The first pitfall to be avoided when theorizing on property is the confusion of having, as it refers to the ultimate relationship in our ontological frame of reference, and possessing or --what is even more serious-- owning. Having in the sense of having a component part or attribute has an ontological status entirely different from having in the sense of owning; and the same holds for the inverse of having, namely belonging to. Having in the sense of having-as-an-element is a relationship we must implicitly or explicitly recognize in order to be able to communicate at all (or else, we must refer to an equivalent, such as being-an-element-of). Owning, on the other hand, is from the ontological point of view a redundant relationship like loving or hating. There is nothing in our ontology that forces us to accept the existence of such a relation. But if we recognize it --which we do for other than ontological reasons--, this has nothing to do with 'having' in the ontological sense: a person may have an object (as an element) without owning it, and 'e may own an object without having it (as an element). The fact that to have is also used instead of to own, and to possess also instead of to have, is a merely linguistic phenomenon (altho the inability to make the appropriate distinctions will both have caused it and be caused by it). In everyday language having and possessing are widely interchangeable and used as generic terms for any relation of belonging or of being controlled, kept, regarded or experienced as one's own. Yet, this merely means that terms such as having, possessing and belonging are homonyms with different meanings not to be mixed up. A perfect example of confusing the different meanings of belonging is the statement that 'men belong to the earth and not vice versa'. If 'men' belong to the earth, this must be read as being part of; if the earth belongs to them, belonging is to be read as being owned by.

As soon as we have divorced the different meanings of having and possessing it need not surprise us anymore that we may be said 'to have our body and our qualities or faculties', and 'to own our body', but not 'to own our qualities, faculties or attributes'. Owning and possessing (in a sense different from having as an element) can only apply to entities which are nonbasic things in the same domain of discourse as people. Thus, whereas it does not make sense to ask whether we own the 'mental satisfactions and bodily endowments' we have ('our' and 'our' body's attributes), it does make sense to ask whether we own the body we have as an element, and as the only component part ('our' body). Hence, also the expression my body has two different meanings: (1) the body i have as an element or (the sole) component part and (2) the body i own. To equate these two meanings and to say that the body we have as a person is always the body we own, is a normative assertion. It is indeed part of the right to personhood that a person owns the body 'e has as an element, or, if owning is stipulatively restricted to objects which one does not have as a part in a strict or loose sense, that no-one owns the body one has, and thus, that no-one else owns it. The ontological and logical differences and diversity of meaning just precede all normative considerations.

If the use of to own is not restricted to external things, a body is the only thing a person can or does both own and have as an element in the strict sense. 'E has attributes, but 'e does not own them; and the parts of the body which 'e has 'e does not have in the strict sense, whereas 'e can or does own every part of the body 'e has. As regards the rest, that is, every primary thing which the person does neither have in a strict sense nor in a loose sense, 'e may own or not own it.

The term possession is not only employed in the standard sense of something owned, ownership or property but also in the different, especially legal, sense of control or occupancy of an object without regard to ownership. Usufruct, then, is the legal right of using and enjoying the fruits or profits of something owned by someone else. (A related notion is stewardship). If it is considered acceptable to say that 'one controls the body one has', then every person possesses 'er body in this sense, whether 'e owns it or not. This holds, too, for the parts of the body one has. Conversely, if someone with a different body controlled one's body, and 'possessed' it in this sense, 'e still would not own it, and 'e could never have it (as an element).

The relations of having, possessing and owning are at least dyadic. The entity which or who has something need not be a person, it may be any more complex system provided that it has whole-attributes in addition to its component parts. This is also true of possession and ownership. The owner may be an individual person, a group of individuals (part of a community), a community, a state, or a larger community or institution. In general an owner is somehow a person or a group of people (household, community or otherwise). Instead of person the phrases natural or private individual are also used to distinguish it from artificial person or corporation. An 'artificial person' is a group or collective of people and also includes families or people living together in one household. These groups are also termed "private", while not being regarded as 'artificial persons' or 'corporations'. To make confusion worse confused, private property does in common parlance not only refer to the property of natural individuals, or to that of households or families, but also to that of 'private corporations'. And, then, 'corporate property' is not only the property of 'private' corporations, also state property is classified as 'corporate property'. On this view 'property' is not necessarily an exclusive individual right. But on the other hand, it has been said that property is something that especially individuals and families enjoy, something they need for their immediate subsistence. On this interpretation it is opposed to the type of mastery over goods and lands enjoyed by governmental authorities. Yet, it is precisely this type of 'mastery' which is called "state property" or "public ownership" by others.

We ourselves shall speak of "individual property" when the owner is one person, and of "communal property" when the owner is a group of two or more persons. The so-called 'community property' traditionally held by a married couple jointly is a form of communal property too. The distinction between 'private' and 'collective' property is, then, another one with a vague transition zone between private and collective . Is the communal property of two, or a small number of, people 'private' or 'collective', or only 'private' if, and insofar as, they share one household? Private is also used in the sense of nonstate or nongovernmental and it would thus serve clarity to differentiate governmental and nongovernmental, collective property. Finally, private property is also defined as the property which is historically based on the labor of its owner but which in a society with capital accumulation has come to exist only where the means of labor belong to 'private individuals'. Its antithesis is, then, said to be 'social' or 'collective property'. By itself it is not very important which definitions are chosen, so long as the language user does not embrace a terminology which is conceptually mixed up, and so long as 'e sticks to one and the same meaning of each word where clarity requires it. Furthermore, 'e (or he) should not speak of "private property" as the property of individuals where it means that one man (a husband, for instance) is made the (exclusive) owner of a holding which is de facto possessed and managed by a group of one man and one woman and/or other human beings together.

At least the following, logically possible categories of primary things owned or possessed can be distinguished:

• the body of the owner 'imself (if an individual) or its component parts;
• (other) persons or groups of people, or their bodies or parts thereof;
• (other) sentient beings such as pets or not so tame animals;
• external, inanimate things (also called "external possessions"). A useful subdivision of these external, nonsentient beings is the one between consumer goods (such as food and clothes) and productive resources or means of production (by which power over other people can be exercised).

This classification does not show the normative possibilities of ownership or possession, and some possibilities should, perhaps, be ruled out even on logical grounds. Thus it is questionable whether a person can even logically speaking 'own' or 'possess' another person in the strict sense. But the idea of ownership or possession of another person's body or bodily parts is certainly comprehensible. To reject such a conception is to reject it for moral or normative reasons.

We have not yet made a distinction between corporeal, or 'real', and incorporeal property. And we have not yet subdivided corporeal property into movable and immovable property. When doing this, we should keep in mind, however, that it is often too readily taken for granted that the description of a so-called 'corporeal' thing would and could not make a difference with regard to the question of ownership. That important issue will be dealt with in section 9.2.4.