Honor (or honoring) is a positive predicate, dishonor (or dishonoring) a negative predicate, and the concatenate neither-honoring-nor-dishonoring a neutral one. The catena of honor, the neutral limit-element and dishonor is the honor catena, a basic catena. This catena has a duplicate: the catena of the positive being-honored, the neutral neither-being-honored-nor-being-dishonored and the negative being-dishonored, the isorelative of the basic catena. Unlike respect and unlike what is a good reputation from a neutralist standpoint, honor and dishonor do not serve any neutral purpose. They merely contribute to the establishment and maintenance of extremist, or lesser unneutralist, and exclusivist institutions. Therefore honor and dishonor are ananormatively inferior predicates, and the attitudes of honoring and dishonoring ananormatively inferior attitudes. Altho it makes quite a difference with regard to a decision-maker's anafactiveness whether 'e honors or is honored, and whether 'e dishonors or is dishonored, it makes no difference at all in the light of the normativeness of being: honoring and being-honored, or dishonoring and being-dishonored are equally inferior. So, it is not the neutrality of the active, catenical aspect in isolation which is ananormatively superior, but the neutralities of both the active and the passive aspects at once. We shall call the bineutrality which combines the two limit-elements "nanhonore". (Pronounced as nän^|höno_|ré with ä as in the variants of stance, höno_| as in the variants of hono(u)r and é as in we; with stress on the second syllable. The e is to distinguish this term from nanhonor, which denotes the neutrality of the active aspect only.)

When applying the ananorm specifically to honor-catenary and isorelative issues, it may be termed "the norm of nanhonore". As a penultimate perfective value nanhonore entails that one should not honor, nor dishonor; and that nothing (personal or not) should be honored or dishonored. As an antepenultimate value honor-catenary anafactiveness entails, first of all, that one should not intentionally and knowingly honor or dishonor. It also entails that one should not have honored or dishonored oneself if one can prevent it, or to the extent that one can prevent it. If it could be proved that a particular, personal or nonpersonal, primary thing were superior according to the ananorm itself, even then positive honoring would not be conducive to less unneutrality, but would only add to it. If it could be proved that a particular, personal or nonpersonal, primary thing were inferior according to the ananorm, even then negative dishonoring would not be conducive to less unneutrality either, but would also then only add to it. Seen from the perspective of the norm of nanhonore, no person or primary thing is in itself honorable, and no person or primary thing is in itself dishonorable.

We have clearly distinguished honor and dishonor from respect and disrespect. The question might now arise why the norm of neutrality does not apply to respect and disrespect in the same way as it applies to honor and dishonor. The reason is that respect itself is a conscious conformity with the principles of the doctrine, and disrespect a deliberate violation of these principles. Principles can be applicable to all kinds of ground-world and propositional things but not to conformity with themselves; or, if they are, they can solely legitimize such conformity. It is therefore that our ideology allows respect, and condemns disrespect, for people's right to personhood; allows respect, and condemns disrespect, for the truth; allows respect, and condemns disrespect, for inclusivity; and allows respect, and condemns disrespect, for neutrality itself.

Just as there is a valid reason to differentiate respect and honor, so there is a valid reason to differentiate praise and honor, dependent on the definition of praise and on the manner of praising. Where praise has degenerated into glorification, worship and idolatry it is self-evident that it is badly corrupted by strong, polar feelings of the honor-catenary stripe. No doubt, it then offends against the norm of nanhonore. But in its pure form to praise something is to commend, to approve of or to express a favorable judgment of something. Praising involves in this instance not the worship of some doxastic authority but an evaluation of an attitude or actions on the basis of independent norms or principles. 'Praiseworthy' is on such an account --again-- what accords with the principles; and 'blameworthy' what deserves blame, because one has found fault with it, also in terms of these principles. In normative theories praiseworthiness and blameworthiness are terms of ascription, that is, of ascribing praise for having good motives or intentions, and blame for having bad motives or intentions. They apply to people's attitude and behavior with regard to normative principles, and obviously these normative principles cannot be applicable to the kind of praise and blame concerned themselves. Praising someone for living in accordance with the subnorm of nanhonore, the supernorm of neutrality, or any other principle of our ideology is therefore in itself not anti-anafactive. It would become anti-anafactive if one praised the one person and not the other who is equally praiseworthy. It would become anti-anafactive, too, if one lost sight of all proportionality in one's praising, for example, by creating or allowing the existence of absolute differences where the differences in merit (if any) are merely gradual.

A typical example of creating absolute differences --still regardless of the principles, or lack of principles, on which it is founded-- is the exclusive naming of objects, such as streets, avenues, buildings, funds, towns, and so on, after particular persons. (If literally every person had an object of the same importance called after 'im, or of an importance proportionate to 'er real praiseworthiness, it would be a different matter altogether.) The tasteless and unimaginative custom of calling objects after particular persons is both anti-egalitarian and in defiance of the norm of nanhonore. Moreover, as an onomastic brand of exclusivity it can be considered an operational manifestation of nonphysical individual, and perhaps also familial, exclusivism. This is but one illustration of how intimately intertwined the norm of neutrality and the norm of inclusivity are. In this instance it is the ideals of onomastic inclusivity and of nanhonore which coincide. Whether it concerns the norm of inclusivity or the norm of nanhonore, in both cases streets, buildings, funds, and so on, should be given substantive names which are, for example, poetical or technical. Names may be used when praising people in an objective and inclusive manner, they should never be used to honor, or for that matter, dishonor people or personified beings. Those who would have liked to, or who would have felt an urge to, call something inter- or non-personal after a person, may call it after the bineutral predicate of nanhonore instead. The way which would otherwise have been prosaically named in honor of one particular specimen will then be the Way of Nanhonore. For nanhonore is the poetic dao in the realm of neutrality, in the realm of inclusivity.