In section 1.2.2 three ways have been mentioned in which every type of discrimination may be manifested: an intermediary, an affirmative and an exemplary way. Words like way and type are still very vague, but now we can be more precise: the intermediary, affirmative and exemplary manifestations of componential, dimensional or integral exclusivisms are their operational manifestations. They differ in the agency thru which the exisms operate, that is, in the manner of taking effect. If there is no intermediate agency thru which a componential or higher-level exclusivism operates, or produces an effect, the exclusivism is either affirmative or exemplary. (Both of them are therefore 'nonintermediary operations'.) As mentioned before: in the case of an affirmative manifestation of exclusivism a distinction need in principle only be made once. If it is active and abnegational, it is a form of exclusionism. The antithesis of this is integrationism.

In the case of an exemplary manifestation of exclusivism it is an unequal or disproportional frequency distribution which betrays the fact that a nonrelevant distinction is made or present in a certain sequence of examples, actions or occurrences. Nonetheless, also in an exemplary operation the object of exclusivism is literally the immediate object of exclusion or exclusivity. We will not subdivide the exemplary operations of exclusivism any further, but there is one affirmative operation which deserves some special attention here, namely existential exclusivism. This is an operational manifestation of exism in which something in the universe is made exclusive (if aggrandizemental) by regarding it as the sole reality, or in which something is excluded (if abnegational) by not regarding it as part of reality (while its existence is at least as plausible as that of qualities or classes which are taken to exist). Typical examples are those of philosophers or other people who claim that everything is material or that everything is nonmaterial, if not a dream; and those of politicians or other people who claim that there are no members of a certain political, denominational or sexual orientation living in their country. (These latter cases are actually hybridisms of nationalism and certain kinds of existential interideological exism or existential erotic exism.)

In the event that an exclusion or exclusivity takes place with the intermediary of language, the symbols or norms of a denominational doctrine, or other such agency, it may be labeled "an intermediary (operation of) exclusivism". Altho there are innumerable ways of excluding something or someone, or of making something or someone exclusive, it is of paramount importance to recognize that there are many intermediary manifestations of exclusivism besides its affirmative and exemplary ones. For example, a certain exclusive theory or practise may have infiltrated into the language, or a certain exclusive attitude may dominate a particular ideology. To fight sexism, ethnocentrism and all other forms of integral exclusivism is also to fight the intermediary manifestations of sexism, ethnocentrism and all other forms of integral exclusivism.

When it is language which is the transmitting medium, we will call the intermediary exism "a lingual (operation of) exclusivism". (Such a lingual exism must not be confused with a 'linguistic exclusivism' which is an integral exism with language, or something linguistic, itself as object.) One of the processes underlying lingual exism is 'semantic generalization' by means of which emotional responses are said to be generalized not only from objects to words, but also from words to objects, and from words to other words with similar meanings. It is generally agreed upon that the emotional components of beliefs, or of attitudes, can be created by the emotive connotations that words and phrases transfer along with their meanings. And that without the subject even having to come into contact with the object itself. The lingual transmission of emotional responses is but one aspect of lingual exclusivism. Also the grammar and general vocabulary of language itself can convey, and continue to convey, irrelevantist conceptions for a very long period of time. (In order not to be so indecent as to offend ad nauseam against traditional standards of lingual, inter- and infrafactorial gender-related exism no examples shall be given here again.)

A second intermediary operational manifestation we should distinguish is 'the emblematic (operation of) exclusivism'. This is the effectuation of exclusivism by means of emblems, that is, objects or figures of objects which symbolize and suggest another object or idea, or symbols, figures or devices adopted as identifying marks. The object or idea suggested may be exclusivistic itself, but it may also be that the use of the emblem as such is exclusivistic. In the latter case emblematic exclusivism can also denote the use of a linguistic or infraideological symbol. Yet, if, and insofar as, the symbol itself is a means to effectuate, or a product of, exclusivism, we shall speak of "lingual" and "(infra)ideological exclusivism" respectively. A notorious example of emblematic exclusivism is the exclusive display of the emblem of one particular ideology by the state or another organization which is supposed to represent people of different ideologies, or all citizens regardless of their ideology. (When such an emblem is ostentatiously put on coins or bills, the ideology which is meant to profit from it is often a theodemonical creation. The irony of this situation is that both emblem and devil derive from ballein: en-ballein, that is, (to) throw in and diaballein, that is, (to) throw across, slander. And indeed, emblematic exclusivism is not only an instrument to impress others with the power and influence of the reigning state ideology, but also a way to misrepresent and damage the reputation of those people and beliefs which cannot be associated with the ideology emblematized.)

