A comprehensive ideology like ours which starts from the primacy of the normative is --what we have called-- 'normistic', whereas a comprehensive ideology which starts from the primacy of the authoritative, that is, from the primacy of divine authority, is theistic and authoritarian or 'theocentr(ist)ic'. The prime notion of a normistic doctrine is the norm or the norms (or the notions pertaining to particular principles), whereas the prime notion of a theocentric doctrine is God or the gods (or the notions pertaining to particular gods). Thus when we call our total disciplinary body "the Norm" or "the Ananorm", this emphasizes its normistic nature (and/or the additional recognition of the right to personhood when it is done to distinguish it from 'the DNI'). It is not that our Norm simply replaces the God of the monotheists, for Norm is not the name of some (personal) authority, if only because we speak of "the Norm". In that case we could be blamed for merely believing in the primacy of the authority of a different 'god', but we do not believe in the primacy of any authority. (Insofar as we 'believe in' authority it is for derivative reasons.) We believe in the primacy of the normative, and no doubt this position is fundamentally different from that of the theocentrists. Theirs is ultimately the primacy of the authoritative: if Mono had commanded them to sacrifice every daughter born before the first son, they would have had to sacrifice every daughter born before the first son. Ours, however, is the primacy of the normative: we must do what the norm requires, and we must abstain from what would offend against the norm, regardless of what Mono or any other personal or personified being orders or is believed to have ordered. (While they say "for God's sake", we say "for goodness' sake".)

A normist will teach that people have to realize a state of being (or that they have to act or refrain from acting) as prescribed by the norm(s) or principle(s). A typically normistic symbolic statement is the doctrine is your master. A person possessed by a god, on the other hand, may enjoin that people have to 'realize Mono' here and now. Twisting the language itself, a beloved theocentric slogan is God-realization. Such phraseology reflects the fact that in theocentrist and other authoritarian ideologies it is a particular being (the Authority) which counts, for it is this being (God or Party) which must determine what is good or just by what it commands, loves, and so on. (The authoritarian commandment of commandments is thou shalt obey orders or orders are orders.) In normistic ideology it is ultimately the norm which counts, and it is then a particular state of being which has to be realized (or a particular act which has to be performed or abstained from) so that the ideal of the norm may come true. Theism or theocentrism primarily teaches people to love or worship a certain god, or the gods in general, whereas normism primarily teaches people to live in accordance with a particular norm, or the norms in general. This is not to say that theists would not find it important that people live in accordance with the rules, but if so, then because those rules have been laid down by a god, or because a god wills that people follow them. By the same token, a normistic ideology does, logically speaking, not necessarily have to deny the existence of gods or demons. The existence or nonexistence of gods and demons is not only a contingent matter, from a purely normistic point of view it is even irrelevant, because the existence of the norm or norms does not depend on them. If any god or demon exists (however it may be defined, and whatever it may turn out to be), it will have to be judged by the same normative standard or standards as all other beings, and so will the belief in a god and/or demon.

Not only is the existence of a particular god or group of gods 'relevant' and believed in in theocentrist ideology, the name of a god is often in itself of the greatest significance. So it is a spiritual practise to hallow a divine name (or 'to praise his holy name'), and to pray in the name of a certain god. This may even exuberate into an unceasing repetition of a mantra, which is believed to lead to union with the divine being of that name itself. Altho the potential symbolic significance of names is recognized in the DNI too, this can by no means be compared to the practise of theocentrists who attempt to harnass certain names in order to get literally closer to a particular personal or personified being. Name symbols do lead to union with the natural mortals who live under the same denomination, and symbolically thru them to union with the ideal they have in common; they do not lead to union with any nonnatural god or demon. Only supernaturalists believe that name symbols can replace real, fundamental attempts at realizing the ideal state of being according to the norm (or, for that matter, according to a god). And only supernaturalists believe that the word name itself would be a synonym of spiritual nature or essence.

