Given that science and ideology are two main departments of disciplinary thought, what is then the position of philosophy and the arts insofar as they belong to the domain of thought? The special nature of the arts seems to be less problematic than that of philosophy, even tho what is called "art" may vary from the rubbishy rhyme royal of a poet laureate to the marvel of a painter in whose work no-one was interested during 'er lifetime. If we include attempts to do so, 'art' is somehow the purposeful creation or expression of particular feelings by means of material effects in a nonpersonal medium (or a medium which is in principle freely accessible to everyone). These material effects may range from sound waves in air to relief patterns in concrete slabs, from the constant utterance of one and the same word to an ever-changing palette of colors in a visual display. One may disagree about the claim that a work of art has to be the result of an intentional activity, but it is a plain mistake to maintain that art must create or express beauty or must produce esthetic objects. It may be true that the artist often, or usually, tries to create an object which is as nice and pleasing as possible, and that we prefer 'im to do that, yet this is no necessity. 'Er aim might also be, for example, to create the feelings one has when visiting a particular (kind of) place (a sense of its atmosphere) or when meeting a particular (kind of) person. These feelings, if not neutral, may be either pleasant or unpleasant, and a good artist creates a feeling of ugliness in the reader, spectator, listener or other person confronted with 'er work when the thing 'e wants to portray 'happens to be' not beautiful but ugly. Similarly, a good artist does not only know how to portray a good character (whatever that may be) but also how to portray a bad one. This is also why the conscious use of skill, and not only of taste, is important in art.

When an artist expresses 'er own particular feelings in a work of art, or endeavors to create the same feelings in others, 'e may do so for ideological or other nonartistic reasons. Within the scope of the arts, however, the creation of certain feelings (rather than thoughts) is an end in itself. This is what distinguishes art from ideology where the creation or expression of certain feelings is an instrument to serve the end or ends of the whole doctrine. One of these ends may be, for example, the promotion of beauty itself, but this, again, is a mere contingence so far as the concept of ideology is concerned (except, perhaps, in those cases where the word for what is nice is the same as the word for what is red).

Philosophy (in the sense used here) does not encompass the creation or expression of particular feelings but of thoughts. This does identify philosophy as distinct from art, altho many a writer may (have) be(en) involved in a creative process which is or was at once philosophical and artistic, that is, literary. It does not yet identify philosophical as distinct from ideological or scientific disciplinary thought. However, the relationship between philosophy and ideology is in a way similar to that between art and ideology. Just as artistic feelings are an end for the arts but (also) a means for ideology, so is philosophical thought an end for philosophy but (also) for ideology. To put it roughly: in art it is the quality of feeling which matters, in philosophy it is the quality of thought wich matters but in ideology it is the quality of the world which matters. The prime business of the arts, of philosophy and of science is to experience, to reflect on and to understand the state of the world as it is, can be or should be; the prime business of ideology is not to change it --as has been contended-- but to leave it as it is insofar as it is good, and to improve it insofar as it is bad.

There is now one barrier left to be taken, namely the distinction between philosophy and science. Of these two philosophy has been defined as thought about thought, yet even disciplinary thought about thought need not be philosophical -- it could be sociological or linguistic. But then, philosophy has been said to rely 'more or less exclusively on reasoning to justify its claims' rather than on observation, quantification and experience. The scientist's business is to systematically organize regularities between events and possibilities into a body of knowledge on the basis of which predictions can be made. The last thing is controversial, but ideally science can explain what it can predict and predict what it can explain. A philosopher, on the other hand, speculates about regularities and irregularities between events, possibilities and values without attempting to prove anything by observation or quantification in the ground-world, and --what seems to be the main occupation of most philosophers-- 'e speculates about regularities and irregularities in other people's (especially other philosophers') speculations. Of course, also scientists speculate, but not necessarily as scientists. If so, then to determine what they have observed or quantified, or what they are going to, or ought to, investigate.

We should now have a general idea of the meanings of the concepts of 'ideology', 'art', 'philosophy' and 'science' as they will be used in this Model. The characteristics given may not be precise and are, perhaps, incorrect in a certain respect or to a certain degree, even from a systematic point of view. But fortunately, we do not need an entirely accurate description (if existing at all) of these four departments of disciplinary thought, since in practise all of them have overlaps. Intellectual undertakings do not consist of isolated thoughts, and it was mentioned already that an intellectual undertaking may be at once philosophical and artistic. Similarly, it may be at once scientific and ideological, scientific and philosophical, and so on. There are common grounds between all departments of disciplinary thought, some wider than others. We may assume the overlap between science and art to be the smallest, the one between philosophy and ideology the largest. Yet, for all departments there are intellectual activities which are unmistakably on this or on the other side of the fuzzy border, for example, statements which are indubitably religious or otherwise ideological instead of scientific, or statements which are indubitably literary instead of philosophical. This general state of 'disciplinary affairs' is schematically represented in figure I.6.1.3.1

There is not one science, not one philosophy, not one ideology and not one art, there are many different (departmental) sciences, philosophies, ideologies and forms of art. Since our ultimate intellectual concern will be the development of a denominational doctrine in this Model, it is especially the category of comprehensive ideologies which demands our further attention. The subdivision of these ideologies into religious and nonreligious, theist and nontheist ones, for instance, will be the subject of the next division. But all ideology is normative and employs a more or less artistic symbolism (however vehemently we may reject the norms and values propagated, and however distasteful we may find the symbols used). To make sure that our own ideological thought will satisfy the minimum requirements of valid normative reasoning (and preferably the highest requirements) we must be familiar with the elements of normative philosophy in particular, that is, the instruments of thought this branch of philosophy, which especially deals with norms and values, has to offer us. The following chapters of this book are therefore dedicated to the normative-philosophical issues which will have the strongest bearing on our own ideological position. It is in the Book of Symbols that we will return to the role the arts play, or may play, in the symbolic enrichment and social acceptance of a new paradigm in denominational thought.