9.4.2

AN EQUAL SHARE IN ALL OTHER THINGS NOT PERSON-MADE

To determine the implications of the right to personhood with respect to property we, firstly, need not, and must not, make any assumption about the value or disvalue of individual or private property in other things than the bodies of people. Every such assumption would be alien to the nature of the extrinsic right-duty constellation. Secondly, we need not, and must not, make any assumption about the person in question being a citizen of a state or not: `e may be stateless, `e may live in an anarchic (democratic) community, `e may live in a totalitarian (democratic) state, or somewhere in between; this is of no normative significance, metadoctrinally speaking. It requires one or more doctrinal principles to justify a certain amount of private property, or to maximize it as much as possible, or to minimize it as much as possible. And it requires one or more doctrinal principles to justify a communal or societal organization with a certain role and function, or to maximize that role, or to minimize that role. Even when someone wants to argue that a certain kind of state is the best institution to guarantee an active, discretionary right like the right to personhood to its citizens, this argument itself, which must be based on one or more axioms and empirical assumptions, is one among several others and cannot be granted any special status.

All living people should be respected equally as persons: this is the metadoctrinal, normative foundation of the system of extrinsic property rights too. It is a dictum which transcends all divergent ideas on empirical reality, on morality itself, on the role of the state (if any) and on the status of individual or private property. Now, how can such a theoretical conception, or rather lack of any (doctrinal) conception, explain what people`s moral rights to property are? Well, it may often not explain what people`s particular property rights are, with the notable exception of the right in their own bodies, but it does have a strong impact as a double-edged principle: on the one hand, it creates or extends property rights which on a doctrinal view would have been nonexisting or more limited, and on the other hand, it partially or completely annuls other so-called 'property rights' which on a doctrinal view would have existed or would have been more extensive. (These doctrinal views include the belief that one always would have moral reasons to obey the law of the land, and not just legal or prudential ones.)

If living people are indeed respected personally, they all have an equal initial right or share in all things which are not made by anyone personally. Thus they have an equal initial right (that is, an initial right to an equal value) in all land which is not person-made --'man-made' or 'anthropogenic', as it has traditionally been called. (A clear example of land which is not person-made are nature reserves; a clear example of land which is person-made are polders reclaimed from the sea.) All living people who have never sold, given away or otherwise personally alienated any land in their lives own the same portion of all land which is in private hands if, and insofar as, it has not been created by people (and assuming that they have not 'bought' or 'received' such land from still-living other people, in which case they own more if the former owners were rightful owners on the same principle). Furthermore, the same people have an equal share in all land which belongs to the community or society of which they are members. (If this ownership is not rightful, the share of the individuals is the same nevertheless relative to the total amount of land, altho the total amount may be too small or too big in comparison with other communities or societies.)

What applies to land as a natural element, applies to all natural resources. And also in this case the proportion between individual and communal, or between private and collective, ownership is of no import whatsoever. The sole thing which counts is that, before anyone personally alienates a part of `er property or share, everyone has an equal right to property in natural land and resources, and an equal share in natural land and resources which is held in common. If there is no private property at all, then everyone has an equal share in everything which is not produced by anyone personally; and if everything which is not produced by anyone personally is in private hands, then everyone owns the same amount of property unless `e personally alienates or has alienated it to a still-living person, or unless `e personally has bought or received it from a still-living person; or part of it. (Since the 'sale' or 'gift' of land or a quantity of natural resources is only rightful so long as both the seller or donor and the buyer or beneficiary stay alive, it is probably better to speak of a case of 'granting a loan' or 'renting', altho the loan or rental may be irrevocable.)

Even the private property right is a share in the total amount of private property for it does automatically become less when the number of living people increases, or when the amount of land held in private hands decreases (for other reasons than that some people sell or give their portion or part of it to the community or state). And it automatically becomes more when the total population decreases, or when the amount of private land increases. Should this sound impractical, this will be a reason to always hold enough of the land in common, so that part of it can be privatized when the population increases (assuming that not all land is held in common). In that case the size of the private lots does not have to change. Of course, in practise, numerous other arrangements are possible, like compensation in money for those who have a smaller or no portion, if, and so long as, they agree to such an arrangement.

The idea of an absolute right in land or natural resources independent of the number of living persons is a product of fallacious, doctrinal speculation. No-one can have such a right to a piece of land larger than the area occupied by `er own body. Land (particularly fertile or unspoiled land) and natural resources are either scarce, so that not enough and as good are left over (in the event that a person takes more than `er share), or they are not, but also then a person must not use more of it than `er share. If other people do not use their share, that is their extrinsic right (even when they cannot use it). To tell them to use it, and how to use it, is to force doctrinal tenets upon them, and this is precisely what the right to personhood does not allow. Absolutist theorists on property who claim that one human being or family could have the right in a piece of land with fixed boundaries, inclusive of its natural resources, and that `e or they could freely devise such an estate, flagrantly violate other people`s right to personhood (especially when the population increases). And they flagrantly violate the rights of future persons still unborn. Not only is the right in a natural element never absolute, but always somehow a share, a person cannot even conceptually have the right to devise land or resources which are not person-made. `E can sell or rent them, give them away or lend them, but it does remain a share `e deals with. This share terminates the moment `e dies, and therefore it is not possible to devise such land or natural resources. A human being cannot properly sell or give away something `e does not own, or something `e does not own anymore at the moment of transference for other reasons than expressed in `er will.

Living people who do not own land or natural resources, altho there is natural land, and altho there are natural resources, privately owned, have an extrinsic right to an income, unless they have explicitly and voluntarily sold or given away their share in the land and natural resources. This right is an active ('negative'), no passive ('positive') right, because the income is a compensation for the fact that their extrinsic right is infringed upon, since they have less or nothing of these things. The income should restore their equality as persons. But they must agree to such a compensation. (Therefore the right to the income may also be conceived of as a special right.) If they do not agree, they still have an equal right to the actual land and resources. Not recognizing their equal property in the land and resources, if, and insofar as, they are not person-made, is plain theft. There is no difference in this respect between what is possessed privately and what is possessed collectively. All living people also have an equal share in the land and resources held by the state, or held by a state. That state has to pay them money for this share, either periodically (in which case it is an income) or at once; or else, it has to provide them with certain services. And, again, the living person who has never sold or otherwise alienated `er share, must agree to such a deal. If not, then `e continues to have an equal property in the actual land and resources.

As has already been explained in our discussion of social and economic rights --8.3.3-- the income a person may derive from `er share in all things (other than people`s bodies) which are not person-made is no 'basic' or 'minimum income' which would, by definition, be sufficient for a 'fully human life' or a 'decent living' or something of that ilk. The amount of money a person may receive as compensation for `er share may vary from nothing when there is no land (or water) privately owned, and when the land or waters which are collectively owned are not developed or exploited at all, to an amount so large that `e does not feel the need to work (for more luxuries), when most land is privately owned (by others) and/or when the land or waters which are collectively owned are industriously developed or exploited (also by others). On the metadoctrinal view it does not matter how high the income from `er share in the natural resources actually is; in practise it may be a question of bargaining. What counts here is the respect for the rights of personhood involved with regard to property. This does not only concern people`s power to sell or lease their property, to grant temporary use of it or to give it away, it also concerns their power to exclude nonowners from their property, whether it be an individual or a state.