The question whether rights exist at all is little interesting from the point of view of normative discourse, for sentences in which rights are mentioned can always be translated into should- or ought-sentences somehow --they may only sound less emphatic (unless the depreciation of the right notion has already gone too far). True should- or ought-sentences do in turn correspond to (the absence of) a norm, whether a supernorm, a subnorm or some intermediate norm. (While we have already ascertained that the existence of norms, at least of some norms, must be granted.) Statements about mandatory rights can quite easily be converted into statements in which one or more norms that one should or should not do something are mentioned. For statements about (general) discretionary rights this relationship between rights and ought-sentences may seem less obvious, because in such statements reference is indirectly made to the absence of both a norm that one should do X and a norm that one should not do X (albeit merely the absence from a 'particular', nondoctrinal point of view, if the right is extrinsic). In this sense the concept of a discretionary right is clearly a privative normative concept, and therefore discretionary rights do certainly not exist, strictly ontologically speaking. Yet, in the language of normative discourse the 'existence of rights' is in principle a question of normative philosophy or ideology, not (or hardly) of ontology anymore. To say that 'a particular right exists' may there in one case amount to an assertion that a certain norm or set of norms really exists, in another case to the assertion that a certain norm or set of norms does not really exist.

The question whether intrinsic rights exist is of great normative significance, altho it must be reformulated in terms relating to whole intrinsic right-duty constellations. If such constellations exist, then both intrinsic duties and intrinsic rights exist. The idea that only intrinsic rights would exist, or only intrinsic duties, is preposterous. Now, as intrinsic right-duty constellations depend for their justification on one or more principles of one or more particular (first-order) normative doctrines, the 'existence' of these constellations (in a normative, nonontological sense) also depends on those doctrines. Therefore the question whether intrinsic rights exist, can only be answered by us on the basis of our own normative doctrine. However, as we will be primarily concerned with the instruments and the preparatory development of our thought in this book of the Model, not with unveiling the fundaments of the doctrine itself, this is not an appropriate place to discuss that issue. We will consider the existence and contents of intrinsic rights and duties in the Book of Fundamentals again.

The question whether extrinsic right-duty constellations 'exist' (in a normative sense) does not depend on any particular first-order normative doctrine or type of doctrine, and can be dealt with here. Being a normative, not an ontological, issue, their 'existence' is a question of their justification. It is this justification which must, by definition, not rest on one or more principles paradigmatic of a particular doctrine or class of doctrines. The only feasible kind of justificatory principle left over is, then, a metadoctrinal principle. But how is this to be interpreted? To find that out, we have to return to some of the basics of our triadic, hierarchical ontology.

A theory or doctrine is in some way a whole of propositions or (when expressed) utterances, factual or potential. This means that a hierarchy of doctrinal levels can be constructed parallel but not identical to that of propositional levels. A first-order theory is, then, a theory about nondoctrinal reality, that is, nonpropositional reality and propositional reality insofar as it is not doctrinal. If such a theory is descriptive or factual, it is primarily a theory about (what are believed to be) facts; if normative, then about (what are believed to be) norms. Now, just as a second-order proposition is not necessarily a proposition about one or more first-order propositions only, so a second-order theory is not necessarily a theory about one or more first-order theories only: it may also be a theory about the relationship between (something in) first-order doctrinal reality and (something in) nonpropositional or nondoctrinal reality. And just as the correspondence theory of truth deals with the relationship between a first-order proposition and nonpropositional reality on the second propositional level, so we can conceive of a 'metadoctrine' on the second doctrinal level dealing with the relationship between a first-order doctrine and nondoctrinal reality, or something in nondoctrinal reality. When this 'something' is the very person holding the first-order doctrine, and when this (non-metadoctrinal) doctrine is a normative one, the relationship in question becomes unique in the context of extrinsic right-duty constellations. If the second-order doctrine about the relationship between people and first-order normative doctrines is itself descriptive, it is about their theories, ideas and ideologies, that is, a psychological, sociological or anthropological study. If it is normative, however, it is about the first-order normative theory or ideology people ought or ought not to adhere to, or have or have not the right to adhere to.

Two things should have become clear now: firstly, that the principles typical of a second-order normative doctrine are metadoctrinal; and secondly, that the notion of person is crucial in this context. Of course, a metadoctrinal principle is also a 'doctrinal' principle, just as a metatheory is also a theory. What counts is that we can, and if necessary do, differentiate metadoctrinal and non-metadoctrinal, doctrinal principles. Thus when we contrast doctrinal and metadoctrinal, doctrinal is short for first-order doctrinal.

The significance of the notion of person need not surprise us. Basic rights have been derived before from the necessary conditions for purposive action. As conditions 'choice' and 'capability' have been mentioned. By itself this could still be interpreted in a broader sense also covering nonpersonal animals with interests. This, however, cannot be done with the classical foundation of natural rights on the equality of all people as rational beings (rather than as beings with needs, desires or interests). Nonpropositional beings, such as rational beings or people, do only have some typical relationship with propositional beings, such as normative doctrines, as rational beings, that is, as people. This is what distinguishes them in this respect from mere human beings, mere animal beings or mere beings with needs, desires or interests.