The classification of the main streams of the normative-philosophic landscape is partially based on whether they spring from goodness, from rightness or from good character. Having already discussed and rejected motivism which primarily rests on what is (believed to be) virtuous and praiseworthy (or a good character), we will now first direct our attention to two other sorts of normative theory traditionally distinguished. One warning is called for tho: the subdivision here presented does not parallel the three horizons of the ethical profile. When comparing the two subdivisions all nonmotivist types of theory can be located on the level of performatory values, rights or duties, or on the two levels of performatory and intentional values, rights or duties.

We will start with consequentialism in general, which claims that the ultimate criterion of what one should (not) do (is right, obligatory, and so on) is the performatory value which is brought into being. In other words: the agent should produce the best state of future affairs as seen from the standpoint of one or more performatory values. An act is said to be 'right' in consequentialism 'if and only if it, or the rule under which it falls, causally produces, or is intended to produce, at least as great a future balance of good over evil as any available alternative'. From this definition alone it follows already that (purely) performatory consequentialism is to be distinguished from (performatory-)intentional consequentialism. The former is exclusively concerned with the actual outcome of the act; the latter is also concerned with the agent's intention, and 'er acting on the basis of 'er information and presuppositions.

In all consequentialist (and mixed) theories one should not only consider the short-term, direct effects of an act but also the long-term and indirect ones. This means that the situation in which the act takes place should be considered over a period long enough to establish to a sufficient degree what all the consequences of the act at issue are. The total effect of what is abstracted from a situation as being a 'single' or 'simple act' can only be determined when all the past, present and future causally relevant features are taken into account. For example, the direct effects of the act at issue may turn out to be very much smaller (even naught) in a situation where similar acts are seldom performed than in one where they are frequently performed (in particular if there are the kind of threshold-related effects we will deal with in the next section under Decision-theoretical consequentialism). An indirect effect of an action which does, perhaps, not have the desired, direct consequences is the positive effect which setting a good example may have in the long run. A person may decide to cast 'er vote, for instance, even when this one vote is not needed (anymore), only to make clear to 'er fellow-citizens that there are (nonegoistic) people in favor of the institution in question. This will encourage those who think likewise and if the institution can be justified on consequentialist grounds, the indirect, long-term effect of such a vote has to be judged favorable as well.

Some theorists characterize all versions of consequentialism as not agent-relative; others propagate an agent-relative form of consequentialism, that is, a form in which values are 'specified by reference to the agent for whom they provide reasons'. We will return to this subject in the context of goal-rights systems (8.1.1 and 8.3.1). At the moment it suffices to consider only non-agent-relative consequentialism. Whether a particular normative doctrine or theoretical complex which is agent-relative or identity-dependent in some way is, then, still to be termed "consequentialistic" is, perhaps, in the end merely a question of definition.

If a single act is assessed on the basis of the consequences it has in one particular case, ethical theorists speak of "act-consequentialism"; if it is assessed on the basis of the consequences of the adoption of a general rule of which it is one particular instance, then of "rule-consequentialism". In act-consequentialism an act is said to be right if it produces, or is intended to produce, the greatest balance of good over evil in the world, without reference to a rule. Rule-consequentialism, on the other hand, emphasizes the central role of rules in morality and claims that it is in practise hardly possible to judge what the separate consequences of single acts might be every time. There is also a third variant, which is called "general consequentialism" because it does not demand that people follow certain rules, but rather that they ask themselves in every situation what would happen if everyone were to do so and so in this or such a situation. It has already been mentioned that the general consequentialist appeals to the principle that if an action is right for person A to do in 'er situation, then it is right for everyone to do who is similarly situated in relevant respects. The general consequentialist thus makes an implicit use of the relevance principle, or --as has been argued-- a principle of universalizability. As noted in section 5.3.5 the relevance principle may already be part of the consequentialist definition of bringing about or producing a value and the general consequentialist does then nothing else than to use it again in a wider context. It would serve clarity, however, to recognize it explicitly. (The question of universalizability we will briefly discuss in the next division.)

The performatory values of a consequentialist theory, or the principles based on it, may be either aggregative or distributive. Aggregative principles deal with a value which is the sum total of something, whereas distributive principles deal with a value which represents a certain way of distributing something (let's say "goods"). An aggregative value is, for example, the (greatest) sum total of happiness in the world, and distributive values are, for example, (distributive) equality or justice. Perhaps relevance may be called "a distributive value" too. Utilitarianism, as a form of consequentialism with the greatest happiness as sole principle, has no way to guarantee that the distribution of goods among sentient beings or persons will be an equal or proportional one (proportionate to their needs and/or merits, for instance). Therefore, if an equal or proportional distribution is a good thing in itself (with equality or proportionality as a performatory value), utilitarianism fails.

To bring about an unequal or disproportional distribution of goods among sentient beings or persons is wrong and an act of injustice, assuming that disproportional refers to the condition in which the differences cannot be justified as being relevant. The consequentialist, however, starts, with the badness of the inequality or irrelevance, whereas a nonconsequentialist nonmotivist (a deontologist to be precise) would start from the wrongness of what 'e calls "an unjust act". Some ethical theorists claim that a pattern of distributing things could be 'right' in itself, but this is a mistake: a pattern is good or bad (or maybe neither); bringing about a pattern by a certain way of distributing things is right or wrong (or neither). Here the relationship between the right and the good resembles more and more that between the chicken and the egg (with the consequentialist representing the School of the Eggs and the deontologist representing the School of the Chickens). If equality is a distributive value, it is also in consequentialism a value in itself, irrespective of what (else) it may be conducive to, or not be conducive to.

Monism is a doctrinal ideal in disciplinary thought, but if we value justice or equality and relevance, then utilitarian monism violates an important principle. Altho it has been made plausible, or not implausible, that the greatest happiness principle need not lead to gross inequalities in practise, it remains a contingent matter in utilitarianism that gross inequalities or injustices are absent (if so). A utilitarian who could bring about more happiness in a human community by making the rich richer and the poor poorer would have to do so (assuming that the situation remains the same for all other sentient beings). Not only would 'e have to do that on the happiness- or utility-principle, 'e would not even have to regret the inequality or injustice. It is also possible in a pluralist theory that people would, on balance, have to increase certain differences in order to maximize an aggregative value, but if equality is one of such a theory's values, increasing these differences would still be prima facie wrong in that particular respect, and therefore regrettable.

What applies to equality, relevance and justice also applies to truth, which is not recognized as an independent value either in utilitarianism. Should in a particular situation lying have more good than bad consequences in terms of happiness (for example, because it makes the liar more happy than it makes the person lied to unhappy), the act-utilitarian will have to lie. Now, a rule-utilitarian would argue that a rule against lying is very useful, that always telling the truth is for the greatest general good, even if it yielded more bad effects than good ones in a limited number of cases. But also this argument, altho plausible, makes the wrongness of lying a contingent matter, for if the rule did not happen to be utility-maximizing, it would not be valid. Antiutilitarians have been eager to point out that the utilitarians' great anxiety about getting values like justice and honesty somehow included in the hedonistic calculus is itself an admission that justice and honesty, or equality, relevance and truth, are indeed values besides happiness or utility. There certainly is much more than a grain of truth in this accusation, yet it may be equally plausible that certain antiutilitarians do not only recognize some other values which should be strived for, but also ignore some values which should be strived for, namely conceptual and axiomatic clarity and austerity. Altho the utilitarian attempt at devising a normative unitary field theory has failed, the attempt at finding such a theory is in itself praiseworthy.