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MODEL OF NEUTRAL-INCLUSIVITY
BOOK OF FUNDAMENTALS
THE DOCTRINE OF NEUTRAL-INCLUSIVITY
THE DNI, THE STATE AND RELIGIOUS IDEOLOGIES

6.3.2 

FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND RELIGIONISM


Since the introduction of religious liberty conditions did not change much in religion-dominated societies. When one considers the high-flying way in which religous ideologies have still infiltrated whole countries, also in those fields which have nothing to do with supernatural belief or divine worship, one realizes that there is in those countries still a more or less official state ideology. It is perhaps not a particular religion anymore which is implicitly or explicitly aggrandized but religion in general. In the main, the religion-based discrimination between the one form of religiousness and the other which existed before the introduction of religious liberty and equality has often become the discrimination between religiousness and irreligiousness. And instead of cultivating a single monotheist ideology or variant of an ideology to the exclusion of all other ideologies and variants, latter-day Mono-cultures cultivate monotheism in general to the exclusion of all non-monotheist alternatives. But where theodemonical believers were or are still in the majority, the insolent characterization and treatment of nonreligiousness cannot impress an increasing number of people anymore, nor could or can the false distinction construed between belief (the 'true faith') and superstition, heresy or magic to distinguish supernaturalists from fellow supernaturalists frowned upon. No longer do non-supernaturalists accept that a religion tries to impose its own pattern of life on nonadherents, because other patterns do not suit its book and would expose inhibited or ignorant members of its temple society to fear and doubt. And no longer do non-theodemonists accept that a religion tries to impose its own law and methods of punishment on nonadherents, because different laws and ways of punishment are too humane and would deprive the revengeful members of the theodemonical public of their retributivist pleasures. More and more so-called 'nonbelievers' have realized, and still realize, that the number of exclusivist institutions, attitudes and practises originally 'justified' on the grounds of religion or theodemonism and forcibly imposed on whole societies has been countless, whether it be in political, socioeconomic, medical, marital, sexual or other types of affairs.

Religious liberty has turned out to be no more than the exclusive liberty of religion where denominational inclusivity would require both freedom and equality of denominationalism. For religious and nonreligious, theocentrist and normistic, denominational doctrines cover the same field: they offer a system of disciplinary thought and of nonpropositional symbols relating things of the human world, or of a much broader sphere, to each other as they supposedly are or can be and as they should be. Hence, religious liberty does not include, take into consideration and respect nonreligious denominational doctrines even tho there is only one field of denominationalism.

The traditional institutions of marriage and celibacy are very much religious products, and so are the institutions of divorce, repudiation and adultery. Yet, everyone has the extrinsic right to marry in a religious or theist marriage ceremony, or to remain celebate for inconsistent reasons (say, to devote his future to the propagation of marital exism and religious family life). This is religous freedom. But it is at once religous exclusivism when civil marriages and laws relating to divorce, repudiation and extramarital sex are exclusively formed in the religious mould, and when weddings in temples are officially recognized by the state. In some countries civil marriages between men and women did not, or still do not, exist at all. There is nothing wrong with this, for example, if it is possible for everyone in such countries to sign a personal contract with another person. However, it is utterly repulsive if the state recognizes religious marriages and treats men and women thus married differently from people not married in such a way. And it is utterly repulsive if the state recognizes religious acts of repudiation in which men have legal rights which women do not have.

Children that cannot yet fend for themselves have to be taken care of in the first place by those who brought them into being. This has been a major raison d' être for the traditional marriage institution too. In itself this concern for the well-being of children or potential children is very praiseworthy, but the concern has traditionally also often been a very limited and partial one. The examples of children of religious families threatened and pestered with the dogmas and rituals of their parents are too numerous to be mentioned here. Just one serious example is the sending of small boys to the war front in order to become martyrs of the state's, that is the clergy's, godly revolution. Special attention should be called nevertheless to the ideological rites which always have been, or still are, performed on the bodies of children, such as baptism, circumcision and clitoridectomy. In many countries these rites were, or still are, a main ingredient of the legal freedom of religious parents. In spite of this these acts are criminal encroachments upon the own bodily spheres of persons-to-be, particularly since they are irrevocable when children are going to choose themselves as persons what comprehensive ideology to adhere to or not to adhere to. If it is believed that human infants and young children should be protected because they are persons-to-be, they should definitely be protected against the 'freedom' to perform ritual operations on their bodies, when these children have not knowingly and voluntarily agreed to such operations.

