---------------------------------------------------------------- InSite, 50 ASWW, July 1 www.xs4all.nl/~in/MNI/I/4/2/1 ---------------------------------------------------------------- 4.2 *THEORIES OF TRUTH* 4.2.1 *DEFINITION AND CRITERION* We have called the imaginary relationship between a proposition or system of propositions on a certain level and the reality below that level "correspondence". If it may be said to exist, the proposition or system of propositions in question is `true`. In other words, on this view truth consists in some form of correspondence between proposition, belief, and so on, and the factual, modal and normative conditions. The correspon- dence relationship itself is imaginary since the real relation- ship is that between the things in the lower-level reality the proposition (or belief) is about. It is this relationship which is factual, modal or normative, and which exists if the factual, modal or normative proposition is true. For example, if A and B are friends, there is a relationship of friendship between A and B, and then < A and B are friends > is true. Hence, < A and B are friends > is true because there is a real relationship of friendship between A and B. It is only an indirect way of speaking to say that there is, then, a `correspondence` between the proposition and the fact that A and B are friends, or the factual friendship between A and B. The same applies to the fact that a thing C has an attribute D. If C is happy, for instance, there is a relationship of having-as-an- element between C and an attribute of happiness, and then < C has (an attribute of) happiness > or < C is happy > is true. The correspondence relationship between the true proposition < C is happy > and the fact that C is happy is therefore, strictly speaking, imaginary. What counts ultimately is that there is really the relationship of having-as-an-element between C and the happiness attribute D. Our `_relational theory of truth_` is quite simple where it concerns the truth of propositions which assert the existence of one-or-more-place relationships between things, including those between things and attributes. It is a little bit more compli- cated with respect to propositions like in which is a name. At first sight it might seem that this proposition does not involve any relation, even not that of having-as-an- element. This is misleading, however, as names are somehow abbreviations for definite descriptions ( like < the person born at that particular moment at that particular place > or < the person who(se body) is the first common child of that particular woman and that particular man > ). If an ordinary name has a sense, it may thus be equated with a so-called `co-designative definite description`, that is, a definite description which refers to the same object. It must be admitted that names may then have a different meaning for different people ( the most notorious one probably being ). It has also been suggested that every name is `loosely associated with a set of descrip- tions`. This may be correct in practise, but it will not do when considering the question whether it is true that A exists. Then we need one definite description or set of descriptions for A ( ultimately without using any name in those descriptions them- selves ). Given the description , or set of descriptions, the question has become whether there really is the particular kind of relationship between the particular things, or types of thing, mentioned in each description. If so, then it is true that A exists, if not, then < A exists > is false. ( It has been denied that a definite description would give the sense of a name. Yet, it is then still the reference of a name which must be fixed by means of some definite description. It is such a definite description which denotes the referent A which is said to exist in the actual world, not just in some possible world, unless the proposition is that A could exist or could have existed. ) If the imaginary relationship between a proposition and a factual, modal or normative condition on a lower propositional level may be said to exist, this is said to be a `fact`, a `fact` or `factual condition of correspondence` ; if it can exist, this is a `mode` or `modal condition of correspondence` ; if it should exist, a `norm` or `normative condition of correspondence`. Anything which has to do with the relations between propositions themselves, however, is no condition of correspondence, but just a first- or higher-order condition of thought, whether factual, modal or normative. And whereas cor- respondence is the key condition in the _correspondence theory_ _of__truth_, it is coherence or consistency which is the key condition in the _coherence__theory__of__truth_. One can find a synthesis of these theories by allowing correspondence the ontological part, while using coherence as a test of truth, playing an epistemological role. In both theories of truth there is a more or less intimate connection with the idea of the ultimate structure of the world, especially in the inter- pretation of correspondence as a structural isomorphism, and in the view of reality as a unified, coherent whole. An objection against both the correspondence- and the coher- ence-theories has always been that the concepts of `correspon- dence` and `coherence` are not or cannot be made adequately clear. This objection does not concern truth in our ontological framework, because we can exactly explain what it means that `a proposition corresponds with a factual, modal or normative condition`. We can define truth provisionally by means of correspondence, altho we basically define it in terms of a certain type of relationship (other than correspondence) between two or more particular things or types of thing ( of the same propositional level ) being there or not being there ( while < being there > itself may be factual, modal or normative ). The correspondence theory provides, then, the _definition_ of the word and the coherence theory only a _criterion_ or test by means of which to tell whether something can be true or is false. Since coherence is not a sufficient criterion anyhow to determine whether a theory is true or not, it does not matter that much that the meaning of < coherence > itself is vague to a certain extent. If a theory is definitely inconsistent because it affirms, for example, both that a thing has a certain relation and that it does not have that relation, then it is false; but if it is nowhere inconsistent in this obvious way, it still need not be true. That a proposition which coheres with a certain system of knowledge must be consistent with that system in that it does not imply a contradiction, is not what makes a vague notion. What makes it vague is that there is to be some `systematical connection` with that system of knowledge, at least if the system is to allow for empirical propositions as well. ( Historically, coherence was mistakenly presented as a sufficient criterion of truth for deductive systems based on a limited number of fundamental postulates. ) Not everyone has always agreed that there is a distinction between definition and criterion. Thus pragmatists have argued that the meaning of a term is correctly given precisely by supplying the criterions for its application. Of course, a definition like that of < truth > cannot be identical to a necessary criterion like coherence, but the difference is less obvious between a definition and a sufficient criterion, or a number of two or more criterions which are sufficient together. In the _pragmatic theory of truth_ `true` is what is ultimately satisfying to believe, either because the expectations such a belief arouses are fulfilled, or because it contributes to the satisfactoriness of, and effectiveness in, the conduct of life. Pragmatism does not work with in the definition of truth, nor with coherence as a test of truth. It is said that people just try to conserve their old belief set, while restoring consistence when new experience comes in. Pragmatic `truth` is a sort of warranted assertibility which characterizes knowledge as a mere form of belief. Theories of truth like the correspondence- and coherence- theories have been called "ontological theories of truth" (altho the coherence theory is in fact more `logical` than `onto- logical`). The pragmatic theory is, then, a `nonontological theory of truth`, and as such closely related to another non- ontological theory, the so-called `_consensus theory of truth_`. On this theory the truth of utterances depends on the possible consent of `all others` under ideal conversational conditions. The aim is said to indicate what a `discursive uptake` of claims to validity based on sense perception means. This should be pre- requisite for making the meaning of truth adequately clear. Hence it is here one particular method of verification which is made a criterion or definition of truth. Several objections have been brought against this consensus theory. One is that it does not allow for a satisfying definition of < falsehood >. (An utterance would have to be automatically false if there is no agreement under ideal speaking-conditions.) A second one is that people may agree that

