To say that something lives or is alive is one thing, to say that it should live or be alive quite another. Now, it does not seem to make sense to assert that things should live, or be made into living beings, in a nontemporal sense, because even if we knew what this were to mean exactly, we would not have the power anyhow. But to say that living beings should remain alive on the temporal view is a meaningful statement which deserves further attention. Those who claim this maintain that life or living beings have an 'intrinsic' --that is, noninstrumental, nonderivative-- worth, that life is of supreme value, or that it is sacred. If this is true, there is always something against killing a living being, because on this schema a dead thing is worthless. (If not, then a dead thing's value is based on another principle, a principle which theoretically may decrease or outweigh the value of life at the same time.) To believe that living beings have a value merely as living beings (a value nonliving beings do not have), is to adhere to an independent or ultimate principle of life, whether it be labeled "respect for living beings (but not for nonliving beings)", "the supreme value of life", "the sanctity of life (but not of nonlife)" or something similar. At this place we will only consider identity-dependent interpretations of this principle. On such interpretations individual living beings are not replaceable by other living beings.

Taken literally, the traditional principle of life states that (being a) living (being) is 'intrinsically' valuable, whereas (being a) nonliving (being) is not. In the nontemporal view of life this would mean that a virus has a worth if it is a living organism, but that a molecule which is not a living organism has no intrinsic worth, regardless of the question whether it is more complex or not. And, according to such a principle of life itself, no distinction can be made between a living organism like a bacterium and a living organism like a human being. Any difference in value between these two organisms must be attributed to another factor and another principle. According to that other principle nonliving beings have either no value at all or they do. If they have no value at all on the basis of that other principle, then the first principle (that of life) is superfluous, and those talking about 'a supreme value' or 'sanctity of life' should let us know what principle they are really thinking of. On the other hand, if nonliving beings have a value too according to the hidden principle with which different types of living beings are compared, then the principle of life is, perhaps, not superfluous, but the theory it is meant to support is in that case pitifully deprived of all practical significance. The reason is simply that on balance both nonliving and living beings have a value now. The question remains what factor would determine the difference in value of the different types of living and nonliving beings.

In the temporal view of life, a true principle of life would make a life of permanent coma of equal value as the fully conscious life of a person. It would entail that killing a person were wrong, but not putting 'er body in a permanently comatose state, since such a transition is only one between two forms of living. The same applies to the comparison between a fetus and a conscious, adult being. And again, should the 'ultimate lifer' object that fetuses and conscious, adult beings and permanently comatose beings are all of intrinsic worth but of a different intrinsic worth, 'e employs another principle, a principle which either makes the principle of life superfluous or entirely vitiates it.

Combining the nontemporal and the temporal aspects of life, someone who believes that the life of fetuses and permanently comatose beings has an intrinsic, nonderivative value, must also admit that the life of plants has an intrinsic, nonderivative value, and an equal value (as far as the principle of life is concerned). On the principle of life in itself the life of a plant is of the same value as the life of a human vegetable and as the life of a conscious person. Consistence requires also that the life of a virus is of intrinsic value, and of the same intrinsic value as that of a fetus or spermatozoon which cannot stay alive outside another living body or without artificial means. Either all of them are living organisms or no-one is.

In an attempt to save the principle of life as an independent principle it has been rejoined that it is not life in the broadest sense, but that it is really being conscious which is intrinsically valuable. However, this amounts to a confession of defeat, because what we are then talking about is a principle of consciousness, not a principle of life anymore. For life encompasses both conscious and nonconscious (including unconscious) living beings.

But, for the sake of argument, let us say that this is only a terminological question. Now, if consciousness is mere consciousness, then those who adhere to a principle of life as consciousness must assign the same value to the 'lowest' conscious living beings as to the 'highest' conscious person -- lowest and highest to be understood in the purely descriptive terms of some other factor than mere consciousness. In cases of conflict there would be no reason to give priority to the one conscious being over the other. It would make no difference whether to kill a lower or a higher, conscious being. On the other hand, if the consciousness referred to in the formulation of the principle admits of degrees, then --as has already been pointed out-- certain nonhuman animals may in a number of respects be more conscious than human beings. It may then be worse to kill those animals than to kill conscious human beings. But even if this supranthropic conclusion were accepted, why would consciousness be an ultimate or perfective value, or a higher degree of consciousness of a higher perfective value? Not only is the latter view extremist, but if consciousness is a matter of the presence and acuity of different senses, one would expect it to be of instrumental value. (On this reckoning the charge of extremism could no longer be made either.) When talking of "a principle of life" or "consciousness", however, this principle is presented as a fundamental principle, not as some derivative principle, and the value of life or consciousness as an (ultimate) perfective value, not as some derivative value. (Note that a derivative value may be either a single nonultimate or nonperfective value or a value derived from a blend of perfective and corrective or instrumental values.)

In another attempt to save the principle of life it has been claimed that it is being human which is intrinsically valuable. Such a principle of human life is of course rank anthropocentrism, one of the speciesist manifestations of exclusivism. If, and insofar as, human refers merely to a biological species, the principle does not deserve our further attention, but what if it is person which is meant in a sense different from that of human being? Those adhering to such a principle of personal life may define person as self-conscious or self-aware being. Such a being is aware of itself as an individual, distinct from other entities in the world, and --as has been added-- it must also be aware that it exists over a period of time. On this account certain nonhuman animals can be 'persons', whereas, for example, human vegetables are not. The category of living beings which are of 'intrinsic' worth would be much smaller than that of conscious beings and there would be no differentiation between self-conscious beings. This principle of self-consciousness hardly resembles the original, genuine principle of life anymore. That is why it does not suffer from the defaults of a belief in the intrinsic, ultimate value or sanctity of all life as life. Yet, the question remains why self-awareness would be of any noninstrumental, nonderivative worth. Has the sanctity of human life, perhaps, merely been replaced by the sanctity of self-awareness to better accomodate the needs of self-conscious human beings who do not want to be accused of speciesism? Altho this substitution may be an improvement, the relevance of the distinction between beings which are self-aware and those which are not, cannot be made plausible in this context.

(It has also been suggested by people asserting the existence of immortal souls, that it would be the life of a being with an immortal soul which is valuable. But in questions of killing it is the 'mortal' life which is at stake and therefore it should rather be the killing of beings without an immortal soul which is wrong in the first place. Such a consistent scheme is not what these supernaturalists envisage, however, because for them it is exclusively or particularly the killing of the bodies of human beings which is wrong, even tho they are claimed to have souls which survive every killing.)

In short, our conclusion is that it is vital to the cogency of the DNI that we forget about a separate, fundamental principle of life altogether. And we have then even not yet discussed the actual conduct and historical record of those who have always so religiously preached on the sanctity of life, or on the sanctity of human life. Such a discussion might not be appropriate in philosophy, it could certainly be appropriate in the field of comprehensive ideology where it is not so much theories without engagements but attitudes and practises which count.