TRINPsite 51.05.7 - 55.34.2  
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Judgments in which an individual gives free play to 'er own way of seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting and touching things in the outside world are founded upon mere feelings rather than upon interpersonal considerations and are thus subjective. While associating and processing the sensory reactions in the body's parts and organs, the feelings developing in such an individual are feelings of love or liking, of anger, hate or disliking. 'E may anticipate danger and pain, possibly accompanied by fear; or protection and pleasure, possibly accompanied by a feeling of security. The same stimulus may induce love in one individual and hate in another; or it may induce a feeling of security in the former individual and fear in the latter one. Things which are related for the one, because 'e is used to associate them while liking or disliking them all, are completely unrelated for the other, because 'e is not used to associate them. Even when people's (or their bodies') feelings are not opposed, they can still differ considerably in intensity: what induces mere liking in A may induce a deeply felt love in B; or what induces mere disliking in C may induce a deeply felt hatred in D. This lack of interindividual (or 'interpersonal', or 'intersubjective') continuity is precisely what characterizes subjectivity.

It is not utterances in which a person gives free rein to 'er own feelings which are subjective in that they are, or could be, illusory. When someone says that 'e 'imself likes or dislikes a certain sight or smell, for instance, there is not any reason to assume that what 'e says would not be true. And if 'e also says it to explain or justify 'er own, personal behavior, there is not any reason to assume that 'er feelings would not be relevant in that context. When we speak of "judgments", however, we do not refer to mere utterances but to opinions, assertions or formal utterances. To say that one likes a certain type of fruit may be true and relevant, but it could hardly be termed "a judgment". The subjectivity of such an utterance is not the kind of subjectivity to be concerned about, for the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity just does not act a part for utterances of which the scope is purely individual.

Even when the scope of an utterance is not purely individual, the utterance may still be subjective when it applies to each individual separately. For example, we all like babanas stands for a conjunction of the type A likes bananas and B likes bananas and ... . However, bananas taste good or bananas are healthy are not mere utterances but judgments of a scope which is not purely individual, and it is such judgments which have to be objective, that is, interindividually reliable. To be reliable they cannot be exclusively based on the speaker or writer's own feelings or experiences, because other people's feelings and experiences may have a different intensity, or may even be opposed. One particular human being's or group of human beings' sensory reactions does not establish a nonpersonal or supra-individual fact. To obtain an objective judgment the same stimulus has to evoke the same reaction in all who can sense this stimulus. This is not to say that the universal frame of reference (of all individuals which can sense a certain kind of stimulus) could not be immeasurably large and even unknown so far as other planets or galaxies are concerned. In practise human beings are forced to confine themselves to a relatively small frame of reference. This does not at all have to discredit a judgment so long as it is realized and expressed that the judgment in question is solely valid for the same frame of reference. Within such a smaller frame, judgments can still be interindividually reliable. To be an objective statement, bananas are healthy, for instance, must at least specify for what species and age-groups they are healthy and under what conditions (such as the number to be eaten in a certain period).

Subjectivity is wrong when it involves utterances or ideas which are perhaps reliable and justifiable for one individual or for one particular group of individuals, but which are considered binding, or demanded to be binding, for other individuals as well, or for individuals not belonging to that particular group. There is a confusion of scopes: the scope of the judgment's reliability and justifiability is different from that of its application. In other words, the judgment is not relevant in the practical context concerned. To be objective a judgment has to be both true and relevant in the context in which it is applied. Objectivity is therefore not simply a matter of being intersubjectively observable, verifiable or falsifiable. Or, if it is, such would not be a reason to regard it as normatively superior to subjectivity. It is only normatively superior when it involves truth instead of falsehood, and relevance instead of irrelevance.

Judgments are not only objective because they are reliable for the same framework as the one in which they are used, they can also be objective when the framework in which they are used is much bigger. This is the case when the basis of the judgment is restricted to the past and the present, but when there is no reason to assume that it will not be true in the future as well. It is an objective view (held true by scientists) to believe that apples will continue to fall off trees in the future, altho this cannot now be observed, and altho this cannot now be verified or falsified. It would even be arbitrary or 'subjective' to believe that apples did and do solely happen to fall off trees in the past or present (unless it can be made plausible that human civilization is not capable of improving drastically and will eventually lead to the destruction of a great part or of all life on Earth, inclusive of apple trees).

Strictly speaking, it can indeed not be proved that ground-world events which were 'always' conjoined, or 'always' succeeded each other in the past, will continue to be conjoined or will continue to succeed each other in the future. But if two of such events are not believed to be conjoined or to succeed each other anymore in the future, the onus is on the one who does not assume that the conjunction or the succession will remain unaltered, to prove that such a discontinuity is to be expected. For the one who must show that the assumption of discontinuity (such as that the Sun will not rise anymore tomorrow) is more plausible than the assumption of sameness or continuity (that the Sun will rise as usual tomorrow), it is imperative to bring forward relevant factors overlooked before or relevant recent changes.

The objective attitude in the factual or modal spheres can and must be extended to the normative sphere. In this sphere it cannot be proved either that, for example, people are 'equal', that is, should be treated in the same way in similar situations. But if two persons are not believed to be equal, the onus is on the one who does not assume equality between people to prove that a different treatment of persons in similar situations is relevant. This is what both the norm of inclusivity and the norm of interpersonal equality demand from us. In this respect, too, normative theories like inclusivism and relevantist egalitarianism turn out to be not more and not less objective than factual-modal ones like the theory on cause and effect.

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Model of Neutral-Inclusivity
Book of Fundamentals
Neutral-Inclusivity, Truth and Personhood
Truth and Neutral-Inclusivity