Negation itself is not a typically catenical concept, but the concepts of catenality and noncatenality and the negatory relationship between them certainly are. Negation is a secondary relation but unlike limitation, opposition and supplementation (in the catenical sense) it is not catenary. In a way, however, all these catenical, secondary relations are more or less negations. Limitation is, then, negation on the borderline or fringe of the framework of the predicate negated itself; opposition is negation within the framework of the complete bipolarity (of which the predicate negated is only a monopolar part); catena supplementation is negation within the framework of the catena extensionality or the catenality; and, finally, what we shall call "aspect negation" is negation within the framework of the aspect concerned, in particular of a form of catenality or of a form of noncatenality.

Aspect is the name we shall use for the imaginary collection of all extensional elements and subset-predicates of one catena and the corresponding noncatenality. Also combinations of such conceptual sets may be termed "aspects". Attributes which form part of the aspect of heaviness, or the aspect weight, for instance, are: heaviness (that is, all proper and improper heaviness attributes), the neutrality which limits heaviness and lightness (in practise the perineutrality medium heavy), lightness (all lightness attributes) and non-heaviness-catenality (the attribute not having any weight, not even 0).

It looks as tho two aspects could be distinguished for every two-place relation: one from the standpoint of the fundament, and one from that of the terminus. This is misleading altho it depends on the kind of relation how easily the error can be shown. For comparative notions it is immediately obvious that there is actually merely one aspect involved. Consider, for example, the relation heavier than: if A is heavier than B, B is lighter than A, and if A is lighter than B, B is heavier than A. Hence, the aspect comprises in both cases the same predicates, namely being-heavier, being-lighter and the corresponding neutrality and noncatenality. But what if A loves B and B is loved by A, while not being-loved but hating is the opposite of loving? In this case loving and being-loved are 'isorelative', that is, they concern one and the same relation. (As the relation is binary it may also be said that being loved is the 'reverse' of loving. In combinatory logic the term inversion is used when the order of variables in a two-place predicate expression is changed.) The intensity of A's love and of B's being-loved is necessarily the same. There is only one catena value for this relation regardless of the position from which it is considered. Yet, this still makes it theoretically possible to discern two 'related' aspects: that of love, hate and nonpolarities, and that of being-loved, being-hated and nonpolarities.

There are many noncomparative predicates which are each other's isorelative, and which each have an opposite of which they are no isorelative. An example is honor(ing) with the opposite dishonor(ing) and the isorelative being-honored. One should bear in mind, however, that predicates which are each other's isorelative need not be catenated. For example, planting and being-planted, being-a-parent and being-a-child are isorelatives; yet they have no opposites because they are not part of any catena to start with. In a way predicates like hate and being-hated, honor and being-honored, parenthood and childhood are as inextricably linked as love and hate, and as honor and dishonor, but there is a significant difference. To love or to have the predicate of love, is as real as to hate or to have the predicate of hate, and living beings cannot have both predicates at precisely the same moment with regard to the same thing. (To understand this one must not forget that a whole and one of its parts, or two different parts of the same whole, are not the same thing.) On the other hand, to be loved is not 'as real as' to love: ontologically someone or something that is loved does not have any proper predicate whatever on the basis of its being loved. It may certainly change or be changed or influenced because of its being loved, but all the proper predicates it may have for that reason are ontologically contingent -- at the most the relation of loving-and-being-loved and those predicates are related as cause and effect. Thus it is quite feasible, and common, to like or dislike someone and to be liked or disliked by that person at exactly the same moment. Yet, the state of being liked or loved, or disliked or hated, by the other does not correspond to any logically necessary, proper predicate in the person liked or disliked. One person may take someone else's hate or love to heart, whereas another person may just make little or nothing of it. All passive isorelatives such as being-liked, being-disliked, being-planted, being-a-child (in contradistinction to being-a-parent) are linguistically contrived pseudo-predicates. And as the argument is analogous with respect to three- or more-place relations, this implies that a multiplicity of relational positions (fundament, terminus, and so on) has no bearing on aspectual diversity.