TRINPsite 51.09.2 - 55.20.2  
===============  MNI/BoI/9/4/1.HTM 





The metadoctrinal foundation of the only extrinsic right we have, the right to personhood, is that (living) people should be respected equally as persons, that is, as living beings who have or can have their own normative principles, ideas and theories. Other people`s principles may be right for us; they may be neither right nor wrong for us; they may be wrong for us --it does not matter from a metadoctrinal perspective, so long as they do not violate the right to personhood itself. Other people`s ideas may be sympathetic to us; they may be indifferent to us; they may be antipathetic to us --it does not matter from a metadoctrinal perspective, so long as they recognize other people`s equal rights. And other people`s theories may be coherent; they may be too obscure to determine whether they are coherent or incoherent; they may be incoherent --it does not matter from a metadoctrinal perspective, so long as they allow everyone to have `er own beliefs.

The extrinsic general right of persons to do or not to do something correlates with the general duty not to interfere, that is, the duty of others not to interfere and the duty of oneself not to interfere. The most overt form of interference, other than bodily assault itself, is to prevent people from believing certain things. Since this cannot be effectively done, it will amount in practise to tying a person`s tongue and to preventing `im from writing what `e believes. A person may have the most antiscientific and appalling ideas in favor of individual or private property, or in disfavor of such property, for example, in land and the means of production, and yet no-one has a right to restrict `er freedom of speech for that reason.

Preventing a person from speaking or otherwise communicating freely is not done by taking measures to stop a body from moving freely. If one would like to prevent a particular person from communicating `er thoughts and feelings, there is only one body with respect to which this could be accomplished: the one body the person in question has as `er component part. This demonstrates that the ontological relationship between a person and the body `e has is also of fundamental significance where it concerns the recognition of the person`s personhood, and the infringement of the person`s personhood. It shows, too, that personhood itself is but an entirely noncorporeal notion, and that the manifestation of someone`s personhood is only possible thru the actions of the body `e has. `Er body is the medium, the sole, irreplaceable medium, to communicate `er thoughts and feelings. In other words: it is the sole, irreplaceable medium of personhood, of the personhood of the person having the body. Verbal communication is, then, merely one means of communication. There are numerous other ways of communicating personally besides moving one`s lips, or a pen in one`s hand. If they are not purely accidental, or caused in spite of oneself, all bodily movements tell their story and are expressive of someone`s personhood, certainly when intentional and purposeful.

Everyone has a unique use relationship with `er body as a medium of communication, which no other person has with that same body. The absolute uniqueness of this relationship reflects an empirical necessity, whether it is called "exclusive" or not. (Note that we are not describing a situation in which 99% of the people use their own mouth and move their own lips to speak, while 'only' 1% would use the mouth, and move the lips, of the body someone else has, to speak. In that case our negligence would be exclusivistic.) The uniqueness of this relationship justifies the extrinsic (and 'exclusive') right in one`s own body, the sole medium one has for the manifestation of one`s personhood. Hence, all people`s bodies are the property of the person having the body in question (as an element). Therefore we discount the option that all people`s bodies would be equally the property of all people in common, or other, mixed options. We have already reviewed the situation in which nature was the fictitious owner of all personal bodies (and the rest). If in such a situation the person concerned cannot refuse the use of parts of the body `e has, `e is not respected on the same footing with those who want to use parts of `er body without allowing `im to use parts of their bodies. (And 'even' a member of an authority is simply a person, like every nonmember.) On the metadoctrinal view, either no-one has the right to refuse any use or everyone has the right to refuse every use of the body `e has. In the former case physical strength would become the overriding factor, and weaker persons could be prevented from expressing what they believe or feel. This would violate the right to personhood itself, and thus cannot be accepted. Our conclusion is that everyone has the right to refuse every use of the body `e has, and that no-one has the right to use the body of another living person without `er permission. Nobody is a prop to be manipulated by other people or by a country at large.

(It will perhaps be objected to this that a person does not need an organ like a second kidney to express `er personhood. This is, supposedly, true, but it still does not give others the exclusive right to remove such an organ. Both the decision to remove a kidney and the decision of who is to remove which kidney can only be made on doctrinal grounds. It is a right of personhood of the living person having the body with the kidney in question to refuse the removal of this kidney on equally doctrinal grounds.)

©MVVM, 41-55 ASWW
 Stichting DNI Foundation 


Model of Neutral-Inclusivity
Book of Instruments
Property as a Right of Personhood