It is not logically necessary for a denominational doctrine to profess the existence of one or more principal beings. It is even not necessary that any principal being does play a role in such a doctrine. (But if it doesn`t, the doctrine must be a normist one.) The being in principal being refers to a kind of entity among other entities to which the norm(s) of a denominational doctrine somehow apply. The principal refers to the main, or one of the main, roles played by such an entity. In a normist doctrine a principal being need not be an authority but, of course, it must be something else than one of the norms itself. A principal being is a 'god' in our terminology if it serves as a denominational medium of aggrandizemental exclusivism in some way, and a 'demon' if it serves as a denominational medium of abnegational exclusivism. Obviously, these definitions start from 'regular' theodemonism. The definition of god does not hold for 'pantheism', for instance; but rightly so, for pantheism is totally devoid of any principal being and of any sensible distinction between the divine and the nondivine. Where everything is divine, nothing is, and where everything is a principal being, no being is. It is therefore important not to lose sight of the fact that on our definition a 'god' is a principal being. Finally, if a so-called 'god' is supernaturally conceived but does nowhere serve as an instrument of aggrandizemental nor as one of abnegational exclusivism by way of the things it kills, forbids, is ashamed of, dislikes or ignores, we shall not call it "a god" but rather "a mythological curiosity" or something of that ilk. Such nonexclusivist supernatural conceptions seem to be extremely rare or nonexistent tho.

Denominationalism on the basis of the god(s) and/or demon(s) recognized in the doctrine someone adheres to is theodemonism-related (person-centered) exclusivism (X.2508). Denominationalism on the basis of the principal being(s) recognized in the doctrine someone adheres to, whether theodemonical or not, is general principalship-related (person-centered) exclusivism (X.2509). When it concerns the concept of a superior being, the two forms of principalship-related exism will be called here "theism-related" and "general superiority-related exclusivism" (X.5016 & 5018) respectively. The twin manifestation of theism-related exism is demonism-related exclusivism (X.5017). This latter exism pertains both to the attitude towards people who believe in a devil (and possibly even more demons) and to the attitude towards people who do not believe in a devil or demon.

We will now finish our classification of integral exclusivisms with one unitary manifestation of theism-related and one of general superiority-related exism. Since the cladograms of theodemonism- and general principalship-related exclusivism have exactly the same structure, both unitary manifestations at the end are quantitative. Quantitative theism-related exclusivism (X.10033) is exism re a person or group of people on the basis of the number of gods recognized; quantitative general superiority-related exclusivism (X.10037) is exism re a person or group of people on the basis of the number of superior principal beings recognized.

The dimensional manifestations of quantitative theism-related exclusivism for a trichotomous subdivision are: theist-, atheist-, monotheist- and polytheist-person-centered exclusivism (X.10033.10 & 11 & 20 & 21). (The subdivision is trichotomous because theist(ic) is mono- or polytheist(ic).) It is not necessary to mention the componential and operational manifestations of theist- and atheist-person-centered exclusivism; they will tell the same story as religious and irreligious person-centered exclusivism. The only thing which deserves to be mentioned separately in this language is lingual external abnegational atheist-person-centered exclusivism (X.10033.10.13.10). It is the infiltration of external abnegational atheist-person-centered exism into traditional language and involves (the acceptance of) the employment of ungodly in the sense of wicked, outrageous or unreasonable to refer to other people by those believing in one or more gods themselves. It is precisely such an attitude of calling people who do not believe in the same things as themselves "wicked" which has made the belief of traditional theists notorious for its intolerance. But apart from the immorality of this attitude, it is also a very unwise one to take, because if not discontinued, this kind of language is bound to backfire. A theist may be right if `e claims that an atheist who neither believes in gods nor in norms has no reason not to be wicked. But so far as normist non-theodemonists are concerned the situation is rather the other way around. The reason why will be revealed when we are going to study the question of denominational primacy. However, there is one great comfort for those suffering from abnegational atheist-person-centered exclusivism: the adherents of the present, inclusivistic doctrine shall never be allowed to call any person "wicked", or "godly" in the sense of wicked, just because that person believes in one or more gods or demons and does not believe in the primacy of the normative.

Quantitative theism-related exclusivism is paralleled by quantitative general superiority-related exclusivism. Of this unitary exism we will only mention the first and the second disjunctive manifestations. The first disjunctive of quantitative general superiority-related exclusivism (X.10037.14) is exism re a person or group of persons recognizing one or more superior principal beings in their denominational system of thought; the second disjunctive (X.10037.15) is exism re a person or group of persons who do not recognize any superior principal being in their denominational system of thought. Exclusivism with respect to people who recognize a/the supreme being is of the former type, and exclusivism with respect to people who do not recognize a/the supreme being of the latter type. If 'every' supreme being were a god, this manifestation of exclusivism would not have to be mentioned again. The second disjunctive would then simply be atheist-person-centered exism and the first one theist-person-centered exism so far as the supreme being is concerned. But a supreme being is not necessarily a god, and the supreme being is not.

When we examined the role of normative supremeness in denominationalism (I.6.2.4) it was pointed out that it is erroneous to assume that a supreme being and a (sole) god would be identical. And it was argued too that every denominational doctrine has at least an implicit notion of what is, or would be, normatively superior or supreme. Having chosen the norm of inclusivity as the first norm of our doctrine, we have implicitly recognized relevance as being superior to irrelevance. On our model the supreme being, or the image of (the) supreme being, therefore cannot be the product of any form of supreme exclusivism. In other words, it cannot be a god or the image of a god. But we have, then, merely established what the supreme being, or the image of (the) supreme being, cannot be, or must not be of necessity. Inclusivism does not constitute a complete denominational doctrine nor does it furnish us with a substantive picture of supremeness; not by itself and even not in combination with the principle of truth and the right to personhood. The reason is simply that the norm of inclusivity as an interpreted principle of discriminational relevance presupposes a choice of one or more values. Altho some of the values which people have selected, or still select, are already illegitimate from the standpoint of relevance itself, it is not, and cannot be, correct that all other values would be legitimate and representative of normative supremeness. Hence, the fundamental question we are now faced with is what is the superior goal, or what are the superior goals, of discriminational relevance?. The fundamental choice leading to its answer we have already made in adopting that interpretation of the principle of discriminational relevance which is neutralistic.
 

2.5.3.0