrumental value. It is well-being which is the situational perfective value. Hence we speak of "a norm of well-being" and not of some "norm of beneficence". The formulation of such a norm would merely suggest that beneficence itself were an ultimate or perfective value, and this would only support those who have claimed that it is good that there is evil in the world, so that people are able to show their benevolence by means of good deeds. According to the norm of neutrality it is the situations of people or sentient beings which have primary significance, and good deeds are of secondary importance and not ends in themselves.

Those who have recognized a principle of beneficence have also argued that beneficence (and certainly utility) is not enough, but that a proper morality also requires some principle of distributive justice or equality. Just as the principle of beneficence is roughly the equivalent of the norm of well-being, so this latter principle of justice or equality is roughly the equivalent of the so-called 'norm of interpersonal equality', another subnorm of the norm of neutrality. We are now going to take a closer look at this equality and at what it is supposed to mean in a social context.