The system of disciplinary thought centering round the norm of neutrality or ananorm is neutralism. Neutrality is the ultimate end, purpose or 'telos' of neutralism. The system of disciplinary thought centering round both the norm of neutrality and the norm of inclusivity is neutralism-inclusivism or neutral-inclusivism. Neutral-inclusivity is the general, ultimate value of neutral-inclusivism. The system of disciplinary thought centering round the norms of neutrality and inclusivity and the veridicalist interpretation of the principle of truth is what we have called "the doctrine of neutral-inclusivity" or "DNI". This doctrine is a goal-duty-based doctrine, and so are the neutral-inclusivist and neutralist components of it. Goal is, then, to be understood in a wide, past-, present- and future-regarding, causal and noncausal sense. The DNI does recognize rights too, but they are intrinsic rights derived from neutral-inclusive or truth-related, doctrinal goals. That is why our ideology is, doctrinally speaking, goal-duty-based or teleological. On the other hand it is, metadoctrinally speaking, right-duty-based or rights-theoretical. This agrees with an interideologically inclusive attitude towards adherence to the DNI itself. The extrinsic right in question is the right to personhood which is based on the sole practical metadoctrinal principle espoused by us in addition to the principles of the doctrine of neutral-inclusivity.

The recognition of the doctrinal principle of neutrality leads within the bounds of neutral-inclusivism itself to the formulation of both distributive goals like those of equality and nondistributive goals like well-being and the minimization of unhappiness or suffering. Besides this the recognition of the doctrinal principle of relevance demands from us nondiscrimination and respect for persons. Altho the ananorm and the norm of inclusivity together seem sufficient to guarantee people's autonomy and bodily integrity, personhood requires that every person be treated as such regardless of the first-order doctrine 'e or anyone else embraces. While in our case the DNI is fully compatible with the right to personhood, there are but too many ideologies or normative doctrines for which this has not held, or for which this still does not hold.

For those who distinguish first- from second-order reasons, it might be said that the doctrinal principles of the DNI provide us with first-order reasons to act or not to act in a certain way. Or, it might be said that the doctrine's intrinsic rights and duties are first-order reasons. The right to personhood, or the metadoctrinal principle of personhood, however, provides us with a second-order reason not to do a certain act. In general second-order reason has been defined as reason to act or to refrain from acting for some reason. Since rights of personhood are nonactivating, the second-order reason concerned is always a reason to refrain from acting for some reason. Such second-order reasons have been termed "exclusionary", but they have nothing to do with the type of exclusion or exclusiveness as denounced in the norm of inclusivity. So the metadoctrinal principle can --if not in practise, then at least theoretically-- confront us with a so-called 'exclusionary' reason not to act in accordance with the DNI. The reason is then that acting on one of our doctrine's principles would infringe a right of personhood, that is, the extrinsic right of a person who is not willing to cooperate with us, while having the right not to cooperate with us. But the knife cuts both ways: if adherents of the DNI do not have the right to impose their own principles on nonadherents of the DNI (and they do not have that right), then adherents of supernaturalist, exclusivist, extremist and lesser unneutralist doctrines do not have the right either to impose their beliefs, institutions and symbols on adherents of the DNI.

The doctrine of neutral-inclusivity is a normative doctrine, and the principle of personhood a normative principle. The normative system of disciplinary thought which comprises both, and which is our denominational ideology or 'doctrine' in the widest sense, may therefore be referred to as "the Norm". The Norm is a proper name but obviously not an arbitrary one. No other proper name can more clearly and adequately express that our ideology is a normist instead of a theocentrist one. (In the last chapter of this book we will further discuss the position of this proper name in the antithesis between normism and theocentrism.) To emphasize that our denominational doctrine is not just a normist denominational doctrine, we shall speak of "the Ananorm", that is, the Norm of neutrality or the Norm of neutral-inclusivity. The proper adjective belonging to it is Ananormative.

There is one pillar which supports neutralism, namely the ananorm. There are two pillars which support neutral-inclusivism, namely the previous one and the norm of inclusivity. There are three pillars which support the DNI, namely the previous ones and the principle of truth. And finally, there are four pillars which support the total normative edifice of the Ananorm, namely the previous ones and the right to personhood. It is these four normative pillars we shall hold on to in this Model. They are listed in figure F.4.4.1.1.