A nonreligionist country would not provide biased information on certain denominational doctrines or groups, or no information at all, while providing ample, favorable and uncritical information on other denominational doctrines or groups. But the public or state schools of religionist countries do not impartially acquaint their children with the whole gamut of denominational or ideological thought, and religionist countries have state (or quasi-independent) broadcasting corporations that use radio and television as instruments to indoctrinate people with religion or monotheism and to support its institutions. Schools in such countries exclusively teach the values and disvalues of the still-existing or former state religion or of doctrines closely related to it. They do not objectively present their pupils with denominationalism in general as this ranges from poly-theodemonism to non-theodemonism and as this involves the antithesis between theocentrism and normism. State broadcasting corporations in such countries have special religious radio and television departments which send out 'reports on religion', not on denominational thought, spiritual life or philosophy of life in general. When they broadcast 'reflections', preferably right after the news, they do not intend to educate their listeners philosophically (as such a program name would suggest), but merely to ideologically immerse them in the denominationalism of the old school. And when they broadcast 'new ideas', they do not intend to acquaint their listeners with novel thought in the denominational, political or other such field, but only with technical gadgets meant to solve material problems. In addition to all this, their supposedly 'nonreligious' programs are but too often heavily laden with the presuppositions, tenets, traditional features and symbols of the same religion, or of (monotheist) religion in general, without ever properly representing the other side of the denominational or philosophical way of life and thought.

Obviously, schools and the media are the most important instruments of perpetuating the state ideology for both religious and political totalitarians. Also here the difference is often not more than that a religionist speaks of "God" where a politico-ideological exclusivist speaks of "Party" (while both of them speak of "Truth").

A nonreligionist country would not arbitrarily and exclusively select or be appealed by denominational opinions and symbols of one kind, while not selecting and not being appealed by denominational opinions and symbols of another kind. But religionist countries only celebrate as national holidays the special days of one particular religion or set of religions supposed to represent all religion and all denominationalism. (Sometimes even the name given to an entire country is religious.) And religionist countries keep one particular day of the week as an official day of rest and worship for all citizens regardless of their personal, denominational convictions or lack thereof. There were, or still are, countries in which some sort of 'Mono's Day Observance Society' did or does everything it can to make everyone abide by the god-day rules of its own airy-fairy belief, whether people had or have chosen to belong to the religious flock in question or not. The fact that those of a different religious persuasion may have different special days, and the fact that the official celebration of religious days of rest, worship or feasting is repugnant to conscientiously nonreligious and antireligionist citizens, is not something aggrandizing religionists feel like taking into consideration. To be sure, everyone should have the opportunity to celebrate a number of days, or one day of the week, for whatever purpose, but no-one should be forced to take days off or to stop working at a time that others want to celebrate their special days. (The celebration of these special days does not mean an extra number of days off, it means that a number of days off has to be taken at a fixed time.) In a nonreligionist country there is a complete separation of state and religion (more generally, denominationalism or ideology) and no religious or religiogenic holiday or day of rest can have a statutory status where people are equal in and before the law.

A nonreligionist country would not treat religious organizations differently from nonreligious ones. But religionist countries exempt temples (of whatever polytheist, monotheist or nontheist cult) from paying taxes, whereas high taxes may have to be paid for the property of nonreligious, ideological or social organizations. Some religionist governments even did, or still do, openly withhold a percentage of the taxpayers' money to financially support a particular religious organization or congeries of religious organizations. In a nonreligionist country, on the other hand, there is a complete separation of state and religion and no temple society or other religious organization can be exempted from paying the taxes which other ideological and cultural organizations have to pay; and no religious organization has the right to receive more financial support than any other ideological organization, unless this support is purely proportionate to the number of adhering or practising people who have personally expressed their wish to be members. (Naturally, temple denotes any supernaturalist place of worship or divination, including those of religions adhered to by people who use the word temple exclusively to refer to the places of worship of other religions than their own.)

There are countless other examples of state religionism in countries with religious liberty. But too often has the state's freedom of religion been construed as freedom of state religionism. Religious and religiogenic countries still officially use religious calendars, thus suggesting that the early readers of this Model would be living, or have lived, in the x-th century and in the y-th millennium (that is, of the old, religionist era) as if it concerned some absolute chronological system. In actual fact, however, the early readers of this Model can only be living, and can only have lived, at a time before the year 1 (of the new, nonreligionist era).

In a similar religionist vein the texts of certain so-called 'national' anthems mention the doxastic supreme being or creator and the emblem of one particular (sort of) religion (if not that emblem and the sword together), whereas these anthems are supposed to be sung on special occasions by all citizens regardless of their personal denominational beliefs. However, when an anthem is an exclusivist song with ingrained, supernaturalist or theodemonist, symbols, it has no general, even no national, value and cannot command universal respect. Such an anthem cannot even command respect in the country it is claimed to represent; that is, it is claimed to represent by those who were, or still are, so odiously impertinent to fellow citizens with truly and relevantly different denominational convictions.


©MVVM, 41-59 ASWW
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