RESPECT
 
To have no respect for respect when it means 'honor',
and to respect nothing,
and to disrespect nothing,
is neutrality.

To have respect for respect when it means 'concern',
and to respect everything,
and to disrespect nothing,
is inclusivity.

Every denominational doctrine requires respect for what it values, or condemns disrespect with regard to what it values. Thus our own denominational doctrine condemns disrespect with regard to inclusivity, neutrality, truth and all values derived from and associated with these three. Traditional, denominational and other doctrines are not capable, however, of distinguishing the absence of respect and of honor from disrespect and from dishonor. Their lack of catenical discernment makes them equate a concept like lack of respect, in which respect is a positive notion, with the negative notion disrespect (not to speak of rudeness). In the eyes of their adherents dishonorable does not only mean disgraceful or shameful (which is correct) but also having no honor. The underlying, ignorant conception is that there would only be two possibilities: a person either actively shows respect and has honor in some positive sense, or 'e is disrespectful and dishonorable. (When describing this position, it would probably be more appropriate not to speak of "a person and 'er honor" but of "a man and his honor".) Now, on the catenical model disrespect is not simply a negation of respect but its opposite. Similarly, dishonor is not some universal negation, or aspect-negation, of honor but also its opposite. Not showing respect is therefore not necessarily being disrespectful, and not having honor is therefore not necessarily being dishonorable. Only those who still base their conception of truth on the antonymical metaphysics of the dialectical yang-yin brand can seriously maintain this. The doxastic truth they respect is not the truth we respect.

Closely related to the concepts of honor and respect is the concept of reputation. Where reputation does not mean anything else than the opinion people in general have about a person, group or institution, there is, from a normative perspective, nothing right in having a so-called 'good' reputation or wrong in having a so-called 'bad' reputation. Being highly esteemed in a certain subculture for one's orthodox, exclusivist attitude and behavior, for instance, is nothing valuable. But when a person, group or institution is judged by the values of a particular normative doctrine, and it has a good reputation then, it means that the person or social entity in question wholly conform to the standards of that doctrine, or at least more than the average person or social entity. In the event that good is used in a badness-auxiliary sense, one must indeed conform entirely; in the event that it is used in a goodness-auxiliary sense, then much more often than on the average. In the latter case it is also possible to 'increase' one's good reputation.

As one would expect, adherents of every ideology --also ours-- are in favor of a good reputation in terms of the values of that ideology. It is something else tho, to call such a good reputation "honor" and to say, for example, that one would be protecting, or fighting for, one's honor rather than one's reputation or good reputation. Reputation is etymologically nothing else than a 'reckoning up' or 'thinking over', while good and bad are clearly auxiliary terms. On the other hand, honor(able) and dishonor(able) are not auxiliary terms and have a number of different meanings and connotations which are anti-egalitarian, extremist and exclusivistic in but too blatant a manner. This need not surprise us, for unlike reputation, honor is a positively unneutral concept which completely lacks the basic meaning of concern, thoughtfulness and consideration inherent in respect.

A good reputation is open to every person in that no person should and need disregard normative principles. Moreover, every person can be both respectful and respectable. Truistic as these statements may seem for us, the ideal of equality expressed in respect for people has not yet come true in cultures or subcultures where certain people, or groups of people, claim to be the only 'Hono(u)rable' ones. In such x-ist milieus everyone is 'honorable' (deserving respect), but some are judged 'more honorable' than others, for example, because they are of so-called 'high' or 'noble birth', or because they are officials of a certain governmental class. As tho this were not enough, some are not just more honorable than common (honorable?) people but even 'Right Hono(u)rable'. Using expressions like Your Hono(u)r is in these subcultures a way of talking to so-called 'men (or women) of superior standing' like judges or mayors. Even representatives of political parties which claim or purport to be egalitarian, and of parties which claim or purport to respect persons as persons, do not refrain from styling themselves and others "Hono(u)rable Members". They do not seem to have the common sense needed for realizing that where an exclusive minority is 'Hono(u)rable' a majority is not.

It could be argued that there is at least a considerable difference between calling certain male or female, human beings "Hono(u)rable" solely on the grounds of their biologic-materialist relationship with other males or females, and calling certain people "Hono(u)rable", or giving them honors, for the work they are doing or have done. There definitely is a difference between these two categories, because being someone's child, or male child, may be a virtue in feudal circles that have not yet been squared with the right present, it is not an anafactive value, whereas the work someone does or has done can be very anafactive indeed. Nonetheless this is no reason to be anti-anafactive ourselves in our attitude towards people's services and good deeds. Even if the assessment of these services and deeds were correct, the function of titles and honor listings is to create absolute differences where there are really gradual ones. What counts in practise is, of course, that the assessment is ideological and must serve the interests, not of high ideals like truth and respect, but of the institution that does the creating and the dubbing.

Honor exism has also infiltrated science, a field of human activity which many have claimed or believed to actually be objective, nonideological and even nonnormative. In traditional (pseudo-)scientific phraseology certain academic degrees and courses are called "honors degrees" and "honors courses". Elsewhere people are said 'to have graduated cum laude'. It needs no explanation that some courses are more advanced or difficult than others. It needs no explanation either that the kind of course someone has followed and the talent or diligence 'e has displayed are relevant to particular academic, professional or other goals. Yet, this is, firstly, no reason to speak in terms of honor, and secondly, no reason to suggest that the difference between the one person who is a little bit better qualified and the other who is a little bit less qualified is an absolute one in which the former person needs to be honored or praised, unlike the latter.