The issue of sexism and language has attracted much attention in feminist studies in particular, and it has been convincingly demonstrated in these studies that the series he, him, his, and words like man, cannot and do not function as genuinely gender-neutral expressions in traditional parlance. Moreover, it has been shown that sex discrimination is endemic to grammatical conventions in the traditional variant(s) of the present language (and considerably more so in similar variants of certain other languages). Little or no attention has been paid, however, to the crucial role played by the concept of relevancy in questions of sex discrimination, in the rejection of any other discriminatory usage and in the logic and principles of conversation itself. Traditional language does not only reveal that it is, or has been, backed up by a sexist (or sexually irrelevantist) world-view, it is not age-neutral either. The intimate relationship between the various attitudes, with regard to gender and age but also with regard to class and minorities, can easily be detected in ordinary traditional language. Such language is, then, not only a product of stereotypes, it promotes them too, or serves as an instrument for their promotion, notably by dint of the emotive meanings of words.

If the old he and man could really be used in a genuinely gender-neutral way, they ought to be applicable to any person regardless of gender. But it has been correctly pointed out that one cannot say, for example, "he is the best" of a female, or "she is the best man for the job". Now, it has been argued that if it is clear that the speaker knows the gender of the referent, 'e is expected to specify this gender. In other words, the speaker would not convey less information than 'e could. But the rejoinder is then that it would be as inappropriate to say "that is the best person" of someone whose gender is known as it is to say "that is the best man" of a female. Hence, a man simply behaves differently from a person: the latter is undisputably gender-neutral, the former not. Many similar examples in feminist literature show that the so-called 'neutral' performance of he and man as 'advertised by traditional lexicographers easily breaks down even under normal speaking conditions'.

Is it true, as has been suggested, that people do not convey less information than they can under normal speaking conditions? Of course not. Literally interpreted this suggestion cannot be taken seriously. In pragmatics (as a branch of linguistics) it is only stated that one should make one's contribution 'such as required by the accepted purpose and direction of the conversation'. This is called "the cooperative principle", and on this principle one should not convey less relevant information than one can, and not more than is relevant or than one believes to be relevant. Relevancy, therefore, plays a central part in any 'normal' conversation; even tho it may merely be informational relevancy.

Whether a factor such as gender is relevant or not in a particular situation or context is not always clear, but a linguistic system which does not have any truly gender-neutral and -transcending word to replace the yin and yang specimens is deficient in this respect. This does not only concern pronouns and adjectives like his and her but also nouns, or pairs of nouns, like actor-actress, bachelor-spinster, launderer-laundress, king-queen, and so on. (In the traditional variants of certain other languages this even applies to almost all nouns denoting people engaged in these kinds of activity or function.) The denotations of king and queen and the connotations of bachelor and spinster are remarkably asymmetrical: the former are expressive of some more aristocratic, the latter of some more proletarian type of sexism. Yet, the imposition of gender differentiation in traditional language is not per se sexist in the sense of being sexually unneutral. If both the conceptual and evaluative meaning run parallel, it need not be. In practise tho --as has been argued-- sex-distinguishing terms do not seldom go with a differential appraisal.

Even if the imposition of gender differentiation were not called "sexist" by itself, and even if, after having distinguished them, men and women were put on an equal footing, the factor gender itself would remain irrelevant (in many, if not in most instances). It is only one factor or set of factors among an innumerable number of other factors or sets of factors, each of which might or could be pertinent in the circumstances concerned. Why not have different nouns and pronouns for each activity or function to distinguish the big from the small, the good from the bad, the rich from the poor, without there being an inclusive noun and pronoun to denote both the big and the small, the good and the bad, and so on? Of course, the idea is absurd; probably as absurd as those people find it whose language has gender-transcending nouns and pronouns (in addition or not in addition to masculine and feminine forms) that there are languages in which the sexual distinction is foisted on the speakers, however irrelevant. And probably as absurd and awkward as the speakers of this language find it that there are traditional languages in which different grammatical forms have to be used dependent on whether one possesses a penis and testicles or a vagina and uteris oneself; and that there are traditional languages with (at least) two words for the pronoun you, whereby the choice of which one to use depends on factors such as age(-difference) and class(-difference). In the latter cultures or subcultures concerned older people tutoyer minors and younger people but expect them to use the polite form of you nevertheless. Fortunately, there is even no forced gender distinction between a male second person (u?) and a female second person (ewe?) in any variant of this language. People could, then, not spell "you" anymore when writing to you. They would first have to make sure whether you were a 'u' or a 'ewe'.

There are dictionaries painstakingly compiled by lexicographical worthies which define man as human being, especially an adult male human but woman as adult female person, and male as plant or animal that is male but female as plant or animal that is female, especially woman or girl as distinguished from man or boy. The supposedly symmetrical harmony of yang and yin is definitely (and painfully) lost in such definitions. Even with respect to the distinction male/female it appears necessary to differentiate between men and boys and women and girls, because boys are certainly not men and girls are certainly not women (or if they are, then to their detriment, as we will see). Some might object that male and female are age-transcending terms which can be employed instead of the longer phrases man or boy and woman or girl. They are indeed age-transcending but at the same time so impersonal as to refer to any unisexual plant or animal.

Is a 'boy' in traditional language just a male minor without any special connotation? This can hardly be maintained, since the word boy was at least in olden days also used for men of a class felt to be inferior (namely servants) or of a race felt to be inferior. The archaic meaning of knave (akin to words denoting 'boys' in other languages) is, similarly, also male servant or man of humble birth or position. (Not coincidentally it means dishonest fellow as well.) According to the traditionalists' lexicon a 'girl' or 'maid' is not just a female minor but, besides a female servant, it is also an unmarried woman who is (still) young or of any age. Again, the asymmetry in the meanings of boy and girl is symptomatic. The only human beings escaping from both boy- and girlhood are adult men who are not of humble birth or position and who do not belong to a class or race felt to be inferior (by adult men who are not of humble ...).

Girls and boys are small humans, and so are women, judging by the traditional use of the diminutive -ette to denote, for example, 'bachelorettes', 'suffragettes' and 'brunettes'. By now, it will not come as a surprise to anyone that the counterpart of a 'man Friday' is not a 'woman Friday', but a 'girl Friday' in traditional language; nor will it that 'bachelor girls' existed long before 'bachelor boys' were born. And while boy(-)friend and girl(-)friend do seem to be analogs, their use is certainly not alike under all conditions. Where a woman could call any of her female friends "a girl-friend", a man would in the same sexually exclusivistic milieu provoke quite different reactions by calling one of his male friends "a boyfriend". The codes of behavio(u)r of some exclusivist dictionaries allow solely males to have girl- and solely females to have boyfriends. A dictionary belonging to that category may state that a man or boy likes his girl-friend but may not be in love with her, while leaving the poor user (m/f) in doubt as to whether females are always in love with their boyfriends or not.