DIVERSITY NOT A VALUE

There is a great diversity of definitions of diversity. Here are some of them:

• the condition of being different
• the condition of having differences
• the quality or condition of having or being composed of different elements
• the fact of many different types of things or people being included in something
• the fact that there are many different ideas or opinions about something
• the presence of various cultural, ethnic, and social groups within a society
• the presence of difference within a group, encompassing varied identities, backgrounds, and experiences, such as race, gender, age, ability and perspectives
• the range of human differences, including but not limited to race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, age, social class

To define diversity as the condition of being different misses the point entirely: it is not the whole which is different from (or the same as) another whole, it is the parts of the whole which differ from each other! However, other definitions are more sensible by referring to the presence of differences within a group, organization or society. Nonetheless, the definition in the middle of this list which reduces all difference to one of 'ideas or opinions' is far too narrow to be taken seriously. It is also one of two definitions which uses many different instead of just different, as if a less than great diversity cannot exist, or has no right to. The enumeration of examples of diversity, as in the last three 'definitions' may be helpful, but is not in itself an act of defining and tends to be partial, if not outright biased, with respect to the choice of possible factors of distinction. (If the selection is not the result of interfactorial exclusivism, it may very well be conducive to it.)

On the basis of a totally correct or, at least, acceptable definition, diversity is still a fact or not a fact. It becomes a value by claiming that it is good, or better than, that is, normatively superior to, its absence. But does it resemble a classical logical quality such as true in the simple sense of not false then, and vice versa; or does it resemble a catenical quality such as happiness and speed, which admit of numerous degrees? To argue that it resembles a truth value would mean that once a group includes two different types of 'things or people' other lacks of variety would not matter anymore. Worse, even the kind of difference itself would not matter: a group of one or more than one men with exactly the same number of women would be 'better' than a group of two or more men, or two or more women, regardless of what is the reason for distinguishing the group from other groups or individuals. Likerwise, a group of one sexist and one sexual inclusivist would be preferable to one of sexual inclusivists only or, for that matter, sexists only. Of course, to this interpretation one might object that a sexist, tho having a different opinion, has an opinion which contradicts the ideal of diversity. This objection is not that solid, however, because a sexist may actually be very much in favor of mixed male-female groups, perhaps, much more so than a sexual inclusivist with a relevantistic conception of what the raison d'être of the group is. (For a normal group, the reason for its existence is never to bring together a number of men with the same number of women, or vice versa, without any further goal, motivation or core objective.)

Now, let's be more realistic: the choice is not between diversity-yes and diversity-no, it is for more diversity, like more happiness or a greater speed. Does diversity become better, then, for each higher degree of diversity? It is supposed to, when you promote a diversity which admits of degrees as a value in itself! If you claim that happiness is a value, then, since happiness admits of numerous degrees, it is the happier the better ad infinitum; and for diversity it is no different. Turning diversity (just like happiness) into a (fundamental or ultimate) value in itself is, what you may call in catenical terms, extremism, something utterly opposed to neutrality and its subvalues, such as moderation, harmony and symmetry. Moreover, even from the point of view of inclusivity it is preposterous to claim a separate value of diversity, because it is precisely in the nature of the value of inclusivity to take a given diversity into account, without turning it into something good in itself, and a greater diversity into something better. At most, a separate attention for diversity may help people to better take such an existing diversity into account, and not to forget the countless ways in which one can have exclusivist ideas and in which one can treat things and people unjustly. In addition to inclusivity, diversity is, strictly speaking, not only superfluous, putting such a diversity on the same level as inclusivity makes a mockery of inclusivity, when diversity is taken literally. On top of this, the lack of conceptual clarity and purity in diversity thinking reaches rock bottom in the acronym DEI —the genitive singular form of Deus such as occurring in Imago Dei; and as found too in the deity and to deify—, a label callously offensive to those believing in the denominational primacy, not of one or more gods and/or demons, but of norms and/or values, among which the norm of inclusivity and the values of inclusivity and relevance.

The definitions of diversity which make use of include and encompass clearly illustrate that it is all about inclusivity (or neutral-inclusivity). And this inclusivity does not demand any difference, let alone, the greatest number of greatest differences. What it demands is that the different persons and different things that do exist be treated on an equal footing with respect to a common goal acceptable and respectable from the perspective of inclusivity (and neutrality) itself.

M. Vincent van Mechelen
81.NML