A historical, so-called 'universal' declaration of human rights has it that (literally) all human beings 'are endowed with reason and conscience', that the family, as founded by people who are married, is 'the natural and fundamental group unit of society', that everyone has the right to 'security in the event of widowhood', that motherhood (not parenthood) is 'entitled to special care and assistance' and that 'elementary education shall be compulsory'. The same 'Declaration' pontificates that education ought to 'promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among religious groups'. Obviously such a formal document is nothing else than a general assemblage of the sensible and nonsensical, inclusive and exclusivist ideas which happened to be in vogue among politicians and officials of a multitude of nationalities at the moment of conception. It has thus become a disorderly coalition program of activating and nonactivating, intrinsic and extrinsic, doxastic rights or --even more disorderly-- 'rights and freedoms' (with at least one type of duty: 'the duty to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible').

Yet, one of the more sensible, nonexclusivist articles of the above ramshackle Declaration correctly states that everyone has the right 'to freedom of peaceful assembly and association' and that 'no-one may be compelled to belong to an association'. In the systematic context of our Model this must be classified, of course, as a right of personhood. It is the extrinsic, nonactivating right to assemble peacefully, that is, in such a way that other people's rights to personhood are respected equally; and the right to associate, or to belong to an association. As the right is extrinsic and nonactivating, it is also the right not to assemble (even peacefully) and the right not to associate or to belong to an association. If the Declaration had been more consistent in its religionist tenor, it should have explicitly mentioned too that no-one ought to be compelled to belong to a religious organization in particular.

Now, in the Ananorm the right to belong to an association or not to belong to one, is not only an extrinsic right (of personhood) but also an intrinsic right. The Ananorm does not know any independent or derivative principle of association or nonassociation. The intrinsic message of the Book of Fundamentals is that everyone should live as much as possible in conformity with truth and neutral-inclusivity. It does not and cannot say, however, to which particular state of being, or to which particular nanaic action, priority must be given. This has to be left to the capacities and interpretations of individual persons and groups and to the circumstances in which they find themselves. (The Model is in this respect as open-ended as a scientific paradigm.) Neutral-inclusivist symbolism is even more subject to these individual considerations, because it serves only indirectly the establishment and maintenance of neutral-inclusivity. The requirement is that it does so on the whole and at least in the long run, but if someone else can contribute to neutral-inclusivity to the same or to a higher degree without denominational symbolism and without joining a denominational or other organization 'e should certainly do so instead.

Both fundamental action or abstention and participation in the DNI's symbolism can be a purely individual or a social expression of adherence to the values of the doctrine. Symbols or forms of symbolism such as those concerned with mourning, singing or meditation can be expressive of only one person's spiritual thoughts (or nonthought) and feelings. Even for the observance of the suprapersonal special days it is not necessary to be with other people, other families or other groups. When an ideological action or practise is the expression of the thoughts and feelings of a group, however, we may speak of "socialization", and when such a group is organized in some way, of "organization". If centered round a comprehensive (rather than a political) ideology, such socialization and organization are of a sociodenominational nature.

Those who organize, or participate in, sociodenominational activities should, of course, not disturb or interrupt those who do not want to participate in these activities, unless social or legal rights equal to those of other comprehensive or political ideologies are being exercised on special occasions. (Such rights are then actually or hypothetically the result of a social contract between free persons.) Similarly, adherents of the Ananorm shall not have to accept any disturbance or interruption by a religous or other ideological practise of fellow citizens; even (or particularly) not if its meaning is purely symbolic, unless rights equal to those of themselves are being exercised on special occasions.

No-one has any moral obligation as a citizen to participate in social activities organized by a state, party or other institution, if the belief in a god or demon, in a supernatural power, in any particular religion or ideology, or in any particular congeries of related ideologies, is given a special status in those activities. Furthermore, a lesson to be learned from religious and party-political history is that socialization and organization should be forced neither on nonadherents nor on adherents, whether by someone representing, or purporting to represent, the state, the party or any other such institution.