TRINPsite, 51.39.3-56.16.4 






For statists or 'archists' the value of the state is perhaps ultimate; for anarchists the disvalue of the state is perhaps ultimate; for us the value or disvalue of the state is derivative. Those who accept the existence of a state will usually say that its primary function, or one of its most important functions, is the protection of individual people against bodily harm. More generally, the same people will probably also agree that the state should protect property in external things, but since there are such widely divergent theories of property this 'agreement' does not mean much in practise. Yet, it is worthwhile to note that an important function of the state (if not the only one) is the protection of people's extrinsic rights. This will not only involve the citizens' freedom from bodily invasions but also their extrinsic property. Contrary to what libertarians or minimal-state theorists may want us to believe this property is not (necessarily) what someone('s family) actually or historically happens to posses, or to have taken possession of, but the property someone has an equal right in as a person amongst persons.

When it is supposed that the role of the state comprises more (maybe even much more) than the protection of personal rights, the protection of contracts is one of the first things to come to the fore. The state should, then, make sure that people fulfil their contractual duties, both among themselves and vis-à-vis the state. But why should the state care about this ? Because it will be beneficial to people's well-being? If so, then the function of the state is not just to make sure that people fulfil their contractual duties (in addition to the protection of their extrinsic rights), but to serve their well-being too; and that may require a lot more and/or different things than the enforcement of contracts. Let us assume instead that the state cares about the citizen's contractual duties because people have to keep their promises, certainly those promises they have given expression to in a formal way. Again, it could be reasoned that the state should have to care about keeping promises, because this is prerequisite for an orderly society. But if an orderly society is taken as the prerequisite, the state's concern should be with much more than with the contractual duties of its citizens. Here we will not consider such a broad function which the state does or might have. For the moment we can accept that the state or 'the law' has indeed a function in the protection of personal contracts. So far as the promise-keeping aspect of contracts is concerned, the value of the state is then that it enforces the morality of promise-keeping, or more generally, of telling the truth. Whereas a state can hardly be called "moralistic" so long as it merely protects people's extrinsic rights, it does become 'moralistic' in a way as soon as it starts doing more than this. This is not necessarily wrong; it is even right from the point of view of the DNI when the moral attention is directed to truth in a scientific or otherwise non-supernaturalist sense.

When a state does more than protecting people's extrinsic rights but concerns itself with contractual duties or promise-keeping as well, the question must be posed, why the state should exclusively preoccupy itself with truth or truth-related aspects of intrinsic morality. The question which arises in particular is why the state should not also concern itself with relevancy-related aspects of morality, that is, issues of discrimination. As a concrete example we might consider a person who has always fully paid 'er insurance premiums. Now, if the insurance company concerned did not pay out when something happened that is covered according to the contract signed by both parties, it would seem to be good that the insured person could go to court and get justice there. Without such a possibility 'insurance' would hardly seem to make sense, for who is going to insure people against fake insurance companies who lie about their assets and who do not keep their promises, that is, who do not respect the conditions agreed upon? For many or most people it would not make sense to think of paying insurance premiums if the agency they dealt with were not subjected to the law of a political system they trust or trust sufficiently. But why should the reliability of this system only depend on its defense of the principle of truth, or of the precept that one should keep one's promises? Why would its reliability not depend on the principle of relevance as well, or on the precept that one should not discriminate on the basis of factors which are not relevant? How can anyone trust a legal system which admits of discrimination? Of course, no-one can, for anyone can be the victim of traditional or nontraditional, arbitrary distinctions.

No insurance business that accepts and relies on a legal system to make sure that people tell the truth and keep their promises can object against this same legal system forbidding to treat people differently on the grounds of irrelevant factors (for example, by having them pay different premiums). It is neither the principle of truth nor the principle of relevance, or it is both doctrinal principles which must provide legal security. If someone argued that it is people's own business to enter into discriminatory contracts or to make agreements with companies that discriminate on the basis of whatever factor, this might be correct from a metadoctrinal angle. But if and when it is correct, it is also correct that it is people's own business to break personal contracts, and that it is the state's extrinsic right not to get involved in business-dealings and -swindlings in any way, provided that everyone's rights of personhood are respected.

Private citizens and organizations may have the extrinsic right to lie and to discriminate, but the state or any other political body like it should either not say anything that could be false or make any distinction that could be irrelevant, or, if it does say something, it should be true, and if it does make distinctions, they should be relevant (and not with respect to a determinant in which an irrelevant distinction has already been made). Furthermore, the state has the extrinsic right and the intrinsic duty not to cooperate with, and not to subsidize, private citizens and organizations that do lie or discriminate (altho this cooperation and this subsidy do not concern what is those citizens' and their organizations' extrinsic property). In other words, the institutions established and the measures taken by a political body which is or has to be nonpartisan shall not be based on false or farfetched party-political or religious dogmas, and shall not be exclusivistic, that is, they shall include, take into consideration and respect all citizens on equal terms.

No political body (state, and so on) should allow the abnegational discrimination or preferential treatment of any group of citizens distinguished on the basis of ethnicity, language, ancestry, age, gender, sexual propensity, marital status, class, wealthiness, personal convictions, or any other factor which is not relevant in the context concerned (with respect to a determinant in which no irrelevant distinction has already been made). And every political body ought to prevent the perpetuation and the occurrence of unequal chances for any of the groups so distinguished. The state or any such political body must not grant or assign an exclusive, official status to the institutions and beliefs of any political, religious or other ideology in particular, or engage in a special relationship with such an ideology other than one that is a purely political theory dealing with the management of state affairs and the relationship between state and citizen. Only by abiding by such a code of inclusivity can a state assure that all its citizens' rights are respected in all fields, and only in this way can it assure that it shall not hamper the fulfilment of the needs and the satisfaction of the personal desires of its citizens in the socioeconomic and political management of its affairs. The conditions of this code of inclusivity are the sole conditions under which universal ideals like those of democracy, peace, equality and liberty can eventually gain victory.

©MVVM, 41-56 ASWW

Model of Neutral-Inclusivity
Book of Fundamentals
The Doctrine of Neutral-Inclusivity
The DNI, the State and Political Ideologies