Traditionally both monotheists and atheists have taken it for granted that the concept of 'supreme being' (or 'Supreme Being') is the same as that of a solitary 'god' (or 'God'). But if god is a supernaturalist or exclusivist concept, supreme being will have to be such a kind of concept too. And if god has a negative connotation, supreme being must also have a negative connotation. Tho this may in practise be the case for most traditional atheists, it certainly cannot be based on the meanings of the constituents supreme and being. It must derive from the assumed identity of supreme being and (solitary) god (or God). This assumed identity, however, cannot serve to prove the identity.

As a matter of fact, the notions of 'supremeness', of 'being' and of 'supreme being' are all fully intelligible and meaningful, and there is nothing supernaturalistic or exclusivistic in attributing a positive value to the concept of 'supremeness'. On the contrary: every denominational or other normative doctrine has at least an implicit notion of what is, or would be, superior or supreme in terms of the value or values of that doctrine. Superior is that entity or state of affairs which is of a higher value, that is, of a higher normative value. To say "normatively superior" or "supreme" is to distinguish these normative notions of 'superiority' and 'supremeness' from factual and modal notions of 'supremacy'. (The terminology with respect to the normative and other auxiliaries we have discussed in 3.1.2.) A certain being may, for example, be the most masculine (anthropomorphic) being in the universe, but if masculinity is no value, or no value in itself, in the normative doctrine concerned, then the entity's supreme masculinity is merely an instance of factual supremacy (in the doxastic terms of that doctrine). Or --to take another arbitrary example-- a certain being may be the most powerful being in the universe, but if power is no value, or no value in itself, either, then the entity's state of being supremely powerful is merely an instance of modal supremacy. It is only if masculinity and power were values (or 'great-making properties') in themselves that (on the extremist account) an all-masculine or all-powerful being would be normatively supreme, and hence a 'supreme being' -- or perhaps a 'supreme being', dependent on its other properties.

The meaningfulness and realist nature of the notion of 'supreme being' or 'being supreme' does by no means imply the actual existence of a (state of) supreme being. An actually existing entity is not normatively supreme by having some predicate or combination of predicates to be filled in later (as in the modal proof of Mono's existence); it is normatively supreme by having a particular predicate or combination of predicates, namely that set of predicates which it should have on the basis of a particular set of norms and values. This presupposes that the combination of predicates is logically and physically possible, and that the set of norms and values believed in is the right one. Hence, if omnipotence were really a great-making characteristic, not only in the modal but also in the normative sense, a supreme being would only exist if there were an entity which would indeed be all-powerful and which at the same time would have all other logically compatible characteristics for being normatively supreme. For example, if omniscience were another great-making characteristic, a supreme being would only exist if there were an entity which would indeed be at once omnipotent and omniscient, while having all other great-making characteristics as well. An entity which would solely be omnipotent, and not omniscient, for instance, would not do. And neither would an entity which would not be omnipotent or omniscient, but which would nevertheless be more powerful, and know more, than any other entity in the whole world. On an absolute definition of supreme being such an entity would still not be the supreme being, even if it possessed all other great-making predicates of the world in the strict sense.

On the relative definition of supreme being (when referring to a thing rather than to a state of affairs) the supreme being is that existing entity whose nature more closely resembles that of an imaginary being with the ideal combination of attributes and relations than any other existing entity. As regards a particular denominational doctrine ideal then stands for what is normatively superior in terms of its own norms and values. In the event that it has merely one value, or that its values can be ordered lexicographically, it is quite clear in principle which being in the world would be supreme. Thus if personal power is the denomination's sole value, or the first one in a serial order of several values, then the supreme being is that personal being which is more powerful than any other personal being (assuming that there are not two or more entities equally powerful). As illustrated above, on this conception the supreme being may be some president or plutocrat (who is living now, or who was/is/will be more powerful than anyone who ever lived/lives/will live). When other qualities than power are considered, the supremo in question could be anything, however: male, female, both or neither; old, young, (both?) or neither; wise, stupid, (both?) or neither; courageous, pusillanimous, (both?) or neither; and so forth and so on. If the denominational doctrine acknowledges more than one value or 'great-making characteristic' and if it can, or does, not order those values lexicographically, the supreme being could be anything with respect to any value. The choice with which every denominational doctrine dealing with the concept of a supreme being is confronted, is therefore to opt either for the guaranteed existence of the supreme being (in the relative definition), but with the possibility that it does not match the doctrinal ideal by any means; or for the possible nonexistence of the supreme being (in the absolute definition), but with the guarantee that it does wholly match the ideal. Sincere denominationalists just cannot have it both ways!

The existence or nonexistence of a supreme being named "God", has always been the prime issue in the traditional monotheist-atheist debate, monotheists claiming the existence of 'God', atheists denying it (and agnosticists saying that they don't know). Both parties have thus implicitly agreed that the question of the existence of a supreme being would not only be important, but more important than the question of the ideal propagated by dint of that supreme being; or (if it does not exist) by dint of its image. But if theodemonism, and denominationalism in general, is ideology --and it is-- it is its ideal which is more fundamental than anything else. It is by way of that ideal that we come to know a denominational doctrine's norms and values -- the norms and values which also determine what kind or state of being may be believed to be normatively supreme. Only by concentrating on its ideal do we enter the normative core of the comprehensive ideology in question and can we find out about all its principles, or lack thereof. Whether we will be excited, disgusted, both or neither, it cannot be denied that the symbol of a supreme being or the concepts of normative superiority and supremeness play a significant role in denominational disciplinary thought. All of us will have to personally pass a last judgment on religion and theodemonism one day, but if, and when, it results in a rejection of these obsolete modes of denominationalism, it need not affect the belief in a supreme being or its image.