Also in a purely ideological context (which is not non- or interideological) exclusivism can, and often does, operate in an intermediary manner, particularly in the field of denominationalism. The kind of operations here concerned are 'infraideological (operations of) exclusivism'. (Note that emblematic exclusivism is interideological if its object is a type of ideology.) When the intermediary is an ideology's doxastic norm, or the formulation or interpretation of such a norm, the operation will be termed "normative" in this Model. An obscene expression of normative sexualism is, for example, the theist commandment that the desire of a woman ought to be to her husband, and that her husband ought to rule over her (without the reverse being demanded as well). Other norms are often formulated in a more indirect way, and altho less obvious, may express a much more serious (if not horrendous) form of normative exclusivism. Thus the 'Supreme Being' of a theodemonical ideology may order 'His' followers to exterminate all people who do things he personally dislikes, and who believe things he personally disbelieves. The doxastic norm is, then, simply not to do or believe what is such a god's abomination, however much his extreme, supernatural hatred may be founded in favoritism towards what the authors of his own scriptures used to love and believe in front of their neighbors.

The form of intermediary exclusivism inherent in the norms of theocentrist ideologies for which norms are nothing else than products of a divine will, can hardly be distinguished from that kind of operation in which not the theist norm, but the god itself is the medium of exclusion or exclusivity. Yet, in other respects the difference is a clear one, and therefore we will indeed differentiate normative exclusivism and 'principal exclusivism', of which supreme and nonsupreme, divine exclusivism are not the only manifestations. Since the principal being of an ideology is not necessarily a god, principal exclusivism is of a higher classificatory level than the form of exclusion or exclusivity which operates thru the belief in a divine agency. In the context of exclusivism, however, denominational principal beings are either gods (when believed to be normatively superior) or demons (when believed to be normatively inferior). But more important than this subdivision is the distinction between the supreme being believed in and all other, nonsupreme principal beings. Therefore it is supreme exclusivism which should have the honor of being distinguished first, that is, before nonsupreme divine and demonical exclusivisms. Supreme exclusivism is found in a mono- or henotheist ideology which projects (irrelevantist) exclusiveness or an exclusion onto its supreme being, or onto one of this being's images or avatars. If the supreme being or its incarnation(s) are believed to be necessarily and/or exclusively, say, men, this is a supreme manifestation of aggrandizing male exism (X.582.50.4.21). Moreover, if they are believed to be necessarily and/or exclusively male beings by males (especially the male authors of sacred scriptures), this is a case of supreme self-aggrandizing male exism (X.582.50.8.21). Since we are, in this chapter, ultimately concerned with the principle of relevance, and not with that of truth, we will not consider the question here whether the supreme being does really exist; and if so, whether it is a human or anthropomorphic being (or something different altogether); and if so, whether it is a monosexual being; and if so, whether it is a male being; and if so, whether it is a man (and if so, whether it is a father). What we are presently concerned with is, firstly, that even if it did exist, and even if it were a man, its being a man (and father and/or son) would not be relevant (saving, perhaps, when artificially inseminating virgins or mothers who have to remain immaculate). Secondly, it is in the choice of the belief in the type of being which is to receive the epithet supreme that the irrelevant distinction is made of (only) linking maleness up with supremeness. (And we are talking about supremeness, not just about something like divinity or courtesy ladyship.)

This time the cladogram belonging to our classificatory survey (figure F.2.1.5.1) shows both the operational manifestations of exclusivism and the antithetical facets of inclusivity. For, unlike dimensional and componential manifestations, different operational manifestations of the same higher-level exism are usually antithetical to a different facet of inclusivity. This is so, particularly because the immediate object of exclusion or exclusivity may be different, even tho the ultimate object is not. Thus the immediate object of an infraideological exism is an ideological entity (such as a real or imaginary, principal being or norm), of an emblematic exism an emblem or similar symbol, and of a lingual exism a linguistic entity (such as a word). Not only do these objects differ from each other, they also differ from the object of the nonintermediary manifestations which are the ultimate object of the intermediary ones as well. Where the immediate objects of exclusivism are different for operational manifestations, the facets of inclusivity pertaining to them must also be different. Moreover, even the 'objects' of nonintermediary manifestations are dissimilar in a sense. However, when the object distinguished on a lower level is itself the product of an exclusivist activity, there is no facet of inclusivity to be subdivided any further. This is the case when nonsupreme principal exclusivism (operational manifestation 20) is subdivided into demonical and nonsupreme divine exclusivism (op.man. 40 & 41). Here the antithesis remains as it is: the nonsupreme principal facet of inclusivity (operational facet 20) with the supreme facet of inclusivity (op.f. 21), itself a facet of principal infraideological inclusivity (op.f. 10).