No country probably starts a war merely because it likes to fight, unless it would be ruled by a mad dictator. And no country starts a war merely because it has to fight ('unless' its arms industry has obtained so much power that it can force the country into war in order to boost its own sales figures). Whatever the reason that a country is involved in a war, it will always have some rationalization for its conduct. Such a rationalization may formally replace the desire:

• to attack a different political and/or socioeconomic system
• to spread the established, denominational ideology and/or to prevent another ideology from freely gaining more and more support
• to subjugate a national, racial, ethnic or linguistic community considered inferior
• to expand territory and/or to increase the power and wealth of the ruling class, and, perhaps, also the rest of the nation.

Each of these 'justifications' prepares citizens for war.

The desire to attack people with a different political or socioeconomic system may be rationalized by referring to 'their' desire (fictitious or not) to destruct 'us', by referring to the economic malaise 'their' system is in, by referring to the lack of personal freedom or to the exploitation occurring in 'their' society. In a process of political indoctrination the citizens are continuously confronted with the shortcomings and excesses of the politics and economics of the enemy or potential enemy. The dangers of their system are underscored again and again, thus making the citizens ready for war when needed. "We want peace, but they do not want it!" To remain level-headed under such circumstances would probably mean that one would be able to distinguish advantages and disadvantages of both economic systems, that one would recognize certain defects in both political or economic systems, and that one could accept the idea that one politico-economic system might be better for one country, while another system might better suit another country, at least temporarily. But in societies which are getting ready for war, any degree of objectivity is taboo, because someone who would see any advantage in the system of the enemy (even when overshadowed by its disadvantages), or who would dare to point at any comparable drawback of 'er own system (even when offset by its advantages), would be regarded as collaborating with 'the enemy'. In such an atmosphere all information about people's own side is interpreted in a way that it answers to their positive expectations, while information about the other side has to confirm to their negative expectations.

There is much similarity between the desire to attack a different political or socioeconomic system and the desire to attack a different religious or denominational system, but there are some important differences too: the ideals for which people are willing to fight are likely to be conceived of as 'higher' than any other ideal. The fear of a different denominational ideology can be stronger than any other fear of a different system, while the rationalization of religious warfare is more egregious than any other rationalization of warfare. History has proved but too often that it can be sufficient in a religious conflict to brand others as "pagans", "infidels" or "atheists" in order to sanction an attack on them without any 'further' rationalization. But more often than not, a difference in religion, or denomination in general, has coincided with a different political, economic, racial, ethnic or linguistic identity, and it is this difference in identity which may be used as a more rational cover-up in place of the recognition of the denominational incompatibility of the rival communities, both in civil and international wars. Even when a nondenominational argument was or is used as a pretext of attack, the attackers may not refrain from openly expressing the gaudy belief that the supreme being (or 'God') would be there to exclusively save their nation and head of state (especially when this is a monarch), thus betraying that theodemonism certainly has to do something with the conflict in question.

While the desire to fight a different political or denominational system may be one cause of conflict, the desire to suppress people who are considered inferior, is another one. The more doubtful certain individuals are about their own status and the more life leaves them with feelings of insecurity, the stronger their need will be to strengthen their own identity by degrading others. It is by looking down on others that these individuals believe themselves to be placed on a higher footing. When the object of degradation is another racial, national, ethnic or linguistic group, this can readily lead to serious conflicts. And again, it is seldom or never possible to completely separate these conflicts from concurrent political, socioeconomic and religious or mixed religious-irreligious differences.

The fourth cause of conflict on our list is the desire to expand territory. A larger territory means more resources; more resources means a wealthier country; and a wealthier country means more power for the ruling class and, perhaps, more prosperity for all, or most, classes. This in itself can be believed to be a sufficient reason (and has in colonial times definitely been a sufficient reason) for the rulers of a country to subjugate foreign territories. However, the land-hungry aristocrats, politicians and others who gave themselves up to these adventures, were but too eager to use nice-sounding arguments for their territorial expansions instead of admitting pure selfishness. So would annexation of the foreign territories to the empire bring civilization to the so-called 'savages' living there. This 'civilization' was to be understood as conversion to the religion of the smart conquerors, who brought with their sword a book of words along: their Manual of Divine Justification.

All civil and international conflicts are conflicts between people who differ in one or more of the following respects: politically, socioeconomically, denominationally, ethnically and/or linguistically; and in all these conflicts the rival parties show an exclusive attitude towards each other in one or more of the following ways:

• by providing and allowing only biased information about the other party
• by making inadmissible generalizations about the people and the system of the other party
• by not treating members of the other party, or individuals relevantly similar to them, as equal human beings, and in a national context as equal citizens
• by not respecting the adherents of other religions, of religion in general or of nonreligious denominations as persons
• by stimulating alienation from the other party (in a national context by concentrating their own or the other party in certain little accessible areas, in an international context by making travel to and from other countries difficult or impossible)
• by believing that their own party would have Mono's or another principal being's support in the conflict.

While all may claim to be in favor of peace, it is this exclusive attitude which prepares people for war.

