The principle of catenated neutrality is a principle of being, that is, of the normativeness of being. It is on this principle that catenated neutrality --or certain superior forms of (catenated) neutrality, to be more precise-- is a performatory value in our normative model. Since superior neutrality does not relate to acting persons in particular, it is also a nonagential value. The principle of neutrality actually colligates several traditional nonagential values like stability, harmony, equilibrium, and also equality, under one universal value. As a universal and axiomatic value neutrality is of course an ultimate value as well. And as an ultimate value it is also a perfective value. To sum up: ananormatively superior neutrality is as a value, firstly, performatory and nonagential and secondly, axiomatic, ultimate and perfective.

An ultimate value is always perfective, but penultimate values can be perfective, corrective or instrumental. Furthermore, there are as many penultimative perfective values as there are types of catenas of superior neutrality. It is the neutrality of every such type of catena which is superior to concatenate unneutralities, and neutralness as a secondary predicate is, as it were, the common denominator for all these neutralities. Hence, the neutrality of a basic catena is a penultimate value, and so is the neutrality of the bivariant difference catena. This latter neutrality, which is called "equality", is therefore a derivative value which is penultimate and perfective. But there is, in turn, a great variety of bivariant difference catenas, and specific types of equality are antepenultimate or of a lower derivative level. Yet, however low their derivative level, they remain perfective.

The positivity of any neutrality-differentiation or -time-differential catena is a corrective value from the ananormative standpoint. In general this kind of positivity is a penultimate value. The positivity of 'the' neutrality-differentation catena and of 'the' neutrality-differential catena with respect to time are, then, antepenultimate as values per se and penultimate as corrective values. Any state of being, force or act which causes positive neutrality-differentiation, that is, a decrease of polarity, is an instrumental value. The relationship between instrumental value and corrective or perfective value is of a physical or empirical nature. Hence, it is on the basis of scientific knowledge or empirical assumptions too that we can be justified in considering a certain state of being, force or action valuable. The term nanaic refers both to what is neutral-directed from a purely catenical perspective and to what is neutral-directed from an empirical perspective. Nanaicity in general is a penultimate ananormative value, whether it is corrective or instrumental. Corrective nanaicity is nothing else than the kind of positivity already mentioned as a penultimate value. (Note that, if the distinctions are made, nanaic stands to nanapolar as neutrally catenal to neutral in the strict sense, since it is the primary thing itself which is nanaic, while the predicate this thing has is nanapolar.)

Ananormative values like neutrality, equality and nanaicity are nonagential and apply both to the material and to the nonmaterial ground-world, both to nature and to nonnature (or culture), both to personal and to nonpersonal beings. For example, not only is the action of a person who promotes some form of superior neutrality nanaic, but also a physical force like the force of gravity is nanaic. Nonetheless, a physical force is nanaic or not, whereas a person's action which is not nanaic was, perhaps, intended to be nanaic (or, if it is nanaic, was, perhaps, even not intended to be nanaic). That is why the Book of Instruments teaches us to distinguish performatory values from intentional and motivational values, and performatory ethics from decision-theoretical ethics (in I.7.2). So far we have only listed performatory values. The nonperformatory ananormative value which plays a role too is 'anafactiveness' or 'anafaction'. (The form -factive in anafactive is an adjectival combining form meaning making or causing; for -faction in anafaction compare benefaction. We will see later under what conditions benefaction is a special type of anafaction.)

Anafactive means having the intention to be neutrally catenal or nanaic. If having the intention is indeed the only thing that counts, the value concerned is purely intentional. This is intentional anafactiveness or anafaction. Strictly speaking, the motive of a person's action or behavior could then still be something else than neutrality. To make sure that neutrality or nanaicity is also the moral decision-maker's motive, one could speak of "motivational anafactiveness". Anafactiveness in general is a decision-theoretical value, intentional anafactiveness an intentional, and motivational anafactiveness a motivational value. What is motivational anafactiveness in neutralism is 'virtuousness' or 'a virtue' in terms of traditional morality. However, anafactiveness is an uncontaminated word without the ancient stain of exclusivist badness inherent in virtue. (See I.7.2.1.)

It needs no further explanation that the main values of neutralism are perfective neutrality proper, nanaicity or nanapolarity and anafactiveness. Something that is neutrally catenal (and ananormatively superior) is not nanaic with regard to the same catena and, even if it is a person, need not be anafactive; something that is nanaic is not neutrally catenal with regard to the same catena, and need not be anafactive either; and a person who is anafactive need not be neutrally catenal, nor act nanaically, with regard to the same catena. Thus neutrality, nanaicity and anafactiveness are really three different values. In the end it is neutrality tho, which is the ultimate value; nanaicity, nanapolarity and anafactiveness are 'only' penultimate values.

It might be objected that nonultimate values like nanaicity and anafactiveness are still very general and 'abstract', neutralist values. That they are as general as they can be is correct, yet we will not continue our analysis here with a discussion of antepenultimate and lower-level, derivative values. First of all, our present subject is the values of neutralism as neutralism. We could, for example, take equality as a penultimate perfective value and discuss the different types of equality as antepenultimate perfective values, but such would amount to a treatment of the values of egalitarianism. Naturally, egalitarianism (if relevantistic) is part of neutralism, but --and this is the second reason-- we will treat of equality and the principle of equality, and of a number of other, 'more concrete' values and principles later in this chapter, and in the chapters following. There is another question, also a rather 'abstract' one, which demands our attention first. It is To what does one commit oneself by recognizing an ananormative value or goal?.