When we speak about cultural norms as we have done until now, we are primarily interested in what people using a particular language ought to do in the light of these norms (even tho this does not tell us anything about what they ought to do in the light of an independent ontological norm). We have, then, already presupposed a system of one or more values, or a theory of value. Communication itself may be regarded as such a value but --as noted before-- almost never as an ultimate value. Also conservatism is a de facto value in linguistic affairs, whether one likes to accept it personally or not. Conservatism is often recognized as an orthographic principle, if it rests on a word's etymology. Such a principle is relative, however, since it not seldom depends on how far back in history one is willing to go and to disregard the neglect of etymology people in former times displayed themselves. For example, the words kategori(e), kritikal and kub(e) thus spelled would be 'more etymological' than the variants with a c (and y), and so are all words with -iz- instead of -is- (as in neutralize and neutralization).

Beauty too is a de facto value in matters of language, but esthetical reasons to pronounce or spell a word in one way rather than another can never be advanced to justify a particular official or standard linguistic variant. On the contrary, love of beauty is an argument against any and every form of artificially institutionalizing language, unless something like a national taste is seriously believed in. If a whole language community really had the same taste and convictions, uniformity would come naturally, that is, automatically, and would not have to be enforced by dint of institutionalized systems. Yet, keeping together the different parts of a linguistic or national community has been mentioned as the key value of institutionalized language. This view is generally connected with the belief that a unitary language (especially a unitary pronunciation and spelling) is a practical necessity to enable the smoothest possible communication between the speaker or writer and 'er contemporary listeners or readers. Even if this were true tho, it would not determine which variant should be the standard one, and the proponents of unitary language have never, or rarely, based their choice of a particular variant as the unitary language on the criterions for the easiest way to learn and understand that language (for example, the easiest way to pronounce and/or spell it). The values of the proponents of an artificially imposed unitary language are not really the values of language as a technically adequate communication system but usually (or always?) the values of the unitary state, if not the values of elitism and conservatism.

Insofar as language is a purely communicative device, conventions suffice --as we have seen-- to solve coordination problems, and it is by no means necessary to formulate these conventions and to promulgate them. (This is not to say, of course, that it may not be convenient to come to explicit agreements with respect to actually recurring communication problems, for example, when in a speech community with a great internal variation the groups farthest removed from each other cannot understand one another any longer.) The belief that an entirely uniform linguistic system would have to be decreed rests on the misconception that every deviant sort of usage would have to be excluded in general. And it also rests on the exploded idea that communication problems could solely be solved by means of verbal, explicit agreements. If language were really that rigid, the 'normal' change of linguistic norms (semantic change, for instance) would never be possible. The norm of good communication --it has been argued-- does require of the speaker and writer that 'e violate lower-level linguistic norms in a creative way when necessary, and it does require of the listener and reader that 'e show the necessary tolerance and cooperation when interpreting the information received. Remarkable in this view is, again, that tolerance is stressed as a value not from an ethical but from a linguistic vantage point.

Even if there were no officially decreed or institutionalized language, this would not mean that everything would be possible, with a confusion of tongues as the chaotic outcome. For everyone who wants to successfully forward or exchange information will have to recognize (at least implicitly) a definite core of conventions common with the group 'er information is aimed at; otherwise 'e will simply not be understood, or otherwise people will not take the trouble to try. Now, conventions only exist because of the consistence of acting. Hence, it is the consistence of acting which is the central value of language and of thought. (Altho it may not be the de facto value of a particular linguistic variant.) 'Inconsistent' acting must, then, not result from a lack of principle but at most from a conflict between different principles or rules, when a choice must be made one way or the other.

Since not one linguistic principle or rule is the only true one, the systematic application of several principles or rules will probably lead to the emergence of nonuniform, but closely related, linguistic systems, products of the spontaneous growth of one language (called "cluster of languages" in another, technical sense). Thus, on the basis of the phonematic principle one spells -or (as in labor) and -er (as in center), altho the spelling -our (labour) and -re (centre) may be preferred on the basis of the etymological principle. (It should be superfluous to note that the writer's nationality or ethnicity is irrelevant in this respect.) Due to an emphasis on different principles one may accordingly conceive of the emergence of a more phonematic spelling system besides a more traditional, etymological one in the language which is our present means of communication (and in other languages using the same or a similar script also of the emergence of a more phonematic system besides a more morphematic one). The conventionality of each orthographical or other linguistic system which is actually used on a smaller or larger scale (perhaps on a universal scale) does, and need, not depend on a decree in which an exclusive status is rendered to only one linguistic system or variant thereof. It should solely depend on the common interest which two or more, independent persons take in the exchange of their thoughts and feelings by means of the spoken and written word. If they do not leave the communicative core of the language in question, and if they systematically apply its intrinsic rules, then their spoken word is correctly pronounced, and then their written word is correctly spelled.

In the books of this Model we will take cognizance of the fact that the language which is our present means of communication has a great many lexical, semantical, pronunciational and orthographical variants. Where there are two or more options open to us, but where it would be inconsistent to employ more than one variant, the most regular (or least irregular) and the most phonetic (or least unphonetic) variant is employed, regardless of its being perhaps traditionally more frequently used in one country or region of the world than in another. For example, catenas, criterions and millenniums are chosen instead of catenae, criteria and millennia, and thru, tho, fulfil and practise instead of through, though, fulfill and practice. In no way does this imply that other variants would be incorrect. If they are in actual use by a sufficient number of speakers or writers, it can only be inconsistent usage which is incorrect.