TEMPORAL AND NONTEMPORAL TRUTH
 
To say that something did have what it did have,
or that it did not have what it did not have,
and to say that something does have what it does have,
or that it does not have what it does not have,
and to say that something will have what it will have,
or that it will not have what it will not have,
and to say that something has what it has,
or that it has not what it has not,
is true.

We have been talking about things having component parts, attributes and relations, about wholes having whole-, part- and pseudo-attributes, and about catenas having one or more positive predicates, one neutral predicate and one or more negative predicates. But what does it mean to say that a certain thing 'has' or 'does not have' a certain part or predicate, or what do we suppose when saying this? A thing can have a part or predicate now without having it in the past or in the future, if its having is temporal. The relation of having is nontemporal, if its having this part or predicate in no way depends and can depend on the moment we look at it or talk about it. This might be the case with all relations of having in the second domain of discourse. Things in that domain did not have, do not have and will not have something in a temporal sense -- so it seems. At least the predicates catenas have they do not have just now. Catenas definitely have their component parts in a nontemporal sense of having.

To have an element in a nontemporal sense is something else than to have it forever or eternally. Eternity presupposes temporality, and --it seems-- solely primary things could have something eternally, that is, at every moment in the past, now and at every moment in the future. (Hence, they are certainly not 'timeless' in a strict sense.) When we talk about things having parts and predicates in an ontological context we consider their situation from a nontemporal standpoint, but as regards primary things this does not imply that their having a part or predicate is itself nontemporal. Everywhere where we say that a primary thing 'has' a particular part or predicate (without making explicit that it has that element now), has and have must be understood to mean did have and/or do(es) have and/or will have.

Did have, do have and will have correspond to did exist, do exist and will exist or to existing in the past, existing now or at present and existing in the future. One might wonder whether the fact that every real thing existed, exists and/or will exist does not mean that it would be 'time-catenal'. The 'time' or 'future catena' concerned would, then, be the whole of (existing-in-the-)past, (existing-at-)present and (existing-in-the-)future. Time itself would on such an account be a quasi-monad identical to the explicit triad of past (or earlier), present (or now) and future (or later). However, the reason that we shall not speak of "a time" or "future catena" is that it does not make sense to assume that there are such primary predicates like existing-in-the-past, -present or -future. It is rather the domain or universe of discourse itself which is temporal or considered at different moments in time. Another way of putting it is that it is the relation of having a certain part or predicate which is temporal. On the former view a sentient being that is happy, for instance, has the predicate of happiness in the present domain; on the latter view it is presently having the predicate of happiness. On neither view is being happy now a question of having some primary predicate of 'presentness' in addition to having the primary predicate of happiness. Yet, this is precisely what one would suggest by speaking of "a time" or "future catena".

Even tho the notions past, present and future are not catenical, they do form part of a connected series. The name we shall use for such a series, which functions in a subsidiary capacity in our ontology, is auxiliary (series). Auxiliary series like those of past, present and future and of earlier, at the same time and later are, then, temporal auxiliaries. Altho such connected series can be divided into three subsets of which two appear or seem to be opposed to each other, they are not connected series of primary predicates, and therefore not catenas.