is true and that is true, while

logically implies that is false ( particularly when

and are complicated utterances between which the connection is hard to discern ). A third one concerns propositions or statements about factual, modal or normative conditions in the past. These propositions or statements would solely be true if agreement is reached on them in the present or future. Yet, the proposition or statement, or what is stated, was true long before agreement was reached. ( The proposition even from the moment the thing in question did, could or should happen. ) Neither the consensus theory nor the pragmatic theory of truth is able to distinguish what is true from _the__belief__in_ what is true, or the propositional reality of beliefs from the lower-level propositional or nonpropositional reality of what the beliefs are about. They lack any propositional hierarchy with the accompanying, real or imaginary, relationships between the different levels of such a hierarchy. In this respect they are diametrically opposed to the _semantic theory of truth_ in which truth must be defined at every separate level of a propositional hierarchy of `languages`. The proposition which is true or not true is, then, expressed in what is called "object language", whereas the definition of truth in that language is given in a metalanguage on the next propositional level. (If the definition is applied to sentences, one and the same sentence may be true in one language and false or meaningless in another.) On the semantic theory of truth the definition of truth must not only be formally correct in that it is defined at one linguistic-propositional level at a time, it must also be materially adequate. This means that it must hold that P is true in language L if, and only if, p ( in which P is the name in the metalanguage of a sentence in the object-language, and p the translation in the metalanguage of that sentence in the object- language ). The underlying idea is that, for example, < water is transparent > is true `iff` ( that is, if and only if ) water is transparent. The reply to those who find this trivial is that the only question at issue here is that of the definition of truth, not some procedure or method to verify utterances, that is, not questions of epistemic justification. It has even been pointed out that the semantic conception of truth can be embraced `without having to give up any epistemological attitude one had already`. The left-hand side of the schema < P is true iff p > has been interpreted as referring to the language, that is, to proposi- tional reality. (Thus < is true> refers to a proposition, the proposition < water is transparent >.) The right-hand side would, then, refer to the facts. ( refers to transparent water, or rather to the relation water bears to the property of transparence. ) The schema

therefore fits the correspondence theo- ry of truth and our relational interpretation very well. The semantic theory of truth has been said to supply a suitably objective account of truth as a guiding or `regulative ideal`. On this account truth is objective or absolute in that it is not relative to people`s knowledge or belief. (It is relative tho in that truth is only defined for one linguistic level at a time.) ---------------------------------------------------------------- (C) MVVM ...@xs4all.nl POB 1 ..., 10 ... Amsterdam, Neth. ----------------------------------------------------------------