A serious threat of unwittingly introducing crucial presuppositions into theories of property comes from assuming that someone wholly owns a particular corporeal holding or object, because it is not understood that the description of the person-thing relation in question is not logically independent of the relevant description of this thing. Especially first-occupancy and labor theories suffer from this. To show how, let us look at two examples.

In our first example someone living in a state of nature or anarchy finds a block of marble and starts to carve it into a certain shape. Having the illusion that it has become a work of art, 'e points at it and tells a passer-by "this is my sculpture". The other person then points at the same thing and says "this piece of marble belongs to humankind" (or, if 'e is a savage, "to mankind"). It is, then, conceptually entirely legitimate to suppose that the sculptor is the owner of the sculpture (if 'e did indeed manage to make such a thing) but not the (sole) owner of the piece of marble; in other words: that 'e is the owner of the object regarded as a sculpture (and, maybe, as an incorporeal thing) but not the owner of the same object as a material substance (which is certainly a corporeal thing). Those who do divorce these aspects of one object may subsequently maintain that someone's entitlement only extends to the added value a person's labor has produced, and does not extend to 'the whole object'. The significance of the traditional distinction between 'corporeal' and 'incorporeal' property then collapses.

The 'fallacy of quasi-absolute description' is characteristic of those who hold that property rights in an unowned object merely originate thru someone's 'mixing his labor with it'. Because of the nature of the metaphor and the belief that one description of an object suffices in all contexts, the adherent of this type of labor theory is confronted with a number of serious questions, like --as they have been formulated elsewhere-- Why isn't mixing what a person owns with what 'e doesn't own a way of losing what 'e owns? and What are the boundaries of what labor is mixed with?. When things are described as natural substances, however (or, insofar as they are natural substances), it is quite possible to argue that all inanimate objects on this planet, such as pieces of marble, are the property of all people on this planet. And when described as cultural goods or artifacts, such as sculptures, they may at the same time be considered to be the sole property of certain individual people or groups of people (inclusive of communities or states). Thus, while it is indeed useful to take into account the category the things owned or possessed belong to, it is obligatory to clarify what would be a or the relevant description of the things concerned. Yet, even when we confine ourselves to natural substances, the exact description of what is owned may still require further analysis, as will become evident from the next example.

Suppose there once was a small community living in an area abounding with beaches all being of equal worth, at the same distance, equal in all other respects and clearly distinct from each other. Hence, in those days there were plenty of them as compared with the number of then-living people, and every first occupier could take one, say, by carrying out 'er purpose to build a sand castle there every afternoon; and so could every laborer, say, by fencing one off (because fencing is labor, whether one relishes it or not). If the first occupier or laborer did only take one beach, even the proviso that enough would be left over for others was not violated. According to the first-occupancy and labor theorist the beach in question became the private property of the first occupier and laborer. It should not surprise us, however, when in later times the number of people grew faster than the number of beaches. In other words: the scarcity value of objects (natural resources in particular) may change. Thus there is a parallel between 'justice-' and 'truth-preserving transformations' in that they are equally invalid if one of the premises which is time-dependent, was true at an earlier point in time, but has become false at a later point in time. In our example this is the premise that beaches in the area considered are not scarce, that is, so abundant that enough of them are left over for everyone else. It may also be said that the scarcity value is assumed to be constant, whereas it is variable.

Paradoxically, the additional principle which requires that enough and as good be left over both saves the traditional occupation and labor theories and kills them. It saves them from the preposterous and awkward consequences they would have without the proviso, and it kills them, because they can consequently only deal with the property of goods which are not scarce, and those are precisely the goods which are not interesting for the lord and lady of private accumulation. Hence, whereas it may still be true that the first occupier and laborer own a number of grains of sand, they do not own the beaches anymore when they are (or have become) scarce. But if the proviso is accepted, did the first occupier and laborer then ever own the beach as beach to start with? If they did, then they entirely lost all ownership at the time beaches became scarce, and then the occupation and labor theories are indeed worthless because not applicable to scarce goods. A complete theory of property provides a criterion of title by which a person or group of persons can own a scarce good. Thus, if there is to be a grain of truth in the occupation and labor theories, then only if one speaks of someone's rightful share in the total amount of goods, even when this share happens to be 100% at a particular moment with regard to a particular thing. The people in the original situation of our example did, then, not own a particular beach in some absolute sense, but they had the right to a 100% share in that particular beach at that moment.

The holding of the absolutist occupation and labor or entitlement theories as complete theories of property (not as parts of such a theory) leads to horrendous consequences which can only be evaded by means of tricky inconsistences. Imagine someone 'justly' appropriated a whole beach or island (not a 100% share in it) at a time they were abundant relative to the number of people. Then 'e could order a castaway from a shipwreck off 'er beach or island and let 'im drown. Altho the absolutist might object that such an act would violate the proviso that enough be left over, this proviso may solely be applied to the moment of appropriation and does not apply to the later situation at all, or if it does, changes rightful ownership itself as well. Thus, the labor or entitlement absolutist in particular oscillates with giant strides between the moment of acquisition of the holding (perhaps centuries ago) and the moment at which ownership is (re)considered, without being willing to fully accept the consequences of changes (especially those in scarcity value). 'E will admit that a person may not appropriate the only water hole in a desert and charge what 'e will. Yet, if 'it happens that all water holes in the desert dry up, except for his', 'e does not draw the conclusion that this only water hole left is the property of the whole community now (or of the community and the original owner together, insofar as its value is due to 'er personal labor and precautions). No, it entirely remains the property of the one, original owner and 'e is permitted to charge for the water whatever 'e will. (To limit this ownership requires an external criterion, but allowing such a criterion will not only modify the theorist's view on justice in the present, it is also bound to modify 'er view on justice in the past.)