Not all egalitarians are equal. The first distinction to be drawn is that between those egalitarians for whom socioeconomic equality is one value besides others, like well-being or happiness, and those for whom equality would be the sole value. The second distinction to be drawn is that between those egalitarians for whom equality is an intrinsic value subject to extrinsic, right-theoretical considerations and those for whom equality is, if not the sole value, a value which is merely to be balanced against other values of the same (doctrinal) nature. As should have become plain from the anti-egalitarian objections discussed above, egalitarianism of the monistic type, and of the type which does not allow for metadoctrinal considerations, cannot be seriously adhered to. But even the egalitarians now left over, are not all equal. A third distinction must be drawn: that between relevantist egalitarianism and the traditional form of what might be labeled "absolute egalitarianism". Traditional egalitarianism has been attacked because of its absolute priority given to equality as an outcome. Yet, this objection could only be raised after divorcing traditional egalitarianism's principle of equality from that of relevance which often was implicit in it as well. In any adequate egalitarian doctrine this interplay of the principle of equality and the principle of relevance is of paramount importance, however. And it certainly is in the neutralist doctrine with its relevantist interpretation of the principle of neutrality, and thus of the principle of equality.

According to the ananorm one should strive for nothing else than neutrality, unless an unneutral end serves a more urgent neutral end. In the present context this means that one should strive for interpersonal equality, unless inequality serves the ananormatively superior neutrality of a different aspect. Such another neutral end may be well-being in a neutral sense but also another form of equality, especially proportional equality. It may be that it is reasonable not to distribute equal shares but shares proportionate to people's merits, needs, and so on. Nonetheless, such proportionality is itself a form of equality again in another respect. For example, if one person has worked 10 hours for someone else or for some collective body, and the other 5 hours, it would be equality in an absolute sense if they were paid the same. To pay the first person twice as much as the second, however, is to pay these people the same hourly wage, starting from the assumption that not the mere fact that someone has worked for someone else or for a collective body is what counts, but the number of hours 'e has worked. This is not to argue, of course, that the number of hours worked could be the only relevant factor. The time worked, for instance, need not be the same as the amount of work done.

Given that our equality is not necessarily an absolute equality in outcome, some might suggest that our egalitarianism is nothing else than relevantism without a principle of equality. Those who suggested this, however, would not have understood the basics of the theory of relevancy and the considerations which have led us from the principle of discriminational relevance to the norm of inclusivity. The role of the principle of equality (or the egalitarian interpretation) vis-à-vis the principle of relevance is that it provides a basis of inherent justification. Relevantism in itself does not tell us that we should opt for equality and only deviate from equality if it can be justified; relevantist egalitarianism does. Within the confines of egalitarianism, any distinction made must be relevant with respect to (another) end of equality, that is, some form of proportionality; within the confines of neutralism in general, any distinction made must be relevant with respect to (another) end of neutrality. Neutral, unless neutral is the motto of neutralism, equal, unless equal that of our relevantist egalitarianism. Evidently, unless neutral is short for unless a distinction can be drawn which is relevant to an ananormatively superior neutral end and unless equal for unless a distinction can be drawn which is relevant to an end of equality in the context concerned.

How does relevantist egalitarianism relate to the theory that there would be two different sorts of right to equality which people (or citizens as individuals) are supposed to have? Firstly, there would be 'the right of equal treatment', that is, to an equal portion of some benefit or burden; and secondly, there would be 'the right of treatment as an equal', that is, 'to be treated with the same respect and concern as anyone else'. The latter right has even been described as "fundamental" and the former one as "derivative", since the 'right to treatment as an equal' may, but does not always, entail a 'right to equal treatment'. This theory which proposes to cleave the right to equality asunder into two rights, one fundamental and one derivative, is really a muddled way of expressing what is nothing else than the position of relevantist egalitarianism (except that the terminology of the proposal is more poetic than analytic). What it all amounts to is that people should be treated equally unless there is a relevant difference between them. The intrinsic right concerned is simply one right. (Note that it is said that people should be treated with the 'same' respect and concern. But what does same mean in practise if it is not related to equality or proportionality of treatment? If there are three persons who are not different in any relevant respect and the first two are each given one half, and the third one nothing, of a certain product, then all three are still treated as a person, assuming that their rights to personhood are not infringed. That they are not treated 'with the same respect' is because they are not given their equal share. And they are treated with the same respect nevertheless, even when not given an equal share, if there are relevant differences between them and if these differences justify the difference in treatment.)