In the relationship between principal beings, or sacred books, and the normative, it is the normative, that is the whole of universal norms and values, which comes first. Consequently it is the choice of norms and values which precedes the belief in principal beings such as gods and demons, and the belief in books which prescribe or proscribe without offering a justification and without reflecting upon what has been said before and elsewhere. Those for whom the attitude and conduct of a god or other doxastic principal being contradict the most fundamental of norms will not accept the authority of such a being, even if it did exist; and those for whom the tales and tenor of a sacred or other book contradict the most fundamental of principles will not accept the authority of such a book, even if it had been revealed in a nonnatural way. This is what the primacy of the normative implies. It is therefore the choice of norms and values itself which gives the life of a normist its meaning. 'Er existence has meaning when certain norms and values have come to engage 'im, irrespective of 'er belief in one or more gods or other principal beings; and irrespective of 'er belief in something like immortality, for immortal beings, whether they exist or not, are subject to the same universal norms as mortal beings. (Should there be a difference, it is the very belief in immortality which will make the life of a person with a body meaningless or less meaningful.)

It comes as no surprise that some social scientists have found that there is a distinct correlation between adherence to theist ideology founded upon the primacy of the authoritative and a general authoritarian attitude. It will come as no surprise either that theocentric believers choose for 'law and order', whereas we as adherents of a normistic denominational doctrine choose for 'legitimacy and order'.

Now, those who believe in the primacy of the authoritative and in a doxastic truth as revealed by a deity are likely to ask a normist how 'e knows what norm or principle is the true or right one. But a theocentrist who poses such a question does not understand, or conceals the fact, that 'e has to face the same kind of question 'imself: how does 'e know what god or divine revelation is the true or right one (that is to say, apart from the claim that the revelation occurred in 'er own part of the world, or in that of those who colonized 'er own country). A normist may as a person have to choose between different norms, or between different contents or interpretations of one principle, but a theist will have to choose between different gods, or between different beliefs in, or predicates of, one god. (It is one of the extraordinary acts of theism to bypass this problem by speaking, not of "the god" but of "God". However, the normist can do exactly the same by introducing a proper name, for example, by speaking of "(the) Norm", whether as an abbreviation of "the Ananorm" or not.) Hence, this is not the kind of question which exposes a fundamental epistemological difference between the normistic and the the(ocentr)ist approach. Such a difference is rather that theists claim the existence of one or more particular (immaterial) beings with a great number of particular predicates (such as unique relationships with avatars), whereas normists will only have to claim the existence of one or a limited number of principles or norms (which are immaterial as well).

Even when the theocentrist asks how it could be known whether it is true that one should do so and so, or that something should be such and such, 'e has already implicitly recognized one principle, namely that of truth. And not only has 'e thus implicitly recognized the first principle of doctrinal principles, 'er very question itself perfectly demonstrates that this principle needs no god.

An outrageous example of normless theocentrism is antinomianism. Antinomians (if still existing) hold that norms, categorical principles or the 'moral law' are of no use or obligation because faith alone would be necessary to salvation (the 'saving of man from the power and effects of sin'). Characteristic of religious existentialists adhering to such antinomianism is that they claim that the 'law of love' should be applied directly and separately in each situation. If this applying of a 'moral law' sounds inconsistent, then only so on the surface, for the injunction to love, on which their situation ethics is based, has in practise never provided any normative directive whatsoever (at least not in addition to what the principle of beneficence enjoins). In actual fact, also antinomians who are not willing to dispense with the clichés of theodemonical agapism always have been, or still are, staunchly opposed to normistic discipline.

When a the(ocentr)ist still scornfully calls people who do recognize principles, but no god or gods, "atheists", 'e may now expect that 'er derogatory way of speaking will soon backfire on 'im. For if a normist who believes in the primacy of the normative is an 'atheist', then a theist who does not believe in the primacy of the normative is an 'anormist' or --worse-- an 'antinormist'.