1.2.4 |
INCLUSIVITY AS A CRITERION OF ATTITUDINAL
CONSISTENCE |
The question of whether all the correlations suggested
between cognitions, affections and conations, and between whole
attitudes, really exist; and if so, whether they are causal
connections; and if so, which one of both relata is the cause
and which one the effect, is itself a problem of empirical science.
From a normative standpoint it is not necessary to postulate that all
attitudes, and also
practises,
do indeed lend each other support; that when a person displays, for
example, one kind of discriminatory attitude
'e will probably display the
other kind as well. Yet, not postulating such correlations is
something else than postulating that they do not exist. Even a
utilitarian, or other person exclusively interested in the
harmfulness or harmlessness of kinds and acts of discrimination
must, strictly speaking, consider clusters of kinds and acts
of discrimination which are correlated. Whether these 'clusters'
are so small that they solely comprise one kind or act of
discrimination, or whether one cluster comprises literally all
kinds and acts of discrimination is, then, an empirical problem
again.
Social scientists have admitted that the concepts of 'consonance'
and 'attitudinal' or 'psychological consistence' are
vague. A complete clarification of the meanings of these notions
has not come forth yet. In spite of this, the researcher has to
be able to denote a priori whether a relationship between, say,
two cognitive elements is consonant or dissonant. And when
speaking of "consistence", 'e has to make clear what it means
that the components of individual or social attitudes, that is,
cognitions, affects and behavioral tendencies, and also practises
or actions themselves, cohere. These attitudinal components,
practises and actions are not necessarily incoherent
because they are different, even when pertaining to the same
object or issue. Sentiments, beliefs, thoughts, and the practical
realization of a person's beliefs and thoughts in actions,
almost all admit of degrees; that is, almost all of them have
intensities which may be equal or unequal. Nevertheless,
psychic-social phenomena, such as emotions, volitions, convictions
and actions of largely different intensities are still
coherent when pertaining to the same object or issue so long as
the directions in which they work are the same. Even when they
do not pertain to exactly the same object or issue, but when the
connection is logically possible, people speak of "logical
coherence" without requiring that there be any necessary connection.
Hence, with respect to a given set of cognitions, the
logical criterion of coherence is basically reductive (or
'negative') in that it only eliminates those cognitions which
cannot be logically combined with the other cognitions.
It does not require, nor provide a common denominator for those
cognitions
tho.
All it demands is that the combination of different thoughts,
sentiments, tendencies and actions not be logically invalid.
In this sense coherence is not more than the absence of
truth-conditional incoherence.
For a structural foundation an attitudinal system requires
a standard of coherence according to which the attitudinal
components can be assigned to two or more different
ground-world categories.
Starting from such a 'positive' criterion, thoughts,
sentiments and actions cohere when they belong to the same
category, that is, have a specific common feature, while they do
not cohere when belonging to different categories. The criterion
to be suggested here for structural consistence is the norm of
inclusivity itself. On the basis of this norm, ground-world
thoughts, beliefs, sentiments, behavioral tendencies and actions
are either inclusive, when in accordance with it, or
exclusive, when not in accordance with it. It is, then, either
because of their consistent inclusiveness (or 'openness') or
because of their consistent exclusiveness (or 'closedness') that
normatively significant ground-world beliefs show structural
consistence; and it is, then, because of the inconsistent
combination of inclusive and exclusive beliefs that they are
structurally nonconsistent, even tho they may be logically
consistent.
With a structural criterion like (the norm of) inclusivity it
becomes possible to determine what kind of belief or attitude
belongs to the same category as another kind of belief or
attitude. (What is meant exactly by kind will have to be
pointed out by means of the classification system already
mentioned. Such a system is also a prerequisite for any adequate
scientific research with respect to attitudinal consonance or
consistence.)
The norm of inclusivity holds independently of any
factual-modal condition, independently
of any empirical fact or correlation.
Yet, if the interplay between especially attitudes and practises which
are discriminatory could, indeed, be proved to exist, it would for many
people (save thoroughly
monistic utilitarians)
probably be easier to accept that the harmlessness or harmfulness of
particular types of such attitudes and practises is not of immediate
import.
It would, then, need no further explanation that with the endorsement
of the requirement of
discriminational relevance
all forms of making nonrelevant distinctions become equally
condemnatory on principle; that is to say, on this principle.