Some theorists have not only distinguished equal treatment from treatment as an equal but also a so-called 'comparative and a 'noncomparative' notion of equality. Thus, if a state tortured a person, it would violate the latter type of equality. This violation would still occur if the state in question tortured every person. The violation would, then, only be multiplied -- it is said. Equality understood in this noncomparative way denotes, of course, nothing else than personhood and the principle connected with it is nothing else than the metadoctrinal principle underlying the right to personhood or the 'right to treatment as a person'. It is someone's right of personhood which is impinged upon when 'e is tortured, regardless of whether other persons are tortured too. Altho this noncomparative form of so-called 'equality' may indeed be termed "constitutional", it is only moral in an extrinsic sense. In the neutralist doctrine, on the other hand, equality is a doctrinal value and the right to equality an intrinsic right not to be confused with the right to personhood.

Even when confining oneself to equality between people, that is, interpersonal equality, the recognition of equality in itself is evidently still subject to many different interpretations. The principle of socioeconomic or interpersonal equality is a principle common to widely divergent stripes of egalitarianism, and it can therefore be advisable to underscore our relevantist position by speaking of "the (sub)norm of interpersonal equality". As a subnorm of the norm of neutrality, this interpreted principle of equality also stresses that if people are not treated equally in an absolute sense, the difference in treatment should be relevant to another end of equality, or more generally, another end of neutrality. A very important goal in the social or interpersonal field is, then, people's well-being. Theoretically, the overall situation in a state of absolute, socioeconomic equality might be much worse than in a state in which socioeconomic differences are allowed to exist. If these modal conditions do indeed hold, then socioeconomic differences are allowable if, and insofar as, they are relevant to people's well-being (not merely correlate with it). But well-being is in such a case not the sole intrinsic value; also equality in itself remains an intrinsic value. Total well-being and equality have in such a case to be balanced against each other as the norm of well-being and the norm of interpersonal equality are then contradictory. (In the last chapter we will discuss how to deal with conflicts between the subnorms of neutrality, and between the norm of neutrality and other principles.)

Nanapolarity with respect to the norm of interpersonal equality is interpersonal difference-catenary nanapolarity. The corresponding decision-theoretical values are intentional and motivational, interpersonal difference-catenary anafactiveness. When anafactiveness in the field of interpersonal relations is a general phenomenon, the unity of interests and feelings characterized by the genuine concern for each other's well-being can be called "siblinghood" or "solidarity". Siblinghood transcends the brotherhood or (brotherhood and) sisterhood of exclusivist ideologies, while solidarity stresses the unity of the social whole. (Solidum from which it derives, means whole sum and is akin to holos which means whole or safe.) The community of interests and objectives so typical of solidarity does in the case of anafactive motives not issue from the mere fact that people with selfish interests realize that they are mutually interdependent nonetheless. Instead, it issues from a solid adherence to neutral principles, and from a common choice of neutral objectives. Anafactive members of a group, community or society show solidarity of neutral purpose. In interpersonal relations this solidarity consists first of all in interpersonal equality. Where they have to confront anti-egalitarian ideologies or doctrines, the siblings of the ananorm shall not yield to the imposition of any kind of inequality which relevantist egalitarianism cannot justify. Given that they will respect other people's rights of personhood so long as their own rights of personhood will be respected too, they shall not compromise. For there is no compromise between inequality and equality: those who propose a compromise between inequality and equality, propose inequality.