Proselytizing supernaturalists love to pose questions
like how do you know that there is no life after death? or
how do you know that God does not exist?. Such questions
are hypocritical, because the supernaturalist does not know the
answers 'imself either. Yet,
such questions need not be inappropriate when a nonbeliever does
actually claim that 'e
'knows that life after death and God do not exist'. Naturally,
many supernaturalists are completely unable to make a distinction
between the claim or belief that something does not exist
and the absence of a claim or belief that something does exist.
They do not realize that it is one thing to be an a(nti)theist
who argues that a supernatural or supreme being named "God" does
not exist, and quite another to be an agnostic or someone who is
not denominationally interested and who neither argues that
something or someone by that name exists, nor that it or 'he'
does not exist. (For the agnostic and the antitheist the
question of Mono's existence is as relevant as for the theist,
but we will see that for us as normists the question itself is
irrelevant on the highest level.)
The supernaturalist does not really have to be capable of
distinguishing between a belief that something does not exist
and the absence of a belief that something does exist; what
suffices for 'im in point of fact is that 'e can differentiate a
belief which 'e knows to be false and any other kind of
belief. The reason is that 'er
principle of truth merely requires from 'im that 'e do not lie.
In other words, that 'e do
not contend and --for 'imself-- believe something which 'e knows
to be untrue. Supernaturalist ideologies have no substantive
criterion whatsoever for the infinite number of cases that the
falsity of a statement cannot be proved. What is worse, a
supernaturalist has only to make sure that what 'e tells children
or other people cannot be falsified or made implausible in any way.
Such is preferably done by means of expressions which have never
been univocally defined, and by means of proper names which have
never been assigned to particular individuals. Thus a
supernaturalist can utter the most nonsensical, absurd and
implausible statements without feeling forced to believe that 'e
does not take the truth seriously, provided at least that 'e
does not lie intentionally. But this is, of course, the most
narrow and egregious interpretation of the principle of truth
one can think of and subscribe to.
If truth were really such an extremely limited affair as
supernaturalist (and certain naturalist) creations cause innocent
human beings to believe, every person could say that 'e
will die tomorrow, for instance, because 'e cannot know today
that 'e does not die tomorrow. Every person could argue that the
world will end the day after tomorrow because no-one can know
today that it does not end the day after tomorrow. Every person
could claim that there is an all-beautiful being named "Dog"
living in a place or on a planet named "the nevaeh" (or an
all-ugly being named "Lived" being dead in a place or on a
planet named "the lleh"), because no-one can prove that Dog and
the nevaeh do not exist, and that Dog does not live in the
nevaeh (or that Lived is not dead in the lleh). These and all
suchlike flights of fancy are supernaturalist illusions and
delusions, however effective and 'natural' their dissemination
by the Ministry of Love or other such agencies may once have
been (or still is). And this is what truthful people must
reject, not necessarily because it is known to be false, but
because no sincere person has a reason to assume that it is
true, let alone literally true.
In the doctrine of neutral-inclusivity
the principle of truth
is interpreted in such a manner that one should only say that
something is the case if one can prove that it is the case, or
if one can make it plausible that it was, is or will be the
case, or made the case. This plausible must be understood in
a scientific or otherwise non-supernatural, realist sense, and
definitely not in the sense of millenniums or centuries old,
sacred books. It is also to apply to the supernatural or
theodemonical promises and
comminations in such books. And if
the truth of an utterance about the future depends on oneself,
then a way of making it true is not only by fulfilling a promise
or carrying out a threat, but also by not promising something or
threatening with something, when one is not able or likely to
make it come true. No narrower interpretation of the principle
of truth than this one can deserve the epithet veridical.
(Taking into consideration that veridical derives from
verus meaning true and dicere meaning (to)
say.) Our neutral-inclusivist position with respect to the
principle of truth shall therefore be called "veridicalism".
Being the antithesis of supernaturalism, our veridicalism
shows in a fundamental preference of the plausible to the false
or farfetched. (The veridicalist word is not made flashy but
well-balanced.) In literature and in other fields of art
fantasies do not have to be taken seriously, and utterances not
literally. In fundamental denominationalism, however, we prefer
to see the real world presented as a theater in which purposes
are unfolded which are, first of all, not sure nor likely to be
extreme, exclusive or extravagant.
4.3.4.0
TRUTH, RELEVANCE AND NEUTRALITY TOGETHER
Truth in isolation is not
worth anything
Reflections on truth cannot be separated
from reflections on relevancy.
Some might argue
that truth also involves the question
whether it is true or not
whether something is relevant or not.
That's true,
but relevancy also involves the question
whether it is relevant or not
whether something is true or not.
Everyone interested in truth must always choose
between infinitely many conditions or propositions, and
between different descriptions of the entities involved.
The question 'e will always be confronted with is:
what do i base my choice upon?,
why assert the one truth and not the other? or
why apply the one description and not the other?.
The distinctions 'e draws
--because in choosing 'e does draw distinctions--
must then be relevant ones.
While a truthful thinker of the past sought for
truth in isolation,
the sincere thinker of the future will seek for
relevance as well.
Truth and relevance in isolation
are not worth anything either
Reflections on truth cannot be separated
from reflections on relevance.
Some might argue
that truth and relevancy also involve the question
whether it is true or not
whether something is the focus of relevance or not.
That's true,
but if truth and relevance cannot be separated from each other,
the search for truth is itself dependent
on its own focus of relevancy.
Everyone interested in truth and relevance must always choose
'er own focus of relevancy first in order to assess
what is relevant or not with respect to this determinant.
The question 'e will always be confronted with is:
what should this focus of relevancy be?.
The neutralist will then opt for a neutral determinant.
And if it's true
that there are reasons not to opt for neutrality in one respect,
'e will opt for neutrality in another, more basic respect.
Only then will 'e accept polarity in the former respect.
The neutralist will not seek for
truth and relevance in isolation.
'E will seek for neutrality above all.
And it is by realizing this
that truth, relevance and neutrality become of supreme value
together.