To overcome the more or less notorious situations in which pure deontology turned out to provide no substantive normative directive, or to be too meager a doctrine on its own, deontology has been mixed by some with consequentialism. And to overcome the more or less notorious situations in which utilitarianism turned out to provide the wrong normative directive, or, similarly, to be too meager a doctrine on its own, this form of pure consequentialism has been mixed by some with deontology. So a theory may be deontological in that it recognizes, and in the way it interprets, a principle of justice, and consequentialistic in that it recognizes a principle of utility or beneficence. Such theories have been classified as "mixed deontological", but this expression is as confused and partial as the message mixed male when used by an informant to describe the makeup of a group consisting of both female and male, moral agents.

Deontology is also used by many ethical theorists to denote any normative doctrine or theoretical complex which is not entirely consequentialistic and future-regarding in every respect. However, this terminology bypasses the following division of nonmotivist normative theories into three classes, namely:

1. value- or goal-based theories (consequentialistic if only future-regarding);
2. duty-based theories (to be classified as "deontological" by us);
3. right(-duty)-based theories (not to be classified as "deontological" by us).

Just as in deontology an act can be right regardless of its consequences with respect to a performatory value, so can in a right-based theory someone or something have a right, not only regardless of the consequences of being given that right, but also regardless of fulfilling a deontological duty. If respecting a right would have bad consequences, or if in exercising this right a consequentialist or deontological duty would not be fulfilled, the person or being in question could have this right nevertheless on the account of a right-based theory.

The concept of right is so important in normative philosophy, and the role of value-based or duty-generating principles in relation to the ethics of rights so delicate, that we will devote the following chapter to this subject. When we eventually opt for a goal-based doctrine which is not only future-, but also present- and past-regarding, it is our right to turn to such a form of teleology which morally enables us to personally do so.