Proselytizing supernaturalists love to pose questions like how do you know that there is no life after death? or how do you know that God does not exist?. Such questions are hypocritical, because the supernaturalist does not know the answers 'imself either. Yet, such questions need not be inappropriate when a nonbeliever does actually claim that 'e 'knows that life after death and God do not exist'. Naturally, many supernaturalists are completely unable to make a distinction between the claim or belief that something does not exist and the absence of a claim or belief that something does exist. They do not realize that it is one thing to be an a(nti)theist who argues that a supernatural or supreme being named "God" does not exist, and quite another to be an agnostic or someone who is not denominationally interested and who neither argues that something or someone by that name exists, nor that it or 'he' does not exist. (For the agnostic and the antitheist the question of Mono's existence is as relevant as for the theist, but we will see that for us as normists the question itself is irrelevant on the highest level.)

The supernaturalist does not really have to be capable of distinguishing between a belief that something does not exist and the absence of a belief that something does exist; what suffices for 'im in point of fact is that 'e can differentiate a belief which 'e knows to be false and any other kind of belief. The reason is that 'er principle of truth merely requires from 'im that 'e do not lie. In other words, that 'e do not contend and --for 'imself-- believe something which 'e knows to be untrue. Supernaturalist ideologies have no substantive criterion whatsoever for the infinite number of cases that the falsity of a statement cannot be proved. What is worse, a supernaturalist has only to make sure that what 'e tells children or other people cannot be falsified or made implausible in any way. Such is preferably done by means of expressions which have never been univocally defined, and by means of proper names which have never been assigned to particular individuals. Thus a supernaturalist can utter the most nonsensical, absurd and implausible statements without feeling forced to believe that 'e does not take the truth seriously, provided at least that 'e does not lie intentionally. But this is, of course, the most narrow and egregious interpretation of the principle of truth one can think of and subscribe to.

If truth were really such an extremely limited affair as supernaturalist (and certain naturalist) creations cause innocent human beings to believe, every person could say that 'e will die tomorrow, for instance, because 'e cannot know today that 'e does not die tomorrow. Every person could argue that the world will end the day after tomorrow because no-one can know today that it does not end the day after tomorrow. Every person could claim that there is an all-beautiful being named "Dog" living in a place or on a planet named "the nevaeh" (or an all-ugly being named "Lived" being dead in a place or on a planet named "the lleh"), because no-one can prove that Dog and the nevaeh do not exist, and that Dog does not live in the nevaeh (or that Lived is not dead in the lleh). These and all suchlike flights of fancy are supernaturalist illusions and delusions, however effective and 'natural' their dissemination by the Ministry of Love or other such agencies may once have been (or still is). And this is what truthful people must reject, not necessarily because it is known to be false, but because no sincere person has a reason to assume that it is true, let alone literally true.

In the doctrine of neutral-inclusivity the principle of truth is interpreted in such a manner that one should only say that something is the case if one can prove that it is the case, or if one can make it plausible that it was, is or will be the case, or made the case. This plausible must be understood in a scientific or otherwise non-supernatural, realist sense, and definitely not in the sense of millenniums or centuries old, sacred books. It is also to apply to the supernatural or theodemonical promises and comminations in such books. And if the truth of an utterance about the future depends on oneself, then a way of making it true is not only by fulfilling a promise or carrying out a threat, but also by not promising something or threatening with something, when one is not able or likely to make it come true. No narrower interpretation of the principle of truth than this one can deserve the epithet veridical. (Taking into consideration that veridical derives from verus meaning true and dicere meaning (to) say.) Our neutral-inclusivist position with respect to the principle of truth shall therefore be called "veridicalism".

Being the antithesis of supernaturalism, our veridicalism shows in a fundamental preference of the plausible to the false or farfetched. (The veridicalist word is not made flashy but well-balanced.) In literature and in other fields of art fantasies do not have to be taken seriously, and utterances not literally. In fundamental denominationalism, however, we prefer to see the real world presented as a theater in which purposes are unfolded which are, first of all, not sure nor likely to be extreme, exclusive or extravagant.

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