When speaking of "the supreme being" it is first necessary to discuss some spatiotemporal aspects of this being. In the last resort, this is the way to distinguish a spatiotemporal primary thing which is supreme from other primary things. Maybe, some will argue that the supreme being, even if it is spatiotemporal, need not be at one place, but could be omnipresent or immanent in the whole of reality. If such a contention is to make sense at all, then those who argue this must confuse the notion of being supreme with the notion of supreme being. Any primary thing in the world that is ananic in a certain respect is supreme in that respect, and thus partakes of supremeness. But this having of a primary predicate which is neutral is quite something else than being a part of something that is neutrally catenal. Moreover, a neutral predicate (whether or not supreme) is not something spatiotemporal, nor does having a neutral predicate make something spatiotemporal. We had therefore better forget about an omnipresent or immanent, supreme being. It is only the norm of neutrality itself, the supremeness of ananicity and non-spatiotemporal supreme being which may be said to be 'omnipresent' in a more or less literary sense.

The principle of catenated neutrality does not apply to the predicates of temporal auxiliary series. (See F.3.1.5.) Therefore it is not the case that the supreme being would only exist at one supposedly 'neutral' moment in time. Yet, if we would like to treat time as space, we could say that the present moment is the neutral moment, and that the supreme being only exists 'now'. Altho the supreme being does, then, have no past and no future, it will in practise exist always (if existing at all), for the catenization concerned shifts as time proceeds.

If we say that the supreme exists only one moment, it simply cannot move. But even if we say that it exists always, it does not move either, for the all-ananic remains at the tri-neutral point forever. Rest is neutrality, and motion as unneutrality is alien to the supreme being. Nonetheless, motion is relative in practise and the all-ananic may actually change position with respect to a nonuniversal system of reference, that is, with respect to any other system. This is the case for example, if the tri-neutral point is flexible and only based on the location of the supreme being itself. (Compare the neutral present point which would only be based on the flexible moment of supreme existence.) Since the all-neutral being is at rest with regard to the theoretical, universal frame of reference, it could be called "extremely slow". This extremely positive form of catenality is that of the slowness catena, however, and the ananorm does not assign the highest normative value to the neutralities of catenas such as the slowness catena.

While the principle of neutrality does not apply to temporal series of auxiliary predicates, it does not apply to normative series of auxiliary predicates either. Insofar as goodness and badness are purely normative or evaluative concepts, the supreme being is all-good (or maximally good) by definition. It is then the norm of neutrality which determines that all-good stands for all-ananic, for (all-)goodness in itself is still devoid of any substance. But good can also be used in the factual sense of beneficent and bad in the sense of maleficent. Goodness is, then, the quality of giving rise to the increase of a happiness-catenary value, and badness the quality of giving rise to the decrease of that value. In that case the all-ananic is neither good nor bad, because the supreme being makes other beings neither happier nor unhappier. Both change and causing change are unneutral and the supreme being does not cause change, neither for the worse nor for the better. Hence, the all-ananic has no destructive or creative powers. It did not even create life, for instance --not even in a symbolic fashion--, because the creation of life, where no life has been terminated or terminates in the same period, would signify an increase in the number of living beings. (This is not to say that the coming into being of life could not be nanaic for reasons not related to the number of living beings.) The all-ananic did never destroy life either, because the destruction of life would signify suffering and a decrease in the number of living beings or the destruction of a natural balance. These are positive and negative predicates the supreme being does not have, and does not cause to have. So far as life is concerned, the supreme being symbolizes the maintenance of the neutrally good life and of the balance of life.

Every honor and dishonor is alien to the nature of the all-ananic: it does not honor, nor dishonor; and it is not honored, nor dishonored. If the all-ananic would assign a cultural or social value at all to other things, then only the limit value which is neither low nor high. Similarly, the supreme being itself can only be treated in accordance with the assignment of a value which is neither low nor high. We have clearly to distinguish the fact that it has the highest ananormative value from the fact that it would be treated in an exclusive way as a being with the highest cultural or social status, that is, from the fact that it would be honored. Since the supreme being can solely be treated in a neutral way, it can neither be honored nor dishonored. Also if the supreme being exists, there is no person in the universe who honors or dishonors 'im or it. Every purported veneration or worshiping of the supreme being is really the veneration or worshiping of an inferior being, for example, of an image of the supreme being, or of material attributes, living beings, people or institutions associated with that image.

What applies to honor and dishonor, applies to love and hatred. No-one loves or hates the supreme being; it is the image of the supreme being, or another inferior thing, which is loved or hated. Conversely, the supreme being 'imself or itself loves or hates no-one and nothing either. If catenal in this respect, it is ananic with regard to all of us, and with regard to all others.