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M O D E L
BOOK OF INSTRUMENTS
PARADIGMS OF DISCIPLINARY THOUGHT
DENOMINATIONAL THOUGHT

6.2.3 

THE THEODEMONIST PROBLEM OF WRONG PROOFS


There is one vital issue which remains: if the existence of Mono and/or Demono could be proved, then what the major theodemonist traditions have always taught is no supernaturalist ideology but knowledge; or at least a form of denominationalism which does not systematically violate the principle of truth, even not when literally interpreted. And indeed, the existence of especially the first principal being has been proved time and time again, but ... these 'proofs' have also been refuted equally frequently. There has been the argument from design, which claims that nature reveals an orderliness which would have to be the work, not just of an agency, but of a personal agency. (There are more modern, statistical variants of the argument.) The flaws in this argument were already so thoroughly exposed more than two hundred years ago by a philosopher more courageous than any all-powerful designer that it has by now been thrown into complete disorder. We shall not review 'er criticisms here, but it is interesting to hear that one might as well conceive of the world as a 'rude essay of some infant deity who afterwards abandoned it, ashamed of his lame performance'; in other words: the work of a god who did not yet have any design experience, and who chose to have eschatology make up for it. (The manuscript in which these criticisms were laid down had to be published anonymously and posthumously as its wisdom did not serve the interests of the ruling party of defenders of orthodox monotheism.)

Other proofs which have been produced to demonstrate the existence of one divine being are the causal and ontological arguments. The causal argument concentrates on the relationship between causes and their effects. It claims that there must be a first cause. It is then 'self-evident' --in supernaturalist terms-- that this ultimate cause condition is part of Mono's ragbag of predicates. For non-supernaturalists, however, the observable succession of events described as 'causes' and 'effects' requires no ultimate beginning or end. To say that it does is begging the question.

According to the ontological argument Mono must exist because the idea of Mono exists, and the same holds, of course, for Demono. This argument is the epitome of madness in the pathology of theodemonical supernaturalism. More critical theodemonists have already pointed out themselves that existence is not a 'property' like strength or wisdom, and that it cannot be part of the definition of any concept. The force of the idea or concept of Mono, or of a being which is perfect --it is said-- is not increased by thinking of it as existing, or by merely thinking about it. It is the distinction between the nonpropositional ground-world and propositional reality in our ontology which rings true here.

After the defeat of the rational 'proofs' to establish the existence of Mono, most of his adherents have fled atheism and agnosticism by adopting some kind of fideism, that is, the view that one ought to rely on faith rather than reason, at least, in religious affairs. Fideism started teaching that 'religious knowledge lies beyond the limits of man's rational faculties', and for quite a while thereafter the theodemonological world remained silent. But did the bells of fideism ring the demise of all attempts at proving the existence of Mono? Maybe they did, yet the body which was supposed to be dead much later turned out merely to have been in a state of suspended animation: the existence of Mono has been 'proved' again. This time it makes use of the most modern of logics -- modal logics to be more precise. The 'proof' heavily draws on the concept of supreme being and tells us that there is nothing greater than the greatest, and that there is one who is the greatest, and only one. The philosopher in question does not know what 'great-making properties' are -- 'e only knows what 'e believes they are. One of these properties would have to be power. Mono, being the most powerful personal being in the world might thus happen to be the president of the mightiest country (if male), or the richest man in the most plutocratic country. Now, this president or plutocrat may feel, and be treated, like a god, he might not be very happy with the proof at all, for example, because his political power or wealth needs an external justification, not one in itself. (In this way he can always claim Mono's special favor, since Mono never says anything to the contrary.)

Most monotheists might not be very happy with such a banal, incarnate Mono either. Banal because the president or plutocrat in question is not, or need not be, the wisest or most intelligent person, let alone show the most exemplary moral behavior. This takes us back to the crux of every theodemonical belief: it is the content of Mono's omnium-gatherum of great-making characteristics and the content of Mono's authoritative judgments which count, not the real or imaginary fact that he has characteristics (whatever they may be) or that he has spoken (whatever he may have said). The theorist who creates a solitary god by proving, however logically, that there must be someone who is the 'greatest' or the 'king', regardless of what this god's properties might be, presents a style of godthink devoid of any content. One may reproach theodemonical fideism with one of the greatest aberrations in human thought, but not for being that trivial.


 
6.2.3.0


THE SPIRIT OF THE MOST EXCLUSIVE

 
When innocent people wondered how things came into being,
'he' would emerge as the sole creator of the universe,
and as a creator outside the universe.
When innocent people were not quite sure
of the existence of others,
his omnipresence would fill up every vacuum, and
his omniscience would take away every doubt.
When innocent people found out
that mind and matter could not interact,
he would be there
to put the representations of things into every mind
at the right moment.
When innocent people could not understand
why there still was so much evil in the actual world,
his omnipotence would allow them to live
in the best of all possible worlds:
a world in which their virtue and piety could stand out.

When his nature came up,
he would be exclusively human:
anthropopathic and anthropomorphic;
and he himself or his prophet or prophets
would be exclusively male at that.
When his extraction came up,
he himself or his sole or last prophet
would have arisen from one people:
the chosen race dwelling in and round the chosen city.

It is the image of this one being
which provided, or still readily provides, the satisfaction
for sexist, ethnocentrist or other exclusivist desires,
and it is the image of this one being
which provided, or still readily provides, the pseudosolution
to a myriad of theoretical and practical problems.
However,
without eliminating the causes of dissatisfaction themselves,
and without adding anything to our knowledge
of factual, modal or normative ground-conditions.
In the main it was, or has remained, the Great Put-off,
the Mumbo Jumbo:
the Solution begging the questions instead of answering them,
the Symbol causing the problems instead of solving them.

Since the image of this one being was, or still is,
so infinitely multifarious,
'He' has many names, one be
the Most Exclusive.
While the spirit of the Most Exclusive
has reigned over too many poor and oppressed people
in the past,
it shall not reign anymore over free and fearless people
in the future.




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