As noted before, it is often hard to tell protoneutralist ideas or systems of thought apart from protorelevantist ones. Similarly, it will often be hard or impossible to distinguish neutralism from inclusive relevantism. The foundation of neutralism is a relevantistic one in that the norm of neutrality has been defined as "the relevantistic interpretation of the principle of neutrality"; the foundation of inclusivism is a neutralistic one in that the norm of inclusivity has been defined as "the neutralistic interpretation of the principle of relevance". At this point it must be admitted that our reasoning has been circular. But the circle we have drawn is so all-embracing that no further justification is needed, or that we cannot conceive of any alternative belief or proposal which would be more plausible.

Neutralism is concerned with the catenical dimension of thought, and inclusivism with the relevancy-conditional dimension of it. Neither neutralism nor inclusivism covers the truth-conditional aspect of thought as such, let alone metadoctrinal and purely propositional aspects of it. When neutralism-inclusivism is for us the most plausible (or least implausible) normative system of disciplinary thought, it is therefore for us the most plausible catenical and relevancy-conditional normative system of disciplinary thought. Like protoneutralist conceptions and theories, neutralism pictures for us a model of harmony, but whereas this new model is catenical, protoneutralist conceptions and theories build on antonymical metaphysics; like protorelevantist conceptions and theories inclusivism pictures for us a model of unity, but whereas this new model is now relevancy-conditional, protorelevantist conceptions and theories build on inconsistent and obscure premises.

The idea of a perfect world of harmony and unity is perhaps as old as thought itself. As we have seen in the previous chapter, even antineutralist thinkers have made their strife of opposites issue in harmony and unity in the end. Hence what is new about the neutralistic-inclusivistic model is not the idea of harmony and unity as perfect things but, firstly, the catenical interpretation of harmony and the relevancy-conditional interpretation of unity; and secondly, the special interplay between the neutralistic theory of 'harmony' and the inclusivistic theory of 'unity'. Because of the intimate connection which exists in our model between the norm of neutrality and the norm of inclusivity, or between the notion of neutrality and the notion of inclusivity, it is reasonable to speak of "one notion of neutral-inclusivity". It is this catenical, relevancy-conditional concept which replaces all traditional and ancient concepts of harmony and unity.

The norm of neutrality is a ground-world norm; the principle of neutrality a ground-world principle. It is when this norm or principle is applied to the making of distinctions that it coincides with the norm of inclusivity, for no distinction shall be made so that things on the one side of a divide are undervalued and those on the other side overvalued. The norm of inclusivity itself is the ground-world application of the principle of relevance. Via this principle we enter propositional reality. Here propositional principles, or norms of thought, take over, such as the principles of truth, coherence and parsimony.

Neutrality and inclusivity are connected in at least two fundamentally different ways. One way is thru the interpretation of the respective principles. With regard to the principle of discriminational relevance this means that equal treatment in a literal sense needs no justification, and that the burden of proof is with someone who claims that a distinction is relevant. Another way is thru the focus of relevancy, which always has to be a neutralistic value. This value may be a perfective one, like equality, or an instrumental or corrective one, like the minimization of unhappiness or a maximum situational improvement in neutralistic terms. Everyday goals like the best quality of work to be done, or the greatest possible safety to be achieved, should fit in with this scheme, for example, because they minimize (the chance of) unhappiness or because they contribute to the establishment of optimum conditions for good health. Neutral-inclusivity requires that such goals always serve neutrality in the end, however remote the position of these goals may be with respect to that ultimate, perfective value.