The universe does not only 'contain' --if we may use this word-- objects, not only primary things and primary attributes and relations but also more complex systems of nonprimary predicates. One of the latter systems is the catena, a whole of (con)catenated positive, neutral and negative predicates. Whereas attributes and relations are purely intensional, with no component parts, the universe is in a sense a pure extensionality recognized in ordinary language as a 'thing' but without any proper predicates which can be ascribed to it. Nevertheless, all things consist directly or indirectly of attributes on our ontological construction, and so the universe comprises a theoretically unlimited number of parallel attributive systems, and therefore it contains ultimately solely attributes itself (since also relations are, as things, sets of attributes). After having distinguished the different domains to which things belong and the kinds of attributes which are the base-elements in these domains (primary, secondary, and so on), it is high time now to consider how primary attributes (and relations) can be categorized. A systematic study of these atoms of the first domain of discourse, to which we belong ourselves as bodies and as persons, will at the same time tell us more about the character of their own, secondary, attributes and relations. The first distinction to be made, then, is between primary predicates, looked upon as things in the second domain, which are and which are not part of a catena. The former predicates will be termed "catenated", the latter ones "noncatenated predicates".

The following list is an example of predicates which are catenated, at least in a sense:

For each pair of attributes or relations in this list, the predicate on the left and the one on the right are 'chained', catenated or inseparably linked together. (It is no coincidence that the original meaning of catena is chain.) Every extensional element of a catena exists because of the existence of the other constituents. No positive predicate can exist without the concatenate negative predicate, nor without the concatenate neutral predicate. For example, no love can exist where there is no hatred, no equality where there is no inequality, and conversely. Quite a few ideologues and others have said this before, while emphasizing in particular that no good or goodness can exist where there is no evil or badness. What they have thus often deluded people into believing is that there must somehow always be bad things (people, for instance) where there are good things. Unfortunately this reasoning tortures logic. Fortunately it tortures logic only: badness is not a 'bad thing' in the sense of an object, person or abstract thing which has the attribute of being-bad, nor is goodness a 'good thing' in an analogous sense. Badness is a primary attribute, that is, a simplex, secondary entity. A thing which is bad, however, is a primary entity and nonpredicative. Hence badness would still exist (in the second domain) if nothing in the world (in the first domain) were bad. It would even exist if nothing 'could' be bad.