It is not only reasonable to speak of "one notion of neutral-inclusivity", it is also evident that there is no separate doctrine of neutrality besides a separate doctrine of inclusivity. In other words: ours is one doctrine of neutral-inclusivity. A convenient and significant abbreviation for this doctrine is DNI. The norm of neutrality and the norm of inclusivity are the paradigmatic or immutable norms of the DNI; paradigmatic in that they together wholly determine our denominational paradigm or potential paradigm, and immutable in that they are not capable or susceptible of replacement or great change without ruining the entire doctrine itself. They are the sole, purely ground-world norms or principles, and as such form the kernel of our doctrine. Of the principles which are not purely nonpropositional, the metadoctrinal one underlying the right to personhood is no part of the DNI, altho it is part of our denominational system of disciplinary thought (and denominational 'doctrine' in a wider sense). The principles of the DNI are non-metadoctrinal, that is, doctrinal as opposed to metadoctrinal. The sole principle in addition to those of catenated neutrality and of discriminational relevance, which is not purely propositional and part of the DNI, is the principle of truth.

If we confine ourselves to the nonpropositional realm and conceive of neutral-inclusivity as one perfective value, the DNI is ultimately a monistic ground-world doctrine. On the surface it may seem rather pluralistic with values like nondiscrimination, beneficence, symmetry, equality, nanhonore, truth and coherence. But firstly, values like truth and coherence are not ground-world values; and secondly, we have seen how the norm of neutrality starts from the normative superiority of a secondary predicate. By taking a secondary predicate like neutralness as the value to be pursued, many primary values of different dimensions can be subsumed under one supervalue. Given the intimate connection between neutrality and inclusivity, neutral-inclusivism offers therefore a monistic view of nonpropositional reality, altho not the monistic view of a system in which a number of old and/or new theories are eclectically soldered together. It is the one value of neutral-inclusivity itself which encompasses an indefinite number of values of indefinitely many different dimensions. Neutral-inclusivity transcends all these dimensions.

Those who have claimed that a complete normative doctrine must always be pluralistic, while thinking of values supposedly being of the same category, like happiness, justice or equality, freedom and truth, have made a number of mistakes. Firstly, they have not differentiated doctrinal and metadoctrinal values such as freedom in a sense. Secondly, they have not differentiated nonpropositional and propositional values such as truth. Thirdly, they have not realized that values which are of a different dimension can still be subsumed under one supervalue if the former ones belong to the primary domain, and the latter one to the secondary domain. And fourthly, they have confused perfective values on the one hand and instrumental or corrective values on the other. Neutral-inclusivism proves that a ground-world doctrine can be monistic without suffering from the serious flaws, fallacies and fancies of monistic beliefs like utilitarianism, libertarianism, agapism and monotheism. Tho our denominational ideology is not monistic on the whole, what is to be added to neutral-inclusivism is a principle of truth which is (partially) propositional; and what is in turn to be added to the DNI is a principle of personhood which is metadoctrinal.

The principle of truth is propositional insofar as it governs the relationship between the ground-world and propositional reality. Unlike the norm of inclusivity and the norm of neutrality it is not paradigmatic since most, if not all, lovers of disciplinary thought pay lip-service to some kind of truth or principle of truth. (Adherents of certain monotheist ideologies may thus call their supreme deity "Truth"; and adherents of the same or other ideologies may thus call their supreme newspaper "Truth".) The recognition of truth as a value does not distinguish the DNI from exclusivist and extremist doctrines, yet what does distinguish it from those doctrines is the neutral-inclusivist, non-supernaturalist interpretation of truth. It has already been shown, and will be shown again, at many places in this Model how much the supernaturalist assault on truth, which has been going on for thousands of years, deviates from the neutral-inclusivist position on this value. And this even tho truth in itself is neither neutral nor inclusive.