An exclusive attitude is not just reflected in a limited number of sentiments and opinions which have a direct bearing on a civil or international conflict, it is a fundamental inclination by which a person or community more or less consistently exhibits a pattern of exclusive beliefs, feelings and thoughts in all fields. The correlation which exists between exclusivisms is not necessarily a causal relationship (two of them may be caused by a third factor, or a different third and fourth factor), but the fact that the combination of inclusive sentiments and opinions with exclusive sentiments and opinions leads to inconsistence, implies that every exclusivism contributes to the acceptance of other and more exclusivisms. Some relationships are very obvious:

• providing and allowing only biased information on a certain socioeconomic doctrine, for instance, is only one step away from providing and allowing only biased information on a certain denominational doctrine
• making inadmissible generalizations about a different race, for instance, is only one step away from making inadmissible generalizations about the other sex, about those with a different sexual preference or about those who speak a different language or dialect
• not treating the members of an ethnic minority as equal citizens, for instance, is only one step away from not treating the members of any minority group as equal citizens
• not taking into account irreligious convictions in a predominantly religious society, for instance, is only one step away from not taking into account personal convictions at all
• stimulating alienation from disliked foreigners, for instance, is only one step away from stimulating alienation from disliked fellow-citizens such as those belonging to a different caste or social class
• believing that one's own party would have the exclusive support of the supreme being in a conflict, is only one step away from believing in the supremeness or superiority of one's nation, one's own language, one's own race, one's own class and one's own political system.

Since conflicts are caused by the exclusive attitude of one or both of the parties involved, every exclusivism is either the cause of a possible conflict (and therefore of national or international insecurity) or contributes to this cause, however unrelated to such a conflict it may seem. A society in which measures and beliefs which offend against the norm of inclusivity enjoy official and exclusive recognition is not only due to suffer from internal frictions, but will also create the conditions leading to international conflicts. Altho it may seem that the internal frictions have nothing to do with the international conflicts, they result from the same official sanctioning of exclusivism.

To be more concrete, let us compare two ideologies, both of which recognize a supreme being. In ideology A the supreme being does not have the predicates of one particular race or sex, nor does it have a representative on the planet Earth or elsewhere who did belong or must belong to one particular race or sex; in ideology B the supreme being has the predicates of a particular sex and judging by its ('his') representative on Earth, also of a particular race. In ideology A there is a second (minor) principal being, but this embraces all races and sexes; in ideology B this nonsupreme being is of the opposite (inferior) sex, but of the same specific race. Ideology A is not exclusively related to the conditions of any particular country or part of the world; ideology B can clearly be identified with one particular country and its neighbors. Now, which of both ideologies makes the greatest chance of being the cause of a bloody, civil or international war in which different races or ethnic groups will be fighting each other? And which of both ideologies makes the greatest chance of activating racism and sexism? If there is a difference in chance, the answer to these questions is obvious! But the answer to these questions would not be different, if we asked which of both ideologies made the greatest chance of having a one-sided view of socioeconomic systems, of ignoring ethnic and linguistic minorities, of promoting the acquisition of more wealth for oneself or one's nation to the detriment of others. The next question would be, which of both ideologies would make the greatest chance of being the cause of any civil or international war. With the few characteristics given of both ideologies in this example, it may seem entirely unjustified to think of an answer to this question. But when we think of the interrelationship of all inclusive sentiments and opinions on the one side, and all exclusive ones on the other, we must conclude that even a small number of inclusive features indicates an inclusive attitude, and even a small number of exclusivist features an exclusivist one. Since these attitudes are fundamental inclinations, the answer to our last question is obvious as well.

Let us once more compare two ideologies, neither of which is theodemonistic. Ideology A does not relate to any particular social class, whether constituting a minority or a majority; ideology B relates exclusively to a particular category of social classes (which represents a majority, however). For ideology A the public expression of different opinions and the distribution of information from any source should be free, that is, not excluded; for ideology B the free availability of information and the expression of individual ideas in public is not permissible if it contradicts its own dogmas. For ideology A one politico-economic system (or variant of such a system) may be better for one country, while another system (or variant of the same system) may be better for another country at a certain time; for ideology B there is only one acceptable politico-economic system, irrespective of time and place. Which of both ideologies makes the greatest chance of being the cause of a bloody, civil or international, war in which different social classes or politico-economic systems (or variants of the same system) are fighting each other? And which of both ideologies makes the greatest chance of stimulating the development of internal and/or external (international) absolutism? If there is a difference in chance, the answer to these questions is obvious again! And it would be the same if we asked which one would make the greatest chance of having a one-sided view of religion (not even recognizing its denominational value), of subjecting or ignoring ethnic or linguistic minorities, of promoting or yielding to the fulsome adoration of political or party-leaders. When we conceive again of the fact that even a small number of exclusivist characteristics denote an exclusivist attitude (in one of its many gradations), this is also the obvious answer to the question which of both ideologies would make the greatest chance of being the cause of any civil or international war.

It turns out that the ideal of peace and peaceful coexistence is formally entertained by practically whole humankind, but that it is overruled by two types of exclusivist measures and beliefs reflecting one and the same principal attitude:

• those which are the or a direct cause of civil and international conflicts; and
• those which are not the or a direct cause, and are seemingly unrelated, but which, in fact, contribute inadvertently to the emergence of these exclusivisms.

Permanent peace and security can never be established so long as either or both of these two types of exclusivist practises and beliefs prevail in any field.