Primary predicates like childhood and parenthood, masculinity and femininity, painting, and being-human are not catenated predicates. Yet, it may be that they can ultimately only be defined by means of component parts and predicates which are catenated. In that case they would all be improper predicates after all (or pseudo-predicates), but we shall not attempt to prove this, nor is it necessary here to assume that they are. What is truly important is that we make clear whether or not a proper or improper predicate or pseudo-predicate is catenated or forms part of a catenical aspect. We can do this by proving or demonstrating that it is, or by postulating that it is. There is hardly any other context in which the meaning-variance thesis (as already mentioned in 1.2.1) is of comparable significance. The axiomatic system in which catenated predicates occur (and indirectly also catenalities and noncatenalities) is that of the catena, and it is this system which determines here the meaning of the term for such predicates, at least partially. For example, if someone argued that 'love' is not the opposite of hate, then love is still the opposite of hate, but the thing 'e would be talking about and which 'e would call "love" would be another thing than the thing we are talking about when saying "love". Thus 'er love and our love would plainly have a different meaning. That is not to say that people could not disagree on the meaning of love even if they do agree that it is the opposite of hate. After all, its meaning is only partially fixed by this opposition (unless there is already a consensus on what hate means.) But if someone calls something "love" that is not opposed to hatred, the predicate referred to (if any) might be of no catenical aspect. (Usually tho, the ideologues of 'love' mix up all senses possible and impossible.)

If positive is used in the sense of prescribed (as in positive law) or in the sense of complete or absolute (as in positive disgrace), it is certainly of no catenical aspect, even not as a secondary predicate. Similarly, neutral in the sense of not taking sides in a quarrel or war or not aligned with an ideological grouping does not refer to catenated neutrality either. In such cases neutrality happens to designate a privative primary predicate of no catenical aspect. The situation is not dissimilar for negative when it is used to denote mere denial, refusal, prohibition or nonactivity (as in the case of negative right). If positive, neutral and negative are not employed in the context of the catenary trinity, they simply do not refer to catenated predicates at all. It can be quite arrogant to claim only one 'true' meaning for what is merely a word, yet it is of paramount importance not to confuse divergent meanings of what turn out to be homonyms.

While we can clearly not do without the concept of the catena where it concerns catenated predicates, catenalities and noncatenalities, we can also hardly do without it where it concerns all other primary predicates. Noncatenical predicates like thinking, walking and painting all admit indirectly somehow of degrees. Thought is more or less intelligent, more or less interesting, more or less literary, and so on. Somebody may walk fast, neither fast nor slow or slow, and somebody may walk more more or less gracefully. Art may be as naturalistic as possible, it may be entirely abstract or something in between. It is also beautiful, indifferent or ugly; and yet painting and art themselves are not catenical concepts. All these examples show the significant part catenated predicates act in the whole primary world of objects and abstract things.

We have until now classified catenated predicates and some noncatenated predicates only on the basis of the general concept of the predicate catena. It is obvious that by classifying catenas themselves we will even learn more about the position, nature and role of catenated and other catenical predicates.